

POLIHEURISTIC THEORY AND ALLIANCE DEPENDENCE:  
UNDERSTANDING MILITARY COALITIONS

A Dissertation

by

JOON GUAN PARK

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of  
Texas A&M University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 2010

Major Subject: Political Science

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Approved by:

Co-Chairs of Committee,	Alex Mintz
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## ABSTRACT

Poliheuristic Theory and Alliance Dependence:

Understanding Military Coalitions. (May 2010)

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This dissertation examines an increasingly common phenomenon in the post-Cold War context, the military coalition. At the heart of the dissertation is thus the question: what explains political leaders' participation and burden-sharing decisions on military coalitions? In tackling the question, two distinct lines of research were brought together; the one based on alliances, the other based on foreign policy decision making. Based on the two lines of research, an explanatory framework was developed that combined the insights of alliance dependence thesis and poliheuristic theory.

A set of hypotheses was derived and tested, utilizing a multimethod approach: statistical, case study, and experimental analyses.

Overall, the results of applying the multimethod approach is suggestive of the strength of the poliheuristic theory, with a supporting role of alliance dependence thesis, in understanding participation and burden-sharing decisions on military coalitions. Moreover, though in large part the second Iraq War (2003 -) was used as the reference in much of the dissertation, an implicit underlying claim of the current research is that the findings may be extended to any broad context wherein the development of a military coalition may be a possibility.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION AND THEORY

This dissertation attempts to address state behavior with respect to decisions on an increasingly common post-Cold War alliance type – the military coalition, a form of limited alliance. The dissertation is leveraged at answering the following question: what explains political leaders' participation and burden-sharing decisions on military coalitions? This chapter presents the current state of the literature on the topic, and illustrates the possibility of fruitfully exploring two distinct lines of research related to the topic. Based on a reading of the relevant literature and the main explanatory framework, a set of hypotheses is derived. This introductory chapter also presents a discussion of the main methods used to investigate the principal research question.

#### **FPDM and Mid-level Theorizing**

Over the years, foreign policy analysis has witnessed the development of several mid-range theories for understanding foreign policy decision making (FPDM) and outcomes, including bureaucratic politics (Allison, 1971; Art, 1973; Maoz, 1990; Ripley, 1995; Kaarbo, 1998), operational code (George, 1969, 1979, 1997; Holsti, O., 1970; Foyle, 1997; Walker et al, 1998; Walker, 2003), personality/distance-profiling (Hermann, 1974, 1984; Kaarbo and Hermann, 1998; Preston, 2001), image/schema/maps (Holsti, 1976; Axelrod, 1976; Hermann et al, 1997; Schafer, 1997; Lepgold and Lamborn, 2001), decision units (Janis, 1972; Hermann et al, 1987; Garrison, 1999, 2001; Gaenslen, 1992; Hagan and Hermann, 2001; Haney, 1997; Hoyt and Garrison, 1997; Redd, 2002; Schafer and Crichlow, 2002; Kowert, 2002), and role theory (Holsti, K., 1970; Wish, 1980; Walker, 1987, 2003; Chafetz et al, 1996). Despite this, however, the

field has still lagged behind in scientific development, relative to other, more “realist-grounded” theories in IR, such as alliance theory, deterrence theory, power theory, etc. This, at least in part, may owe to the fact that past research on foreign policy decision making (FPDM) has been hampered by a less-than faithful attention to at least two types of generalizable comparisons: cross-national and cross-theoretical (Kaarbo, 2003).

Most studies in foreign policy decision making tend to reflect a U.S.-centric bias (Smith, 1986; Neack et al, 1995; Hudson and Vore, 1995; Light, 1994; White, 1999), as well as tending to an over-reliance on the related U.S. use of force literature to draw inferences (eg. Ostrom and Job, 1986; Powlick, 1991; Holsti, 1992; James and Oneal, 1991; Jacobs and Page, 2005). Where there may be exceptions, and where a more cross-national study is attempted, the focus also often tends to be limited to advanced industrial democracies in specific geographical domains, such as Western Europe (Foyle, 2003). This may be akin to what is typically found in many other topical fields of investigation in the discipline, such as economic voting where most comparative studies, until of late, have tended to focus disproportionately on Western Europe (eg. Powell and Whitten, 1993; Whitten and Palmer, 1999). This situation in FPDM may, in part, be explained by a lack of systematic tools, such as multi-country surveys, that are necessary for undertaking proper cross-national studies. Thus, albeit the implied corrective may hold mainly for correlational-type of empirical investigations, this is a glaring weakness of the FPDM field, and one that deserves to be tackled.

At least one of the aims of incorporating a more explicitly cross-theoretical<sup>1</sup> method of investigation is to compare and contrast relevant competing explanations for properly understanding a phenomena in foreign policy. A more explicitly cross-theoretical investigation will, thus, tend to contribute to the weeding-out of alternative explanations, in favor of the most plausible one (George and Bennett, 2005). As well, theoretical comparisons tend to make more transparent the strengths and weaknesses of various explanations of a common phenomenon which, in turn, allow for a possible integration of different insights. However, to date, and with the exception of a few studies (eg. Allison, 1971; Allison and Zelikow, 1999; Mintz, 1993; Redd, 2002; Brulé,



2005), there has very much been a dearth of such consciously cross-theoretical investigations in FPDM.

Indeed, the proposition that causal inferences acquire greater strength and meaning when they are less context-bound - such as to particular spatial or temporal domains – is, in most circumstances, unlikely to be vigorously challenged<sup>2</sup>. However, the neglect of such aforementioned necessary cross-national and cross-theoretical comparisons has hampered the development of “normal science” and creation of generalizable findings required for advancement of the field of foreign policy decision making (Rosenau, 1968; Hudson and Vore, 1995; Carlsnaes, 2002; Kaarbo, 2003). A need to address these types of neglect thus forms a part of the motivational basis of the current study. A slightly different problem seems to exist in the area of alliance research.

### **Limited Alliances: Military Coalitions in Alliance Research**

Unlike with “alignments”<sup>3</sup>, the “military coalition” shares in common with the “alliance”<sup>4</sup> the expectation of some joint use of force in the event of conflict. Thus, a first cut of the argument suggests that a “military coalition” can be thought of as a particular type of alliance, albeit one that is both more temporally-circumscribed, more mission-specific and/or target-specific, and less formally institutionalized (O’Halloran, 2000; Dibb, 2002; Tertrais, 2004) than is usually denoted by the conventional term “alliance”. Hence, it may be accurate to term such an entity as a form of “limited alliance”. From a historical perspective, the military coalition, has been atypical compared to the traditional alliance. However, some obvious historical examples can be pointed out. During the 19<sup>th</sup> Century Napoleonic Wars, for instance, there existed numerous European military coalitions, or limited alliances, arrayed against France. In the second part of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, during the Cold War, some of the more notable international conflicts involving limited alliances, include: Korean War (1950), Vietnam War (1965), Lebanon (1982), Suez Crisis (1956), and Grenada (1990). In the post-Cold War period, limited alliances formed in the first Gulf War (1990), Somalia (1993), Kosovo (1999), and Afghanistan (2002) among others.

By way of a reminder, some of the broader theories on conventional alliances include collective goods/benefits approaches (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Thies, 1987), structural balance from a system-level perspective (McDonald and Rosecrance, 1985; Snyder, 1997), formal game-theoretic accounts (Wagner, 1983; Niou and Ordeshook, 1994), and rational choice (Altfeld, 1984; McGinnis, 1990). For the most part, however, most such traditional theories of alliance formation and development fail to give systematic treatment to the concept of “coalition”, a key concept in limited alliances. An exception to this theoretical lacuna may be Riker’s (1962) game-theoretic, coalition theory with its focus on the “size principle” and “minimum winning coalition”. It is claimed that the basic tenets of the theory can be applied to understand coalition politics in international settings (Riker, 1962: 211-46; also, Alpert and Bernstein, 1974). However, the theory has not convincingly overcome a myriad of theoretical, conceptual, and measurement issues that consequently hinder its broader applicability in international settings (Russett, 1968; Kaplan, 1963). At least one problematical issue has to do with the observation that - outside of a self-enforcing body such as the U.N. whose activities require adherence to majority vote - coalition politics in interstate relations, such as alliance formation, are rarely circumscribed by a need for “minimum winning coalition” (Russett, 1968)

On the other hand, however, when it comes to motivations or incentives for coalition formation or participation, the ideas of balancing and band-wagoning (Walt, 1987), associated with the structural balance approach, does still provide a useful starting point for the issues under consideration in this research. In its original formulation, Walt (1987) suggests that state behavior regarding alliances is motivated in part by two dominant concerns: the goal of balancing against a threat, and the goal of band-wagoning with the threat (or dominant power), against another state(s).

These ideas have been applied to understand coalition formation, or limited alliance, in the post-Cold War era in at least a couple of studies. Schweller (1994) suggests that, for many states, band-wagoning motives for economic gain principally drove their coalition participation in the first Gulf War (Iraq I). Similarly, in analyzing

state responses to the second Gulf War (Iraq II) coalition, Rhodes (2004) suggests that continental balancing goals motivated state behavior in the case of Germany and France, whereas a careful interplay of band-wagoning and “bridging” goals (ie. between Western Europe and the U.S.) drove the responses of most Central European countries.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, there exists a common *problematique* with these studies. Partaking of a common neorealist foundation – as typified in the broader approaches to alliances (ie. collective goods, structural balance, game theory, rational choice, etc) – these studies of military coalitions under-appreciate the internal dynamics of state behavior. In particular, the domestic factors and constraints that bear on decisions by the national leaders of the state regarding coalitions, or limited alliances, are more often than not ignored<sup>5</sup>.

### **Domestic Politics as Potential Common Ground**

Paradoxically, this general under-appreciation of the role of domestic level factors on *limited* alliances, such as military coalitions, has occurred concomitant with an increasing awareness of the impact of such factors on alliances *writ large*. Indeed, among scholars of traditional alliances, there has been an increasing recognition of the role of domestic constraints and pressures that may impact upon decisions on alliances. According to Snyder (1997: 143), for instance: “Much more common are cases in which the systemic constraints leave considerable room for choice [on alliances], and domestic constraints then determine actual choices, or at least narrow the range of choice”. Sources of such domestic level factors, or constraints, include individual-level considerations, such as the leader’s need to balance foreign policy choices with his/her need to maintain broad domestic coalitions to ensure continued political survival (eg. Bueno de Mesquita et al, 1999); indeed, as claimed by one observer, “shifts in [domestic] coalitions do alter alliances”. (Morrow, 2000). Domestic constraints may also include more macro-level factors such as characteristics of the regime. Pressured by such things as domestic audience costs (Fearon, 1994; Smith, 1998; Bueno de Mesquita et al,

1999), for instance, democratic regimes tend to make more credible and enduring alliance commitment choices, as compared to autocratic regimes.

This increasing recognition, within the traditional alliance literature, of the interplay between domestic and external factors seems to dovetail well with a long-held parallel trend in the sub-field of FPDM. But whereas in much of the past, the inescapable domestic logic of FPDM was largely limited to investigations of processes involving individual constraints (eg. cognition) and institutional constraints (eg. organizational pathologies) and their interaction with external pressures to effect outcomes, FPDM scholars are also now beginning to delve below these elite-level processes, to the society at large. In fact, borrowing in part from findings in other fields of the discipline, many are now beginning to understand that domestic public opinion often imparts important influences on elite-level processes in foreign policy choices both within the US (eg. Graham, 1994; Powlick and Katz, 1998; Foyle, 1997) and cross-nationally (eg. La Balme, 2000; Sinnott, 2000; Isernia et al, 2002). The “black-box” of foreign policy decision making may thus have to be enlarged to accommodate such potential interactions, as well as to better understand the conditions under which such interactions are most likely to occur, especially in non-US contexts (Foyle, 2003).

In sum then, though their different core working assumptions (Ripley, 1993) may be viewed by some as a mutual point of departure *sans* viable comparative analysis, both FPDM and the neorealist-based alliance literature<sup>6</sup>, do seem to converge with an increasing appreciation for the import of domestic level factors. This convergence on the domestic logic of the two research programs thus suggest an opening for a fruitful comparison of competing explanations for understanding foreign policy decisions on limited alliances, such as the military coalition.

### **Main Explanatory Framework: Poliheuristic Theory**

This study, then, attempts to demonstrate the relevance of some of these outstanding issues, and they inform the illustration of a credible explanation for understanding state decisions on participation in military coalitions. As the main

explanatory framework, then, this study principally employs the poliheuristic theory (PH) of foreign policy decision making (Mintz and Geva, 1997; Mintz et al, 1997; Mintz, 2003, 2004) to examine (non)participation decisions by various states in the second Gulf War coalition. In this section, a brief outline - including core assumptions - of the primary theoretical framework is presented.

### **Main Assumptions of Poliheuristic Theory**

In comparison to other theories of foreign policy decision making, a distinctive feature of the poliheuristic theory is its explicit recognition that political leaders employ a mixture of decision strategies. The decision process is sequential, and is divided into first and second stages. The first stage is dominated by cognitive processes, while the second stage is captured by analytic processes – either lexicographic or utility maximization, cost-benefit calculations associated with rational choice and expected-utility theories (eg. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita, 1984). Thus, the theory aims at bridging both cognitive and rational choice theories of decision making on war and peace, and conflict in general (Mintz, 2003).

A complex decision environment, characterized by time constraints, limited information, and stress is what a political leader often faces in times of crisis or conflict. Under such conditions, the decision-maker employs simple decision rules, or heuristics: in the first stage, cognitive shortcuts are used; in the second stage, a more analytic, expected-utility calculus is used, to arrive at final policy decision.

The decision process, particularly in the first stage, is underscored by five basic assumptions, or characteristics (Mintz and Geva, 1997: 84-7; Mintz, Geva, and DeRouen, 1994; Mintz, 2004): non-holistic search, dimension-based search, non-compensatory principle, satisficing principle, and order sensitivity. The initial stage of search for policy options is non-holistic because comparisons among options are made within certain narrow alternative set and attribute set. The search is also dimension-based in that each alternative policy option is examined along the most important dimension (eg. political dimension), and those that fail to meet a certain threshold are

rejected from further consideration (Mintz, 1993). The decision process is also driven by a non-compensatory principle: alternatives that are unacceptably low along a certain crucial dimension (eg. political dimension) cannot be compensated for by a higher value along another dimension (eg. economic or military). Such alternatives are, therefore, dismissed. Since alternatives are rejected or retained (for second stage) based on whether or not they are acceptable along a certain dimension – instead of all dimensions - the process is characterized as “satisficing”, rather than maximizing or optimizing. And the search for alternatives is order sensitive since the sequence or order in which dimensions (eg. political, military, economic, or strategic) are invoked have an impact on decision strategies and final choice.

In the second stage, the poliheuristic theory assumes that the decision process reflects a more analytic mode. Thus, the remaining alternatives (ie. retained alternative policy options) are examined sequentially along the other dimensions, based on standard cost-benefit calculations. Usually, these dimensions involve strategic and military interests (Mintz, 1993; DeRouen, 2002; Brulé, 2005), but can involve economic ones as well. The poliheuristic theory expects the final policy choice to be reflective of an option whose total benefits relative to costs are the highest, compared to the other options.

### **Non-compensatory Political Dimension and Loss Avoidance**

Political leaders, like all decision-makers, have a preference order. The usual primary preference for political leaders is the maintenance of power, attained in part through domestic popular support and approval. Leaders are thus naturally averse to policy options that entail possible losses (eg. decrease in support/approval of policy) in the domestic political arena.

Relatedly then, for political leaders, the domestic political consequences of policy choice is usually the most crucial factor, or dimension, in weighing policy alternatives. Indeed, “domestic politics is the essence of decision”(Mintz and Geva, 1997: 83; also, Mintz, 1993: 598-603). At a deeper level, moreover, this implies that political leaders are relatively more “loss averse” than “gain accepting” in this area. This

in turn suggests the logic of the non-compensatory principle: losses in the domestic political dimension cannot be compensated for, or offset, by gains in other dimensions (eg. economic or military dimensions).

### **Decision Process and Outcome**

A particular strength of the poliheuristic theory is that it connects decision processes with outcomes. In this vein, then, the cognitive-based, non-compensatory, political dimension of the first phase adds an important insight to the decision process that has heretofore been ignored in much of the conventional literature on alliances and, more specifically, military coalitions.

In relation to decisions on military coalition (non)participation, the poliheuristic theory suggests that cognitive motivations or preferences (ie. avoidance of political loss) act as an initial filter for weeding out acceptable from unacceptable policy options. Only those options that meet a certain threshold along this non-compensatory dimension will be considered by state leaders. The process then proceeds to the second stage where a more analytic calculation – based on either utility maximization or lexicographic considerations - will determine the final policy choice by the state's leader. The result or outcome of this poliheuristic decision process is the state's decision on (non) participation, as well as the level of such (eg. active military support versus passive military support).

Critically, however, and per the calls for a more comparative approach and a more conscientious cross-pollination of ideas and explanations (Rosenau, 1968; Hudson and Vore, 1995; Carlsnaes, 2002; Kaarbo, 2003), the alliance dependence thesis (Bennett et al, 1994) presents itself as an important component within the larger poliheuristic theory. In other words, though it is doubtful that alliance dependence thesis can stand on its own, it may still play an important role in the development of the poliheuristic model of military coalition formation.

### **Alliance Dependence (AD) Thesis**

Indeed, one relevant study<sup>7</sup> does come closer to addressing some of the aforementioned neglected issues in the alliance literature, and how the situation of hitherto under-appreciated impact of domestic-level factors may be rectified in understanding the military coalition, or the limited alliance. In their investigation of coalition dynamics of the first Gulf War, Bennett et al (1994) employ extensive process-tracing techniques on well-chosen “most-likely” cases: France, Germany, Japan, U.K. and Egypt, to assess the impact of various influences on foreign policy decision making and on subsequent state responses to external pressures on participation and burden-sharing in the military coalition of the first Gulf War.

The study identifies both external and internal factors that influence such foreign policy decisions. Among the external factors, they cite “collective action”, “balance of threat”, and “alliance dependence”; internal factors are: “state autonomy and domestic society” and “bureaucratic politics”. The study pays particular attention to the role of alliance dependence.

Much of Bennett et al’s (1994) alliance dependence thesis draws on the alliance security dilemma (Snyder, 1984; also Kupchan, 1988: 324-5; Lake, 1996).) faced by asymmetrically dependent allies. For dependent allies, two considerations dominate their strategic choice: abandonment versus entrapment<sup>8</sup>. Abandonment can take several forms: an ally may realign with the opponent, abrogate the terms of the alliance treaty, fail to live up to explicit commitments, or fail to provide support in expected situations. Entrapment occurs when a state becomes involved in a conflict whose outcome is central to the interests of the ally but is only marginal to one’s own interests. The dilemma for dependent allies arises from the inverse relationship between abandonment and entrapment: higher levels of credible commitment to the ally will tend to reduce the risks of abandonment, but will also tend to increase the risks of entrapment (Snyder, 1984: 467). A resolution to the dilemma requires “chiefly a comparison and trade-off between the costs and risks of abandonment and entrapment” (Snyder, 1984: 467).



Dependence can be economic and/or military. Each type of dependence carries with it the implication of costly adjustment, in the event of alliance rupture, or benefits, such as military aid or economic aid, in the event of compliance. According to Bennett et al (1994), therefore, a smaller ally will tend to support its larger ally if the pressures of dependence – and thus costs and risks of abandonment - outweigh the costs and risks of entrapment<sup>9</sup>. These costs and risks are weighed via alliance bargaining. For Bennett et al (1994), a critical aspect of alliance bargaining is the two-level interaction between the external and domestic pressures faced by decision makers (Putnam, 1988). In alliance bargaining, therefore, externally-induced pressures such as alliance dependence and concomitant demands on desired policy by the larger partner may be met with the dependent ally's countervailing demands for a restraint on such, by citing various domestic constraints. Conversely, the larger partner's threat of abandonment may be used by the political leadership of the dependent ally to leverage domestic support in line with the goals of the larger partner.

Having applied their competing set of external (ie. "collective action", "balance of threat", and "alliance dependence") and internal explanatory factors (ie. "state autonomy and domestic society" and "bureaucratic politics") to the relevant cases, Bennett et al (1994) reach two major conclusions. First, the foreign policy decision to participate (or not) in military coalitions is externally-driven, and variations in historical patterns of alliance dependence best accounts for the decision to participate or not in the military coalition. Compared to collective action and balance-of-threat hypothesis, of their five comparative cases, at least four (Japan, Germany, Egypt and Britain) are better explained by alliance dependence (Bennett et al, 1994: 40, 72, Table 3). Unlike France, each of these countries, it is pointed out, typified some degrees of alliance dependence on the coalition leader, the U.S., and thus reached policy decisions of participation in the military coalition. And second, the particular form of burden-sharing (ie. military contribution or financial contribution), is best explained by internally-driven hypotheses, such as state autonomy or bureaucratic politics (Bennett et al, 1994: 40, 73).

In light of Bennett et al's main findings (1994), the alliance dependence thesis may be plausible. Nonetheless, there are reasons for suggesting a slightly different interpretation regarding the impact, as well as the role, of alliance dependence. In fact, at least three inter-related issues present themselves for consideration: cognition, domestic politics, and non-compensatory loss. First, and as the foregoing suggests, much of the underlying assumption in the alliance dependence thesis implies that for dependent allies (non)participation decisions are usually dominated, at least in the early stages, by a "rational" calculation, such as the weighing of costs and risks of abandonment versus entrapment; such factors are then considered in relation to domestic pressures. But this type of utility-driven calculation is only a part of the answer, and ignores the more cognitive-based factors of the decision calculus used by most political leaders, especially in the initial decision stage of a crisis context. The second basis for a different interpretation of alliance dependence has to do with understanding the role of domestic constraints and external pressures. Though decision choices may be the product of an interaction between such domestic and external factors (Putnam, 1988), an alternative to the alliance dependence thesis suggests that the theoretical driver of the initial analysis may be internally-located, at the domestic level. The final basis for re-interpreting the role of alliance dependence brings together the first and second issues (ie. cognition and domestic politics) and considers the possibility that, unlike in the alliance dependence thesis, some types of "losses", such as lack of public support for a policy, may not be easily offset nor compensated by other means. Notwithstanding this three-fold basis for a re-interpretation of the role of alliance dependence, a core argument of this study is that alliance dependence can nonetheless offer important insights into the dynamics of understanding military coalitions. Indeed, instead of being viewed as the primary explanation or the main theoretical "driver" in understanding military coalitions, alliance dependence may best be understood in the context of its role as a critically important component within the larger poliheuristic explanatory framework.

## **Hypotheses Set**

Based on the foregoing, this section presents the main hypotheses, and the main explanatory model. The model combines the distinctive strengths of both the poliheuristic theory and the alliance dependence thesis, for understanding (non)participation decisions and type of burden-sharing in military coalitions.. Non-compensatory, cognitive motivations (ie. avoidance of political loss) should affect the initial stage of weighing various policy options on (non)participation, to be followed by a more analytic, second stage. In consideration of this, the following three hypotheses are presented<sup>10</sup>:

PH.H1: Decision to participate in international military coalition will be inversely related to the amount of perceived political loss.

PH.H2: Breaching a non-compensatory level of perceived political loss is likely to lead to a decision to reject participation.

PH.H3: The level of either participation or non-participation will be influenced by the amount of perceived political loss or gain.

## **Analytic Second Stage and Alliance Dependence**

An important goal of this study is to illustrate how the alliance dependence thesis can be incorporated into the larger poliheuristic theory. In this regard, then, the level of dependence on a dominant ally presents itself as a possible factor in the second, more analytic stage of the PH decision processing model. In other words, maintaining positive ties with a dominant ally with whom the potential coalition participant-state has various types of dependent relations, such as economic, military, security, diplomatic etc (Bennett et al, 1994), would likely be considered an aspect of the cost-benefit calculations on the part of decision makers when assessing the remaining policy options. Ergo:

PH.H4: If a non-compensatory level of political loss has been breached, alliance dependence may be positively associated with policy decisions on the level of non-participation, in the second stage of the decision making process.

Thus, PH.H1 and PH.H3 address the general impact of perceived political loss on policy choices. More importantly, whereas PH.H1 and PH.H3 only *indirectly* infers the expected effects of non-compensatory political loss (ie. at progressively higher levels of political loss, the probability of breaching a non-compensatory level of such political loss is higher), PH.H2 and PH.H4 does so more explicit way. Further, between PH.H2 and PH.H4, the latter hypothesis addresses the second-stage of poliheuristic decision processing in a much more direct way and does so by forecasting the likely final policy choice.

Figure A-1 (Appendix A) represents the poliheuristic model of decision-making on military coalitions, and the causal decision paths. This may be considered a combined model, since important elements of the alliance dependence thesis is incorporated within the larger poliheuristic framework. The process begins, in the first stage, with political loss<sup>11</sup>. If there is no perceived non-compensatory political loss<sup>12</sup>, then the expected outcome is participation (ie. Outcome 1). But if there is perceived a non-compensatory level of such political loss, then any option that entails participation is rejected. With the surviving options, the process then moves on to the second, more analytic, stage. Among remaining options, the level of dependence on the dominant ally, and coalition leader, is assessed in terms of alliance dependence. The final decision choice is straightforward. A high level of alliance dependence leads to a high level of involvement among non-participation options (ie. Outcome 2). Similarly, a low level of alliance dependence leads to a low level of involvement among non-participation options (ie. Outcome 3).

### **Multiple Method Approach (MMA)**

In investigating the two competing explanations (ie. poliheuristic theory versus alliance dependence thesis), the dissertation employs a multiple method approach, or “MMA” (Mintz, 2005; also Mintz, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003; Maoz et al, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita, 2002; Levy, 1998: 162; Levy, 2001; Elman and Elman, 1997; Schafer, 2003; George and Bennett, 2005: 3-16). Justification of a multiple method approach is based, in part, on its ability to better address various issues related to the method-of-analysis problem (Mintz, 2005; Russett, 2005), including the prevalence of disparate/contradictory findings (Levy, 1981; Weede, 1989; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1988; Ostrom and Job, 1986; James and Oneal, 1991; Waltz, 1979; Barbieri, 1996; Polachek et al, 1999), lack of “consensual knowledge” and corollary inhibition of development of a scientific discipline (McDermott, 2000b; Kinder and Palfrey, 1993; Mintz, 2005; Bueno de Mesquita, 2002), and imprecise policy prescriptions in relevant topical areas across the field of international relations (Mintz, 2005). The selective incorporation of different methods may thus help rectify some of these negative manifestations that accrue from the method-of-analysis problem.

Given the benefits of a multimethod approach, three complementary methods were chosen for investigating the principal research question of the dissertation: case study, experimental, and statistical. In most instances, the design phase of each method was driven by a need to satisfy five sequential and interrelated tasks: specification of problem and formulation of research objectives, specification of variables and hypotheses, case selection, describing the variance/operationalization in variables (ie. for statistical and experimental method), and formulation of data requirements (George and Bennett, 2005; also King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994). These tasks are interdependent and interrelated, and their successful execution – as part of MMA – required reiteration and re-specification of each task (George and Bennett, 2005). Such a caveat also extended to the hypotheses, some of which needed refinement or modification, when weighed against a particular method of investigation.

## Notes

1. An underlying argument of this study is that a cross-theoretical approach need not limit itself to an intra-subfield (eg. FPDM) comparison of competing theories; the comparison can be across levels, such as that between a grand theory and a mid-level theory. It is a truism that there are differences, some very significant, in the core assumptions of such theories. But a comparative analysis may still be appropriate as long as the main issue (ie. military coalition) under examination remains the same. For an overview of the different core assumptions between FPDM and neorealism, see Ripley (1993).
2. Of course, this is by no means intended to dismiss nor ignore important single-case study findings that can support or impugn established theories, *a la* Eckstein's (1975) "least likely" and "most likely" cases.
3. Morrow (2000) and Dingman (1979) make a distinction between alignments and alliances. But for these authors, the motivational basis of "alignments" seems to include situations where there are specific and immediate military goals (eg. first Gulf War), as well as situations where there are no such goals (eg. US-Israel relationship). In contrast, however, military coalitions are usually formed to achieve specific and immediate military goals (eg. Korean War, second Gulf War, etc). A second feature of alignments has to do with their low levels of formalization, if any, of the relationship between the involved states and absence of written agreements (Morrow, 2000). In contrast, however, military coalitions often entail written agreements on various aspects (eg. written commitments on size and type of contribution) of participation (eg. first and second Gulf War). Sometimes, these agreements are reached via inter-state bargaining (eg. US-Japan and US-Turkey in the first Gulf War).
4. As an example of an encapsulated definition of "alliance", the following may be given: "Two or more states form an alliance when they conclude a treaty that obliges them both to take certain actions in the event of war". (Morrow, 2000: 63)
5. Granted, there are some exceptions to this general line of critique (eg. Levy and Barnett, 1991; David, 1991). But for the most part, these latter set of studies focus on elite legitimacy factors, or lack thereof, that often influence state decisions on coalitions among autocratic governments in the Third World. The argument put forth in this study, however, goes beyond this: domestic factors should influence state decisions on coalitions, irrespective of regime type.
6. Morrow (2000: 73), for instance, argues that: "The balance of power is the best-known theory of alliances, and neorealism is the version of that theory currently in the literature".
7. Among the multitude of studies in the alliance literature, Bennett et al (1994) is the only study, of which we are aware, that seem to address the kinds of problematical issues (ie. dearth of studies on limited alliances, under-appreciation of domestic-level factors, etc) raised in the current study.
8. An alternative to this model of asymmetric alliances is one that focuses on the autonomy versus security trade-off. See, for example, Bennett (1997) and Morrow (1991).
9. This is the basis of the first hypothesis, introduced below.
10. In this study, "level of participation" is equivalent to Bennett et al's (1994) usage of the term "form of contribution" (p.40 and p.73). Both terms refer to burden-sharing, and this is different from the strictly participation (or contribution) versus non-participation (or no contribution) distinction. Moreover, in both this study and in Bennett et al (1994), by "participation" (or contribution) in the military coalition, it is meant the commitment of significant national resources, either in terms of lives or finances.
11. There are different ways of operationalizing the "noncompensatory political loss" variable. These include: threat to a leader's survival, drop in public support for a policy, drop in popularity, prospects of

electoral defeat, domestic opposition, threat to regime survival, intraparty rivalry and competition, internal or external challenge to the regime, potential collapse of the coalition, government, existence of veto players (eg. pivotal parties in parliamentary government)(Mintz,2004: 9). Among these different operationalizations, perhaps the most common way, and the one used in this study, is public opinion via survey data. This operationalization is discussed in the research design section of Chapter2.

12. For simplified analysis, this model assumes that political loss is associated with a policy option that entails some type of participation in the military coalition. If the public is strongly opposed to such participation, this will likely be perceived by the political leadership as a non-compensatory level of such political loss.

## CHAPTER II

### CROSS-NATIONAL PATTERNS

In relation to the research topic, therefore, in this chapter the goal is two-fold: (1) to extend the parameters (ie. different regions, different regime types, etc) in the applicability of the poliheuristic theory, and (2) to test the strength of the poliheuristic theory relative to the alliance dependence thesis for understanding participation decisions on military coalitions. Moreover, both of these goals speak to certain core strengths of the statistical method. These include: the relatively higher potential for generalizable findings compared to other methods (Jackman, 1985; Coppedge, 1999; Russett, 2005), a higher degree of external validity (Collier, 1991), and greater tractability over rival explanations (eg. diversionary theory, government type, ideology, etc), owing to inclusion of controls (Collier, 1991).

This chapter begins with a reminder of the main hypotheses, for explaining and understanding cross-national patterns on military coalition participation decisions. The research design itself is structured around familiar components. These include an explanation of the main variables (dependent, independent, and controls), the sources and types of datasets used, and the testing procedure. Four sets of probit results are presented and analyzed. A few concluding points are also given regarding this chapter's attempt at deriving generalizable findings that may hold cross-nationally.

#### **Research Design**

Thirty countries are included in the database, drawn mostly from Western Europe and East/Central Europe <sup>(Appendix B)</sup>. We are mainly interested in the differences in state response to coalition participation pressures in the period immediately preceding the beginning of the second Iraq War. Thus, the main period of investigation is confined to the crucial months preceding the start of the war – or approximately two months prior to the start of militarized conflict (March 20, 2003). The initial number of cases is thirty.



The relevant datasets include those found in Euro Gallup, World Factbook, European Journal of Political Research, Polity IV, and the Heritage Foundation<sup>(Appendix B)</sup>. Sources of datasets specifically related to “alliance dependence” include US Defense Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)<sup>(Appendix C)</sup>. Initial inspection and cursory tests of relevant data sets revealed only very minor problems with non-normality; distribution points in the relevant variables were within the normal range. No data transformation was necessary.

### **Model and Main Variables**

The main aim of this study is to test the poliheuristic theory of military coalition participation and its type. Within this framework, it is assumed that alliance dependence thesis will offer additional important insights and contributions, though its role is explicitly secondary to the main theory. The main independent variable is “political loss”, reflective of PH theory. The main dependent variable is “decision”. The set of control variables include: elections, economic factors, level of democratic development, government type and government ideology. For “alliance dependence”, the main variable representing the alliance dependence thesis, it is included as either a control or an independent variable depending on the related statistical test and the stage of decision making in which it is invoked.

***DV: Decision.*** A dichotomous or an ordinal dependent variable is used, depending on the hypothesis examined. In the case of a dichotomous dependent outcome, the responses are collapsed into one of two categories: participation (ie. active military support or combat troops) versus non-participation (ie. no support, political support, or passive military support). A state decision to participate or not participate are coded as 0 or 1, respectively. In the case of an ordinal dependent outcome, 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 are used for no support of any kind, political support, passive military support, active military support, and combat troops, respectively; further each decision type represents

progressively higher level of participation in the military coalition. An important exception to this categorization and coding is in testing PH.H4, as explained below, in the testing procedure section.

An affirmative participation decision by the political leader of the state can take two forms: contribution of combat troops and/or other type of active military support. A country's decision response is categorized as "active military support" if it involves the deployment of military personnel short of them being involved in actual combat. Thus, this involves use of military resources (eg. naval crafts, fighter planes, etc.) and/or support troops (eg. support troops such as engineers, medical teams, chemical and/or biological teams) that entail only a very small probability of direct military engagement with Iraq. These types of responses – although different in several respects - are, nonetheless, considered as similar state decisions to participate in the international military coalition against Iraq.

Non-participation decisions can also assume several forms: passive military support, political support only, or no support of any kind. "Passive military support" is when the leader of the state allows use of its airspace, air bases, and/or sea ports to other countries that choose to participate in the international military coalition – often these are related to the enactment of previous bilateral/multilateral treaty obligations, and hence difficult to deny on the part of the relevant country. Thus, in contrast to a decision to participate, non-participation does not involve deployment of the country's military personnel in any significant capacity. One case (Norway) was coded as an instance of passive military support since its decision to send chemical warfare suits most closely fits this category. A state's decision choice is categorized as "political support" if it makes an equivalent public statement to that effect in support of the U.S.-led military coalition against Iraq. A country's response was coded as "no support of any kind" if it is not identified anywhere in the principal reference source for this variable.

The main reference for information on this variable is the Heritage Foundation. Other sources of this information also exist (eg. The New York Times, CBC-online,

Washington Post, and USA Today), but the data provided by the Heritage Foundation is comparatively more reliable and systematic in coverage.

**IV: *Political Loss*.** The main independent variable is political loss. It is true that an analysis of public opinion prior to adoption of a particular policy does not exclusively establish a linkage – such as that delineated in the poliheuristic theory - between behavior of political leaders and the public (Holsti, 1992). Nonetheless, when it can be persuasively shown that a cross-national pattern exists in such a relationship, the claim of a valid and generalizable causal chain may be strengthened; this also represents a core contribution of the current study to existing research in FPDM. One of the ways, then, of operationalizing the perceived “political loss” variable is via public opinion which indicate the overall change in level of support or opposition to a particular issue or proposed course of government action (Mintz, 2003).

The main data for this perceived political loss variable is based on Euro Gallup’s “International Crisis Survey”. The Euro Gallup data contains relevant information on public opinion for 30 countries of Western and Central/Eastern Europe on the question of his/her country’s participation in the international military coalition against Iraq. The survey contains public opinion for both support and opposition to participation in the military coalition against Iraq.

The choice of one survey item over another (ie. support vs opposition) is informed by recognition that the core of the poliheuristic decision processing theory is premised on non-compensatory loss on the most important dimension – typically the political dimension. As an important logical corollary to this, then, political loss can occur if the leader’s adoption of a policy is contrary to public opinion – be it in support of or in opposition to a particular course of action. In short, although maintaining political support (ie. avoidance of political loss) is the crux of the non-compensatory rule, in operational terms, such support can be maintained by *not* going *against* public opinion writ large, or by not behaving in ways that are contrary to such public opinion. In consideration of this, the current study focuses on the level of public opposition to

participation in the military coalition. The Euro Gallup's survey question item of interest is the following: "If the United States intervenes militarily in Iraq without a preliminary decision of the United Nations, do you think that it would be justified or not that our country participate in a military intervention in Iraq?" The cross-national survey was conducted on thirty European countries on January 21, 2003 and January 27, 2003.

### **Non-Compensatory Cognitive Demarcation Point**

Studies also suggest that public opinion exerts a certain amount of influence on policy when it reaches at least a "consensus" level, identified as between 60% - 69% of public opinion on a particular issue, with progressively greater amounts of policy impact with each higher levels of public opinion (Powlick, 1995: 439; McClosky, 1968; Graham, 1989; Holsti, 1992; Wilcox et al, 1993; also Brulé and Mintz, 2006). Relatedly, it may be posited that, at progressively higher levels of public opinion, it becomes increasingly non-compensatory for political leaders to ignore or behave in ways contrary to such public opinion.

In light of this, then, a sensitivity analysis was undertaken to "locate" the non-compensatory level of political loss. Values ranging from 69% to 74% were tested, and the latter value was chosen and used in the relevant specified model. This value is only slightly higher than the upper limit (ie. 69%) found in previous studies on public opinion (Powlick, 1995: 439; McClosky, 1968; Graham, 1989; Holsti, 1992; Wilcox et al, 1993; Brulé and Mintz, 2006), and so should not pose major methodological and theoretical problems. The value also allows for sufficient variation on the variable leading to more proper statistical estimates.

In comparison to other similar datasets (eg. Gallup International), Euro Gallup's concurrent period of survey coverage for all countries (Jan.21-27, 2003), use of same question item, and similar sample sizes, allows for a more systematic investigation and plausible comparisons of cross-national variances in state decisions on coalition (non)participation. And, depending on the hypothesis examined, an interval or a dichotomous political loss variable is used.

### **Alliance Dependence**

In accordance with Bennett et al (1994: 44-5), “alliance dependence” is measured in two ways: “economic ties” and “military ties”. This variable is included as either a control (ie. test of PH.H1, PH.H2, and PH.H3) or an independent variable (ie. test of PH.H4) depending on the hypothesis being examined and the stage of decision making in which it is invoked.

Bennett et al (1994) make specific mention of the following components that comprise “alliance dependence” of a potential participant country in military coalition: number of active military personnel of coalition leader in potential participant country, arms transfers from coalition leader to potential participant country, military assistance by coalition leader to potential participant country, economic assistance by coalition leader to potential participant country, and number of active military installations of coalition leader in potential participant country.

At least two possibilities present themselves in capturing the overall level of “alliance dependence”: composite index or an underlying common factor. Theoretical justification argues for the former, since it better reflects Bennett et al’s (1994) understanding of this concept. A composite index of “alliance dependence” is created composing of military personnel, arms transfers, military assistance, economic assistance, and military installations. Each component is given equal weight<sup>2</sup>. Also, since Bennett et al (1994) adhere closely to a historically-patterned understanding of “alliance dependence”, and this is reflected in their choice of comparative cases, this logic is followed.

For creating an index of “alliance dependence”, two slightly different historical time-periods are used: 1992-2002, and 1999-2001. The rationale for choosing 1992 as the start point for the first time period is based on the fact that, reflective of system change attendant with the end of the Cold War, there exist structural breaks in the data for each of the components, beginning in that year. The advantage of using this time period is that it closely models the historicity of long-term patterns in “alliance dependence”. Thus, this time period hews closely to Bennett et al’s (1994) implicit

understanding of “alliance dependence” as a long-term historical development in the relationship between countries.

On the other hand, a drawback to the use of this time period is the non-availability of “personnel” data for the years 1992-1998, inclusive. This drawback, in turn, justifies the choice of the second time period, 1999-2001. Although this time period represents only three continuous time points, it contains all of the datasets for each of the five components of alliance dependence. Thus, unlike with the first time period, the second time period is more balanced, reducing thereby the possibility of spurious inferences. However, the choice of using both of these two time periods has its own distinct advantage: it neatly sidesteps a type of investigator-induced selection bias in the construction of this variable, thereby providing a more rigorous test of Bennett et al’s (1994) alliance dependence thesis.

Although the data is cross-sectional, time-series, a panel design method need not be applied for constructing, or “predicting” the index, since alliance dependence is either a control variable or an independent explanatory element in understanding coalition participation and burden-sharing decisions; moreover, any such “predicted” alliance dependence scores would not be very meaningful in the application of this study. In obtaining the composite index score, therefore, for each country in each time period, three basic steps are taken. First, the average value of each component (ie. active military personnel, military assistance, economic assistance, active military installations, and arms transfers) is calculated for the respective time period. Second, since the scales and units of each component are different from each other, the average values are standardized via z-scores. And third, the obtained z-scores are once more standardized to arrive at a final alliance dependence score for each country for each time-period.

The U.S. Department of Defense is the main source of data for “military personnel” and “active military installations”. Data on “military assistance” and “economic assistance” is from USAID. And data on “arms transfers” is from SIPRI<sup>(Appendix C)</sup>.

### **Control Variables**

It is expected that, in comparison to alliance dependence, variations in perceived political loss, the core of PH theory, will explain more of the cross-national differences in state response to military coalition participation pressure. However, the research design also incorporate various state-level controls into the decision processing model: elections, economic factors, level of democratic development, government type and government ideology. These additional factors are meant to reflect the frequently-used controls in the use of force literature (eg. US presidential use of force studies).

***Elections.*** Many previous studies have suggested a relationship between elections, the electoral cycle, and foreign policy (Volgy and Schwartz, 1991; Gaubatz, 1991; Morgan and Anderson, 1999). At least one study, however, finds that the relationship has been exaggerated (Leeds and Davis, 1997). The preponderance of evidence, nonetheless, suggests that it may be relevant to consider election year as a control. Data for this control is based on the *European Journal of Political Research*. Election year is coded as 1, and as 0 if otherwise.

***Economic Factors.*** One line of research, based on theme of a diversionary use of force, suggests that political leaders may be more willing to use force abroad, such as part of a military coalition, when faced with negative domestic economic conditions (Russett, 1987, 1990; Fordham, 1998; Heldt, 1999; DeRouen, 2000). In accordance with Fordham (1998), who advocates a disaggregated approach to examining the effects of economic factors – but in contrast to others who often use aggregate measures of “economic misery” (eg. James and Oneal, 1991) - in light of their differential impact, we use two measures, most recent annual unemployment rate and inflation rate, to assess the influence of domestic economic factors in the use of force. Data for both unemployment and inflation (consumer price index) is from the World Fact Book.

***Level of Democracy.*** Compared to newly-transitioned democracies, political leaders in more established democracies may have a more nuanced view on what constitutes legitimate use of force against another sovereign state (Foyle, 2003). Thus, cross-national variation in state responses to coalition participation pressures may partly be a function of level of democratic development. For democracy scores, the most recent Polity IV dataset is used<sup>1</sup>.

***Government Type.*** Embedded within the democratic peace literature, at least one long-held argument suggests that, among democracies, majority governments are less constrained in interstate foreign relations than minority governments, since in such cases parliamentary rule equates with government rule (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Tsebelis, 1995, 1999). A slightly different argument is given in another study which suggests that, since they tend to hold a larger number of seats than majority governments, coalition governments face less constraint in foreign policy, and thus are more likely to either reciprocate or initiate such militarized interstate-disputes and conflicts (Prins and Sprecher, 1999). A more recent finding, however, implies that coalition and majority types of government are equally more likely to initiate conflict than minority governments. Equivalently stated, minority governments are less likely to use force, in large part because they face greater number of veto players (Ireland and Gartner, 2001). For government type, the focus is on the particular form of cabinet. Three main cabinet types are considered: coalition (either minimum winning coalition, minority coalition, or oversized coalition), majority (single party majority), and minority (single party minority). Data for all countries is based on the *European Journal of Political Research*<sup>3</sup>. A set of three dummies are created for each government type (majority, minority, or coalition). Coding is 1 or 0.

***Government Ideology.*** An increasing trend in the FPDM literature, particularly in relation to various cognitive variants, such as role theory, image theory, operational code, (eg. Breuning, 1995; Walker, 1992, 2003, etc) has been the identification of



powerful ideas, political beliefs, and related ideational elements that more directly affect foreign policy decision making (Goldstein, 1988; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 5; Foyle, 1997; White, 1999; Kaarbo, 2003; Coates and Krieger, 2004; Ozekici-Taner, 2006). In particular, and in relation to military coalitions, if there is shared ideological affinity between the political leader of the dominant state in the international military coalition and political leader of potential participant state, it may be more difficult for the latter to ignore participation pressures and active burden-sharing pressures.

A related perspective is that in an evolving multi-polar world (Snyder, 1997) with no clear-cut definitions of security threats, a shared world-view, as afforded by ideological ties, may at times serve as a guide for state action by political leaders (Carlsnaes, 1986; Kim and Fording, 2002; Tsebelis, 1995, 1999; Cook, 2003; Kampfner, 2003; Riddell, 2003; Coates and Krieger, 2004; Beckett and Hencke, 2005). Again, therefore, political beliefs and ideational elements, in the form of ideology, may sometimes act as another type of cognitive filter in making foreign policy decisions. But the cognitive impact of such on policy decisions may usually not be as strong as that exerted by perceived political loss, since the latter more directly impacts upon the position of the leader in the political system.

For the “government ideology” variable, in the case of single party governments, we rely on Benoit and Laver’s (2004) expert survey data to derive government ideology. This score ranges from 0 (most left wing) to 20 (most right wing). In the case of coalition governments, lack of systematic data forces us to rely on a proxy method for generating this variable: the party affiliation of the head of government (HoG). The information on the HoG is combined with the expert survey on party ideology (Benoit and Laver, 2004) to arrive at the score for government ideology. This proxy method has been advocated by others (eg. Muller-Rommel, et al, 2004). This method also hews well with the current operationalization of this variable, since the aim is to infer the ideological leaning of the political leader of the potential coalition participant country.

Sources of information on head of government are the *European Journal of Political Research* (various issues) and World Factbook. Government ideology is a

continuous variable ranging from 0 (most left-leaning) to 20 (most right-leaning). Note that for France, coding was done by the author based on a content analysis of the relevant information: two values were tested, and the lower value – which is a far more conservative estimate, in comparison to similar political profiles of the HoGs of other countries – was used.

### **Testing Procedure**

To test PH.H1, an interval political loss variable (ie. level of public opposition to participation in military coalition), PLOSS, is used on two mutually exclusive categories of a dichotomous dependent variable, DECISION: participation versus non-participation. The following are treated as being equivalent: no support, political support, and passive military support. These three are collapsed into “non-participation” dependent outcome, and are coded as 1. Similarly, the following are collapsed into “participation” dependent outcome: active military support and combat troops. The latter category is coded as 0 for participation<sup>4</sup>. In testing PH.H2, the same dichotomous dependent variable, DECISION, is used, as in PH.H1. But to capture the non-compensatory effects of political loss, 74% as the cut-off point is used in creating a dichotomous independent variable, PLOSS. In other words, it is assumed that at 74% or above in public opposition to coalition participation, political loss becomes non-compensatory for political leaders. When PLOSS is 74% or higher, it is coded as 1, when it falls below this level, it is coded as 0. The expected direction for political loss (non-compensatory) is negative. Regression estimates will be based on a basic probit model.

To test PH.H3, the effects of an interval PLOSS variable is examined along with an ordinal dependent variable that identifies the level of (non)participation. Here, all levels of (non)participation are examined. Again, however, the same corollary logic applies: at progressively higher levels of political loss, the probability of breaching the non-compensatory level becomes greater, and this will be reflected in the choice of particular level of (non)participation.

For all three hypotheses the expected direction for political loss is negative. Further, depending on the hypothesis, either a basic probit (PH.H1 and PH.H2) or an ordinal probit (PH.H3) is used in deriving the regression estimates.

### **Selection Model and Analytic Second Stage**

For hypothesis PH.H4 a selection model is used to test its core claim. To recap, the poliheuristic theory stipulates that, in the first stage, a non-compensatory level of political loss triggers the rejection of certain outcomes. The non-compensatory level of political loss acts as an endogenous trigger or switching mechanism. This trigger leads to rejection of certain options. Moreover, this endogenous trigger affects only a subset of the cases under observation. In the second stage, remaining options are weighed in terms of utility maximization, such as alliance dependence. Thus the dynamics of the first stage and the second stage are connected; what happens in the first stage will affect outcomes in the second stage. These types of endogenous switching and sample selection issues are best dealt with in stage-based selection models, But weighing the needs for proper estimation with the limited sample size dictates that a binary outcome variable be constructed<sup>5</sup>. Two categories are created. In the first category are options that reflect high non-military form of involvement in the coalition. The option of “military assistance passive” and “political support” are in this category. In the second category is the option of “no support”. This category thus reflects, at most, low non-military form of involvement in the coalition. As well, however, political leaders who self-selected out of non-participation are also put in this category. At an intuitive level, a high level of alliance dependence should create positive pressures for the option of “combat troops” or the option of “military assistance active”. But of course, this is contrary to what is forecasted in the second stage of the poliheuristic theory. Thus, this binary categorization also provides a more robust test of the impact of the endogenous non-compensatory trigger and the analytic second stage. The first category is coded as 1, the second category is coded as 0. The estimation is based on a Heckman probit selection model (Gronau, 1974; Lewis, 1974; Heckman, 1976, 1979).

## Results and Analysis

The estimates for PH.H1 and PHT.H3 are presented in Tables D-1 and D-2 (Appendix D), each with two time-periods. In Table D-1, the model P1 shows the estimates for the period 1999-2001. To deal with collinearity issues, two separate estimates are given. The model P4 gives the estimates for the second time period.

The baseline models P1 and P4 suggests that the sign of the main explanatory variable is in the predicted direction. In other words, in line with PH theory, perceived political loss generally effected a negative military coalition participation decision on the part of political leaders. More clearly, the greater the amount in such perceived political loss, the greater the likelihood of a decision choice not to participate in any substantive way in the coalition. Viewed in another way, theses results suggest that the greater the perceived political loss – or public opposition to coalition participation - the greater the possibility that such loss becomes non-compensatory with consequent impact on a negative participation decision. As a result, as the political leader faces increasingly greater levels of political loss, the optimal foreign policy choice might be not to give any type of support, voice only political support, or engage only in passive military participation in response to coalition participation pressures. In fact, this was the policy response for nearly two-thirds of the countries approached by the U.S. to participate in its international military coalition against Iraq. Only about one third (or eleven countries) responded with active military support or with the sending of combat troops. Interestingly, these estimates for the PH.H1 show that the ideology of the government (Head of Government) is also consistently significant - though at lower levels than that for political loss, but at higher levels in comparison to ADEP. The other controls do not suggest any significant effects. Model fit for both P1 and P4 is quite significant, as suggested by the p-value of the  $\chi^2$ .

Results for the test of hypothesis PH.H3 are shown in Table D-2 (Appendix D). Models T1 and T3 show the estimates for the two different time periods. For both time-periods, the coefficients for political loss are negative, as expected, and are significant. Another interesting finding, however, is the significant result for the control variable

ADEP. This seems to suggest that, *contra* Bennett et al (1994), alliance dependence is a significant factor in explaining the type of participation or burden-sharing. Nonetheless, as with results for PH.H1, across both sets of nested models, political loss seems consistently more significant than ADEP. The results thus suggest that as perceived political loss becomes progressively larger, as measured by public opposition to coalition participation, the probability of breaching a non-compensatory level in such loss becomes greater and it interacts with decision choices on the type of (non)participation policy options. This process is revealed in the negative direction for the political loss variable; progressively higher levels of perceived political loss is associated with a progressively lower level of (non)participation<sup>6</sup>. Findings for ideology is mixed across the nested models, and across the two time periods. As with the models for PH.H1, the fit for most of these models is noticeably good.

### **Results for the NC Model**

The non-compensatory political loss effect on decision making is more ably demonstrated in Table D-3<sup>(Appendix D)</sup>. Table D-3 presents the main test of the non-compensatory political loss principle, and its impact on participation decisions on military coalitions. As with the previous models, operationalization of non-compensatory political loss (NC Political Loss) is via level of public opposition to coalition participation<sup>7</sup>. Per hypothesis PH.H2, NC political loss is of the correct sign, and is consistently and strongly significant across the two different time-periods. Significance level of ideology also seems to be stable across the two time-periods and different specifications of the baseline model. Unemployment and level of democracy, however, seems to be equivocal across the two time-periods. The model fit seems noticeably better for the first time period compared to the second time-period.

The overall findings for this model thus suggests that when political leaders perceive a breach in the non-compensatory threshold of political loss – a level identified as 74% or higher in public opposition to the issue - they tend to reject substantive participation in the military coalition, such as active military participation or the sending of combat

troops. Instead, to avoid this high level of political loss, political leaders in such situations generally adopt a non-participation decision (ie. no support of any kind, only political support, or passive military support). This relationship between non-compensatory political loss and participation is clearly conveyed by the negative sign of the coefficient.

Another way to understand these implied findings is to illustrate the responses of countries whose political leaders did not perceive a non-compensatory level of political loss. In fact, the leaders of only six countries (ie. United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) *may not* have perceived a non-compensatory level of political loss. Thus for such leaders, the level of public opposition did not reach a politically intolerable level – which is not to say that public opposition to coalition participation in such countries was muted. Compatible with poliheuristic theory, this situation allowed for a greater range of policy options being available in responding to coalition participation pressures, including participation in the military coalition. And, *in each instance*, the leaders in these countries chose to respond to such pressures by either sending combat troops, in the case of the U.K., or by some form of active military participation, such as deployment of military resources (eg. naval crafts, fighter planes, etc.) and/or support troops (eg. support troops such as engineers, medical teams, chemical/biological teams), in the case of the other five countries. Viewed in another way, having greater leverage over available policy options allowed such leaders to better market and frame, vis-à-vis the public, a particular policy option as the most desirable course of action (Brulé and Mintz, 2006; Jacobs and Page, 2005).

### **Results for Selection Model and Analytic Second Stage**

However, a yet better way to illustrate the impact of non-compensatory political loss on decision making on military coalitions is to examine the particular policy choices of countries whose political leaders may in fact have (1) perceived a cognitive breach in the level of such loss, and (2) therefore chose not to participate. The subsequent behavior of such countries is especially relevant for understanding and demonstrating the second

stage of PH decision processing framework of FPDM. In the second stage, a more analytic decision strategy is adopted wherein cost-benefit calculations and utility-maximization considerations, such as consequences of a policy choice on the nature of a state's relationship with a dominant ally, often assume primacy (Mintz and Geva, 1997; Mintz, 1993, 2004). Thus, by way of a re-visitation:

PH.H4: If a non-compensatory level of political loss has been breached, alliance dependence may be positively associated with policy decisions on the level of non-participation, in the second stage of the decision making process.

In other words, if a non-compensatory level of perceived political loss is breached, non-participation is expected. In turn, a high level of alliance dependence is expected to lead to the choice of high non-military involvement (ie. either “military support passive” or “political support”); a low level of alliance dependence is expected to lead to the choice of low non-military involvement (ie. “no support”).

Table D-4 <sup>(Appendix D)</sup> presents the alliance dependence scores for two time periods, for thirty countries. Data sources for this measure are varied. Across both time periods, there is no extreme difference in terms of the ranking of each country's alliance dependence relative to the other countries.

Table D-5 <sup>(Appendix D)</sup> presents the estimates of the stage-based selection model. As before, two time periods are incorporated, 1999-2001 and 1992-2002, to avoid selection issues. The endogenous trigger is the non-compensatory level (ie. public opposition at 74% ). This is identified by the variable “NC” in the full equation. The binary dependent variable is “level”. This is identified in the selection equation. As well, per the poliheuristic theory, in the selection equation, only alliance dependence is the independent explanatory variable (ie. “ADEP”). As the estimates show, the sign of the coefficient conforms to expectation. In other words, a high level of alliance dependence is positively associated with the option of either “military assistance passive” or “political support”, instead of “no support”. Between the two time periods,

however, ADEP is shown to be statistically significant only for the 1992-2002 period. Moreover, although these results are strongly suggestive, the relatively small number of cases implies caution against drawing conclusions with high confidence<sup>8</sup>.

In all then, these tests of the various PH hypotheses suggest a few things. First, the level of perceived political loss has an impact on whether or not leaders choose to participate in international military coalitions. Second, the level of such political loss also influences the type of (non)participation decisions, such as passive versus active military involvement. Third, perception of a breach in the non-compensatory level of political loss has an impact on subsequent policy decision choices. And, fourth, this study's cross-theoretical approach suggests that insights from AD thesis and PH theory may be fruitfully combined.

### **Summary and Substantive Conclusions**

This study represents a small attempt at a cross-national, statistical investigation of foreign policy decision-making on military coalitions, using the second Iraq war as the relevant focal case. Given this, a few of the more relevant findings of the study need be summarized, beginning with some of its more specific limitations. First, the ADEP (composite index of alliance dependence) variable, used in the analytic stage of PH decision theory (ie. selection model), is based on historical patterns of alliance relationships<sup>9</sup>. Relatedly, the non-compensatory level of perceived political loss (ie. 74%) used to test PH.H2 may be deemed too high.

Despite these problems, however, the study does lend some important insights into the literature on alliances and foreign policy decisionmaking. For instance, despite the many important differences in the working assumptions between these two distinct lines of research (Ripley, 1993), there seem to be an increasing convergence on the recognized import of domestic politics. This common trend in turn seems to provide a reasonable basis for a comparative analysis of competing explanations – provided there is some theoretical basis and justification for seeking comparative insights on a shared research theme. In the case of the current study, this happened to involve state crisis



behavior with respect to participation and burden-sharing in limited alliances, the military coalition. Relatedly, a great contribution of this study to current understanding of foreign policy analysis is the design and application of an explicitly cross-national investigation to the question of: “what explains political leaders’ participation and burden-sharing decisions on military coalitions?”

The alliance dependence thesis (Bennett et al, 1994), on the one hand, is found to have some statistical evidentiary support when applied to a more varied, cross-national, set of cases, in Iraq II. As well, the study’s findings also imply that the significance of alliance dependence may not be limited to the question of participation only but, rather, may be extended to the question of type of participation. Importantly, however, the significance of AD seems dependent on the time period used to construct the index since, for many of the models, the findings were equivocal across the two different time periods used (ie. 1992-2002, and 1999-2001).

On the other hand, the main findings of this study is strongly suggestive of the cross-national, empirical evidence of the poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making (along with DeRouen and Sprecher, 2004). In fact, the results suggest that the poliheuristic theory offers a consistently more significant explanation than does alliance dependence thesis. Perhaps most importantly, from the poliheuristic perspective, the study also presented evidence strongly suggestive of the application of the noncompensatory principle as a likely decision heuristic in the two-stage decision making strategy for most leaders of democratic regimes in a comparative setting. In fact, a key finding of this study is that when approximately  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the public oppose participation in military coalitions, their leaders are unlikely to commit combat forces or to render active military support to such coalitions. Such a finding is also largely in line with previous studies of the impact of public opinion on elite behavior (Powlick, 1995: 439; McClosky, 1968; Graham, 1989; Holsti, 1992; Wilcox et al, 1993; also Brulé and Mintz, 2006). Another important finding is that alliance dependence enters into the calculus of decision making in the second stage of the poliheuristic theory, per the results of the selection model.

As regards the potential for wider generalizability, there are elements of this study that suggest the need for restraint as well as modest optimism. On the one hand, the current study was a limited test of the poliheuristic theory, with a supporting role for alliance dependence thesis, for understanding decisions on participation and burden-sharing in the military coalition of the second Gulf War. At a facile level, this implies the need to circumscribe any sweeping generalizations beyond this particular event. Yet on the other hand, when the main findings are viewed strictly from the perspective of a foreign policy decision making framework, the results may cautiously be extrapolated to any similar crisis contexts involving policy choice. In fact the robustness of the poliheuristic theory may allow it to be modeled into most situations – political or otherwise – as long as the core element remains that of making a choice (Mintz, 2004). Furthermore, and despite the contribution of this study to the PH research program on foreign policy decisionmaking, it nonetheless would be remiss to not mention additional considerations that may further enhance the plausibility of its main findings. For example, process-tracing techniques (George and Bennett, 2005) may be applied to well chosen most-likely cases, among the original dataset of countries. Such methods can be applied to either confirm or challenge what was only implicitly accepted in this study – the cognitive elements of poliheuristic decision making, such as political leaders' perception of a non-compensatory level of domestic political loss. Previous poliheuristic studies using process-tracing techniques have provided strong case study evidence of the impact of such cognitive and perceptual factors in foreign policy decision making in other crisis contexts (eg. Mintz, 1993; De Rouen, Jr., 2002; Brulé, 2005). The research program may also benefit from more studies on ways to most efficiently identify the non-compensatory level, as well as more consciously comparative, cross-national investigations. Also, the incorporation of “ideational” elements (eg. ideology, world-view, operational code, leadership style, etc), into PH theory (eg. James and Zhang, 2006; Keller and Yang, 2008) may help in the understanding of potential outliers or anomalies – from the PH perspective - such as Prime Minister Blair's (U.K.) decision on coalition participation (ie. sending combat troops). And, as seen in this limited attempt,

the combining of explanatory elements of different models, on a shared research theme, may also prove to be a scholarly fruitful endeavor.

## Notes

1. Malta is left out from the case selection since Polity IV provides no score for this country, due to its small population size (ie. Less than 500,000).
2. Bennett et al (1994) implicitly suggest that alliance dependence be understood as a “holistic” concept, and thus give no information as to whether any one component of such alliance dependence should be given greater weight than any other component.
3. For Romania and Bulgaria, *Electoral Studies* (2003) was relied upon, since *EJPR* lacks information on these two cases.
4. An important theoretical note here is that, in testing this hypothesis, it is not necessary to identify *a priori* a particular non-compensatory level of political loss; however, the possibility of reaching/breaching that non-compensatory level is likely to be higher, the greater the value on the political loss variable (ie. greater level of public opposition to coalition participation). Hence, this hypothesis implies that at progressively higher levels of political loss, political leaders will become increasingly inclined to reject participation in the military coalition.
5. The “sample selection model” (Miranda, Alfonso and Sophia Rabe-Hesketh, 2006) was used on an ordinal dependent outcome. However, the small sample size prevented proper estimation.
6. This *implied* evidence of the impact of non-compensatory political loss on decision making is more *directly* addressed in the “non-compensatory” models.
7. Again, per earlier explanation, the *non-compensatory level* of political loss was located via a sensitivity analysis of public opinion. When the level of public opposition to participation was 74% or higher, it was categorized as “non-compensatory political loss”. Regression estimates for other levels from this baseline showed insignificant results.
8. On the other hand, the results on the relationship between alliance dependence and the analytic stage can be further explored via a simple bivariate model, with an ordinal dependent outcome (ie. “military assistance passive”, “political support”, or “no support”. Table D-6 shows the results of the bivariate model for the alternative test of PH.H4. One case was dropped due to absence of relevant scores. The coefficient for ADEP, or level of alliance dependence, is positive as expected. Although the level of significance for ADEP seems to differ depending on the time-period, the modeled relationship as a whole is still quite a significant fit with the data. This seems to imply, in accordance with the logic of PH.H4, that higher levels of alliance dependence is positively associated with higher levels of non-military involvement in the coalition, within the parameters of the remaining set of non-participation policy options.  
 In specific terms, among the countries included in the dataset, twenty-three countries registered a level of public opposition to coalition participation that may have breached a non-compensatory level of perceived political loss. And, in line with the poliheuristic decision processing perspective, in a large majority of such countries – seventeen out of twenty three - the political leaders chose not to participate in any substantive way in the military coalition. The seventeen countries were: Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria, Portugal, Finland, France, Sweden, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Slovenia, Turkey, Switzerland, and Norway. More clearly, depending on his/her country’s level of alliance dependence on the military coalition leader, such political leaders opted for one of three policy decisions: no support of any kind, only political support, or passive military support (ie. permission given to coalition forces for use of airspace, air bases, and/or sea ports).

9. Thus, incorporation of “real-time” offers of carrots and sticks (such as forgiveness of foreign loans versus cutting off of military transfers, etc) was not modeled. Lack of systematic data on this suggests the problem may not easily be resolvable.

### **CHAPTER III**

#### **ERDOGAN CABINET AND THE IRAQ CRISIS: A CASE STUDY**

The previous chapter presented evidence on cross-national patterns on foreign policy decision making and participation in military coalitions. The evidence suggests strong support for the poliheuristic theory. But the veracity of the statistical findings can further be probed by another complementary scientific method, the case study. The advantages of the case study method are well-known. These include its higher levels of conceptual validity, possible derivation of new hypotheses or variables, greater attention to contextual factors, and better accommodation of complex causal relations (George and Bennett, 2005; Lijphart, 1971; Ragin, 1987; Sartori, 1991; Collier, 1993). In relation to the current topic, two such strengths are particularly relevant: conceptual validity and contextualized explanation.

Drawing from the 30 countries of the Euro Gallup Iraq Crisis Survey, the Erdogan (or Gul-Erdogan) cabinet's foreign policy decision making on the Iraq crisis represents the choice of case to be examined in this chapter. The import of the case choice is also informed by a recognition of its representation as a strong candidate for the "least-likely" case for the poliheuristic theory and a "most-likely" case for the expected utility-based alliance dependence thesis. The Erdogan cabinet's crisis decisionmaking represents an ideal case for undertaking a "disciplined configurative" study (Eckstein, 1975: 99-104; George and Bennett, 2005; also Lijphart, 1971), since the main aim is to illustrate the veracity of the core claims of the poliheuristic theory (ie. satisficing, non-compensatory, stage-based, and non-holistic decisionmaking). According to Eckstein, "[c]ases that are extreme on pertinent measures can usually be regarded as crucial in the sense of being least-likely and most-likely cases" (1975: 119). Indeed, the intense levels of public and internal party opposition, in the context of huge material and non-material inducements does seem to speak to the "extreme" character of this crisis case. A detailed, analysis of the case should therefore yield more knowledge

about the strengths of the poliheuristic theory, relative to competing explanations, such as the expected utility-based alliance dependence thesis<sup>1</sup>.

## **Introduction**

When the AKP came to power in November of 2002, it was faced with the effects of two consecutive economic crises, the most recent of which occurred in the previous year. Long term economic mismanagement by previous governments led to run-away inflation and interest rates and extreme instability of the national currency. In the latest crisis, these events were accompanied by a general collapse of the financial markets, widespread bank failures and business bankruptcies, massive levels of unemployment, and a government debt nearly equal to the national GDP. Only by once again turning to the IMF for emergency loans, was further economic catastrophe staved off. But the new AKP government was still saddled with a combined foreign and domestic debt of nearly \$95 billion (US), still dependent on continued IMF aid, still faced with shaky financial markets, and was seeing only the very rudimentary beginnings of an economic recovery. Thus by force of circumstance, the economy became one of the cabinet's most important priorities (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, March 27, 2003; Heper and Toktas, 2003: 176; Park, 2005: 23; also Hale, 2007: 86-7). However, within weeks of the AKP's electoral victory, the Bush administration contacted the newly-established Gul-Erdogan cabinet with requests for cooperation in its military planning against Iraq. In addition to its myriad national interests in northern Iraq and the region as a whole, such military action against Iraq threatened to scuttle Turkey's nascent economic recovery, by severing the latter's UN sanctions-compliant trade relations with Iraq. Critically, however, the Gul-Erdogan cabinet was also presented by the Bush administration with an opportunity to significantly mitigate such economic losses. At offer was the prospect for billions of dollars in economic aid, as well as the invaluable opportunity to secure its long-term national interests in northern Iraq and to continue to exercise its strategic role vis-à-vis the US and the region as a whole.

Two days before the start of the second Iraq War, on March 18, Erdogan's cabinet reached its final decision on US request, officially presented three months earlier, for cooperation on a critical aspect of US strategic military planning vis-à-vis Iraq (Sarıkaya, 2003a). The Erdogan cabinet decided to reject the original "Iraq bill", and instead formulated a new bill authorizing access only to Turkish airspace for the US military, enroute to targets in Iraq. This decision came on the heels of the failed parliamentary ratification of the original "Iraq bill", two and a half weeks prior, on March 1. And, just a few hours after the US-led coalition bombs started falling on Baghdad, on March 20, 2003, the AKP-dominated parliament passed the revised bill by a vote of 332 for and 202 against, with one abstention. In quick order, Turkey created an air corridor for US and, later, coalition planes.

The original US agenda, however, was the establishment of a northern military front via land access through Turkish territory. Thus, the Erdogan cabinet's final decision fell quite short of initial high expectations publicly held by the Bush administration regarding Turkey's cooperation. The disappointment evinced in Washington was all the more great since, historically, Turkey had been one of its closest regional allies. As a result of the final decision, however, Ankara willingly forfeited any significant participation in post-conflict political and economic restructuring of Iraq, heavily compromised its interests in the de facto autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq, and incurred major damage to the historically strong US-Turkey alliance.

But from the beginning of the Iraq crisis, in early December when Washington first broached the issue of cooperation, the Erdogan (or Gul-Erdogan) cabinet had a variety of policy options. Moreover, even in the aftermath of the March 1 parliamentary vote, the Erdogan cabinet did not immediately rule out any of the previous major policy alternatives, including its initial decision, on February 25, to submit the land access bill for parliamentary approval (eg. Alyatli, 2003; Excerpts of Erdogan Interview on TGRT, March 6, 2003; Sarıkaya, 2003b). So, why did Erdogan, in the end, choose to formulate a new bill that only authorized US access to Turkish airspace, despite vociferous objections from stakeholders within Turkey's own foreign policy establishment?



The stylized answer has tended to focus on the role of public opinion (eg. Yavuz, 2005; Park, 2004a; Hale, 2007; Robins, 2003). In fact, an earlier study (Mintz, 2004) that analyzed the Turkish case from a poliheuristic theoretical perspective also largely emphasized the role of oppositional public opinion in affecting leadership behavior and policy choices. The current study extends the analysis one step further by taking into account other explanatory factors. As a first step, then, the current study implicitly incorporates a well-established view regarding the *indirect* impact of public opinion on elite political behavior<sup>2</sup>. This indirect impact of public opinion is coupled with an equally important emphasis of the intermediary role of legislative institutions and the need for viable domestic coalitions on foreign policy (Risse-Kappen, 1991; Hagan, 1993). According to one study: “[The] main role of the public in liberal democracies is to influence the coalition–building processes among elite groups...[There] is strong empirical evidence that domestic structures are the intervening variables between public opinion and foreign policy. Under given international conditions and despite relatively similar public attitudes across countries, variances in the interaction between the general public and elites in the foreign policy-making process can be explained by differences in domestic structures.”(Risse-Kappen, 1991: 510-511). The recognition, then, that public opinion often exerts an indirect impact on policy suggests a greater direct role for the dynamics of parliamentary politics on affecting policy outcomes. This recognition also sets the proper stage for more efficiently identifying the non-compensatory dimension of poliheuristic theorizing. In sum, then, the current study will attempt to demonstrate that for Turkey’s leader, a non-compensatory political loss manifested itself less so in terms of oppositional public opinion, and more so in terms of intra-party dynamics of the AKP. Critically, this included the potential collapse of the AKP government, in the absence of a viable intra-party consensus on policy<sup>3</sup>.

### **Crisis Phase 1: Background and Alternatives**

In early December, 2002, the Bush administration made an official request for cooperation from Ankara on US military plans against Iraq. In their discussions with

AKP chairman, and official leader-in-waiting, Recep Tayyip Erdogan<sup>4</sup> and the acting Prime Minister Gul, the Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz and Grossman, an adviser to Secretary of State Powell, presented a three-stage process<sup>5</sup> for Turkey's cooperation (*Hurriyet*, December 13, 2003). Shortly thereafter, an official White House visit by Erdogan underscored two things: implicit recognition of Erdogan as the *de facto* political leader of the Turkish government (Aydintasbas, 2002; Sontag, 2003; Robins, 2003: 552), and the Bush administration's reiterated need for the Gul-Erdogan cabinet's cooperation in the three-stage preparatory plan for military action against Iraq. The different stages of the preparatory plan entailed incrementally higher levels of Turkish cooperation on US military planning<sup>6</sup>. The third and final stage required Ankara's cooperation in the stationing of US air and land forces on Turkish territory, for their eventual transiting to northern Iraq. In effect, this "land access" stage represented the critical linchpin in US plans to open up a northern front for possible major military action against Iraq.

The Gul-Erdogan cabinet's crisis response quickly shifted into gear in the latter half of December. The cabinet pursued two related tracks: US-Turkey negotiations over the terms of Turkish land access in the event of war, and diplomatic offensive to secure a peaceful solution that would obviate the need for war. The cabinet's negotiations with Washington first began in mid-December and picked up pace in early February for the final round. In large part, these were aimed at addressing the Gul-Erdogan cabinet's multiple concerns and perceived national interests that would be negatively impacted from military action against Iraq. In return, Washington was to be given permission to use southeastern Turkey as a staging area for US air and land forces for launching operations into northern Iraq. The negotiations covered three principal issue areas: military, economic, and political. The most important military issue dealt with the size of US troop deployment on Turkish territory. Washington's initial position was for a maximum of 120,000 troops to be temporarily stationed in Turkey for eventual transit to northern Iraq at start of conflict (*Hurriyet*, December 11, 2002; also Salmoni, 2003). On the issue of economic aid, Washington's initial offer was for \$4 billion, equal parts in

loans and grants (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, February 19, 2003; Salmoni, 2003). Against this was the Gul-Erdogan cabinet's initial demand for aid of upwards to \$92 billion (Hale, 2007: 108; Bozarslan, 2005: 128; Colasan, 2003a). On political issues, the Gul-Erdogan cabinet sought explicit commitment from Washington to respect the territorial integrity and unity of Iraq, political representation of the Turcoman (minority ethnic Turks) in post-conflict northern Iraq, and maintenance of the neutrality of the oil-rich centers of Kirkuk and Mosul (Park, 2004a: 82-3; Hale, 2007: 110; also, Yavuz, 2005: 167-8).

The bilateral negotiations, by mid-February, however, remained deadlocked and incomplete in all three areas, especially economic. On the issue of economic aid, for instance, while Washington increased its offer to \$6 billion in grants and \$10 billion in long-term loan guarantees (Salmoni, 2003), the cabinet still sought between \$26 billion to \$40 billion in grants and loans (*Hurriyet*, February 20, 2003; Salmoni, 2003; Hale, 2007: 107-8). In addition, the Gul-Erdogan cabinet vigorously objected to Washington's last minute demand for IMF-supervision of any economic aid (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, February 26, 2003; Bila, 2003d; Sazak, 2003a; Park, 2004a: 84; Colosan, 2003b). Moreover, there was continued disagreement between the cabinet's demands for written and signed Memoranda of Understanding, and the Bush administration's insistence on only a verbal agreement (Tinc, 2003; Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, February 19, 2003; Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, February 21, 2003; Park, 2004a: 84; Bila, 2003a; Sazak, 2003a; Sontag, 2003).

The Gul-Erdogan cabinet also actively engaged in "multidimensional diplomacy"<sup>7</sup> in the hopes of securing a peaceful solution to the on-going crisis, and thereby preventing war. This entailed a focus on regional and bilateral, as well as international efforts. Thus, in early January, the cabinet undertook a Middle East diplomatic initiative. The initiative aimed at putting region-wide political pressure on Iraq to abide by UN resolutions on weapons inspections and to give full, transparent accounting of past efforts at acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) (Kardas, 2006; Park, 2004a; Salmoni, 2003; Robins, 2003). This culminated in the Istanbul

meeting, in late January, of the foreign ministers of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, and Turkey. The resultant Istanbul communiqué, however, merely reiterated the calls for Iraq's cooperation, without any subsequent moves on the part of Iraq for more sincere efforts at cooperation with the UN.

A more direct, bilateral diplomatic initiative was also undertaken. In early February, meetings were held in Ankara between representatives of Saddam Hussein, including his chief deputy and foreign minister, and the Gul-Erdogan cabinet. At offer was the guarantee of safe sanctuary for the Iraqi leader if he chose to go into exile, either in Turkey or another country (Murinson, 2006: 954; Hale, 2007: 105; Kardas, 2006: 321; Sazak, 2003a; also Ergin, 2003). In fact, the offer of sanctuary was merely one of three peaceful solutions that were being actively considered by the cabinet; they also included allowing Hussein to retain power, in exchange for complying with UN resolutions and democratization of his country, and Hussein voluntarily giving up power though not necessarily going into foreign exile (Ergin, 2003; Excerpts of Arinc Interview, March 10, 2003). The cabinet's diplomatic efforts were also supported by Erdogan's meetings with Russia's President Putin and China's Communist Party Secretary General Hu and Prime Minister Zhu, wherein he continued to reiterate the need to peacefully resolve the Iraq crisis (*Hurriyet*, January 15, 2003). This emphasis on a peaceful solution was a consistent theme for much of the crisis. In Erdogan's own words: "I am not one of those expecting a war. I am still banking on a peaceful solution...And we aim to continue these efforts" (Transcript of Erdogan Interview, "AKP Leader Erdogan Assesses Chances of Averting Iraq War", February 9, 2003) and "We are doing our level best so that the Iraq issue ends peacefully." (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, February 19, 2003).

By late February, however, the already much delayed schedule and logistics of military planning forced the Bush administration to more aggressively push the Gul-Erdogan cabinet to make a parliamentary submission of the anticipated land access bill (Sazak, 2003b; Kardas, 2006: 320). Despite this more aggressive stance on the part of Washington, the cabinet was met with a countervailing demand. This countervailing

demand, projected from influential circles both inside and outside of government, argued that such a bill would first have to be preceded by a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution that explicitly authorized the use of force against Iraq (Sarıkaya, 2003a; Colasan, 2003a; Hale, 2007:104, 111; Transcripts of Ret. General Kemal Yavuz Interview, February 17, 2003; Sazak, 2003b; Cevik, 2003). As well, only through such UNSC resolution, it was argued, would the dispatch of Turkey's own troops to northern Iraq meet the necessary constitutional requirements on external use of force (Excerpts of Arinc Interview, March 10, 2003). In fact, Erdogan also publicly acknowledged that such a UNSC resolution may be necessary (Transcript of Erdogan Interview, February 9, 2003; Hale, 2007: 111). Notwithstanding the debate over the possibility of a parliamentary submission of the land access bill, the cabinet also faced another issue: the type of voting procedure to be employed, in the event of a bill submission. In keeping with past "oligarchical" practices of most political parties in Turkey (Salmoni, 2003: 4; Robins, 2003: 560), some observers argued that a "group" vote<sup>8</sup> would most likely be chosen over a free vote (Dundar, 2003). Similarly, in consideration of what was at stake for Turkey (ie. economic, political, military, and strategic interests), and to lessen the possibility of a rejection of any submitted bill, some expected the cabinet to impose strict party discipline on the vote (Rubin, 2005; Saglam, 2003; also Yavuz, 2005: 170).

At this critical juncture of the crisis, then, the Gul-Erdogan cabinet's most likely policy option set, on the land access bill, was the following:

1. Continue to push for peaceful solution (eg. Hussein's cooperation, exile, and/or stepping down from power, US giving up its war plans, etc) and reject submission of bill.
2. Wait for UNSC resolution.
3. Submit bill for parliamentary approval *after* signed agreement and allow free vote.
4. Submit bill for parliamentary approval after signed agreement and impose *group* vote.
5. Submit bill for parliamentary approval *before* signed agreement and allow free

vote.

6. Submit bill for parliamentary approval before signed agreement and impose *group* vote.

Each option also entailed particular implications, along several dimensions. These dimensions are: domestic politics, external political (Northern Iraq), economic, military and strategic.

The option of pursuing a peaceful solution and the option of waiting for a UNSC resolution implied non-cooperation, since they went against the Bush administration's goal of an immediate near-term permission for land access for setting up a northern front<sup>9</sup>. The other four options, however, implied cooperation with US military planning since they were aimed at granting land access in the immediate near-term. It is unlikely that this set represents an exhaustive list of all possible policy alternatives that were considered by the Gul-Erdogan cabinet, as it neared its decision time point. But, the foregoing chronological process-tracing of the main events suggests that this policy option set may be a fairly accurate representation of the options that were considered at the time<sup>10</sup>. To explain the cabinet's policy choice, the decisionmaking process of the poliheuristic perspective must be illustrated. This process is driven by a decision heuristic that initially focuses on the domestic political dimension. The focus on that particular dimension will in turn suggest that the Gul-Erdogan cabinet would have been able to quickly eliminate non-feasible alternatives from the above identified policy option set.

### **Domestic Politics**

A core decision heuristic of the poliheuristic theory stipulates that, in the first stage of decision-making, the set of policy alternatives or options are weighed against the most important dimension. This usually is the domestic political dimension (Mintz, 1993, 2004). Perceived losses, either potential or real, along this dimension cannot be compensated by gains in other dimensions (eg. military, economic, strategic, etc). In

other words, for political leaders, losses along the domestic political dimension are non-compensatory. Thus, policy options with perceived losses along the domestic political dimension are expected to be dropped from further consideration.

***Public Opposition.*** From the very outset, Washington's request for US military land access created much national controversy and debate. In fact, in one of the earliest public opinion polls on the issue, the Pew Research Center found, in early December, that nearly 85% of Turkey's public opposed their government's authorizing US forces to use Turkey's bases to attack Iraq (Jarreau, 2002). Similarly, at least one longitudinal polling also showed that between December and January, public opposition to US military intervention in Iraq had increased from approximately 87% to roughly 94% (Uslu et al, 2005: Tables 1 and 2). On the other hand, and not surprisingly, the public also indicated a strong preference for a "peaceful solution" to the Iraqi crisis, as reflected in 75% of the Turkish public's support for diplomatic efforts such as those that were undertaken by Gul (Uslu et al, 2005: Table 29).

Erdogan was fully aware of such public opposition. Yet, at the same time, he seemed to deliberately downgrade its import. His public statements suggested as much, as revealed in an interview, in mid-February of 2003:

“Erdogan: ... Almost one hundred percent of Turks are saying ‘no’ to war.

Der Spiegel: [Then] why can you not bring yourself to an outright ‘no’ to US President George W. Bush, like Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder [of Germany]?

Erdogan: Germany is in a very comfortable situation, as it has no common borders with Iraq. The two cases are totally different.” (Transcript of Erdogan Interview, February 9, 2003; also Bisrel, 2003).

This short exchange thus suggests that while acknowledging Turkish public opposition to cooperation with US military action against Iraq, Erdogan did not seem

wholly convinced of the need to simply follow the dictates of such public opinion, however intense.

***Group versus Free Vote.*** In contrast to his apparent under-appreciation of oppositional public opinion, Erdogan was more fully cognizant of the intra-party ramifications of a “wrong” policy choice on more immediate political fortunes of the AKP and, by association, his own. Indeed, since he was the leader-in-waiting of a government whose mandate was but a few months old, Erdogan’s decision-making was driven by two related goals<sup>11</sup>: becoming the PM and preserving the governing mandate of the AKP (Salmoni, 2003: 5; Robins, 2003: 564). But such goals were complicated by a simple fact: in addition to the foundational Islamist roots of the AKP, the policy preferences of the deputies of its parliamentary group were, in no small measure, influenced and shaped by Turkey’s oppositional public opinion (Hale, 2007: 103; Yavuz, 2005: 170; Kardas, 2006: 315-320).

Then, given the politico-situational context of Erdogan, a decision by simple fiat and expectation of “total allegiance”, typifying the form of most past Turkish political parties (Salmoni, 2003: 4), would have been very problematic. In other words, unlike with public opinion, intra-party opposition to the land access bill could be dismissed only at the risk of incurring serious political consequences for the AKP’s official leader-in-waiting. Critical to Erdogan’s decision calculus, however, was the *level* of opposition within the AKP Parliamentary group, or the rank-and-file AKP deputies. According to an informed account, Erdogan expected only about forty AKP deputies to defect and cast “no” votes, in the event of a parliamentary submission of the land access bill<sup>12</sup>.

However, since the Justice and Development Party controlled 363 out of 550 seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM), this was still a very safe “margin of error” (Robins, 2003: 564; Hale, 2007). In fact, the number of excess parliamentary seats beyond an absolute majority for the AKP, in relation to the expected number of defections, was nearly two to one. Clearly, a parliamentary submission of the land access bill would not have been overly problematic, from the standpoint of preserving the



AKP's governing mandate. Thus, the truly vexing dilemma for the Gul-Erdogan cabinet was not whether or not to submit the land access bill – as would be implied by a facile focus on oppositional public opinion alone. Rather, the dilemma was over the type of vote to be used in the event of such: a free vote versus a group vote.

Erdogan was concerned that the use of a group vote, via the imposition of party discipline, would have met great resistance among the AKP deputies, and created serious rifts within the party, including its possible breakup (Sazak, 2003c; also Robins, 2003: 564). An equally great danger was that the use of a group vote would have led to mass defections which, in turn, would have triggered a no-confidence motion by the Republican People's Party (CHP), the AKP's main parliamentary opposition (Phillips, 2004; Colasan, 2003a; Altayli, 2003; Bisrel, 2003). This threat was real, since the AKP Parliamentary Speaker Arinc, the leader of the Islamist faction of the AKP, had also publicly opposed the land access bill (Kardas, 2006: 317-22; Hale, 2007: 103, 111; Sontag, 2003; Sazak, 2003; Robins, 2003: 564; Kirisci, 2004: 43). True enough, as with the group vote, the use of a free vote also entailed the risk of parliamentary rejection of the bill. However, there still were three important advantages to the use of a free vote. Unlike with the group vote, for instance, a free vote would not have triggered a no-confidence motion, in the event that the land access bill, if submitted, failed to gain parliamentary passage. Thus, the use of a free vote largely mitigated the dangers of government dissolution, and allowed it to continue to exercise its governing mandate.

Just as importantly, in relation to public opinion – whatever its discount - a free vote served two aims. First, it signaled to the public that its views were not being ignored, since a free vote allowed the public's representatives to determine the fate of any submitted bill. And second, if a submitted land access bill obtained parliamentary passage, the use of a free vote would have afforded Erdogan a certain amount of "absolution", in case of a public backlash against his future electoral fortunes (re: upcoming Siirt by-election). Erdogan was also keenly aware of such implications, as reflected in the following exchange: "Can you say that you are responsible before history in any decision that will be taken?", asked Ali Kirca [interviewer] to Erdogan

who replied ‘if we take a group decision, yes’ ” (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, February 21, 2003 [brackets mine]).

### **Options: Elimination and Retention**

The foregoing recount of the main events in this phase of the Iraqi crisis is thus suggestive of two things. First, oppositional public opinion exerted minimal direct impact on Erdogan’s decision calculus; its indirect impact on shaping the policy preferences of those within the AKP’s parliamentary group was greater. And second, the foremost concern for Erdogan, along the domestic political dimension, was the maintenance of the AKP’s governing mandate (Salmoni, 2003: 5; Robins, 2003: 564). Within the initial policy option set, certain options clearly posed a greater threat to such mandate than others. These are the two options that included a group vote component, such as the fourth option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval after a signed agreement, and impose a *group* vote), and the sixth option (ie. ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval before a signed agreement, and impose a *group* vote).

According to the poliheuristic perspective, in the initial stage of decisionmaking, policy options that do not satisfy the requirements along the most important dimension (ie. domestic politics) must be dropped from further consideration. This, in effect, constituted Erdogan’s decision rule in the first stage of the decisionmaking process. Ergo, in keeping with the dictates of such decision rule, the fourth and the sixth options were eliminated from further consideration. From the original option set, then, what remained were two options that implied non-cooperation with the Bush administration’s goal of setting up a northern front: the first option (ie. continue to push for peaceful solution) and the second option (ie. wait for UNSC resolution). The other two options implied cooperation: the third option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval *after* a signed agreement, and allow free vote) and the fifth option (ie. ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval *before* a signed agreement, and allow free vote).

In order to identify the most optimal choice among the remaining policy options, in the second stage of the decision-making process, Erdogan undertook a more analytic

assessment of each option across a common set of relevant dimensions. Past studies in poliheuristic research suggest that military and strategic dimensions often represent principal concerns for decision makers in the second-stage of the decision making process (eg. Mintz, 1993; DeRouen, 2002; Brulé, 2005). This is in line with Erdogan's frequent citing of the various strategic implications (eg. alliance ties) as being a key factor in the cabinet's approach to the crisis (eg. Erdogan, 2002; Transcript of Erdogan Interview, February 9, 2003; Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, February 26, 2003). As well, military issues represented an explicit area of bilateral negotiations with the Bush administration. The two other issue areas of negotiation, economic and political (ie. northern Iraq) reflected the non-stylized nature of the crisis, and as such represented important and self-evident dimensions of the policy options for Erdogan. The remaining policy options are evaluated in terms of benefits relative to costs and probability of successfully effecting each option.

### **Economic Dimension**

Given the crisis context of the Turkish economy, the Gul-Erdogan cabinet was faced with a simple choice filled with major implications: cooperate or not cooperate with the Bush administration's plans for setting up a northern front. "Cooperation" implied immediate near-term parliamentary submission for approval of the land access bill, whereas "non-cooperation" implied no such bill submission. The costs of non-cooperation were rather stark. In the event of US military action against Iraq, the projected economic damage to Turkey from lost trade alone was estimated to be between \$40 billion and \$100 billion (US) (Transcripts of Erdogan Interview, February 9, 2003; Robins, 2003: 560; Idiz, 2003; Baran, 2008; Kardas, 2006: 311; also Park, 2005: 27). Non-cooperation meant that avenues for redressing such expected economic losses would be few (Congar, 2003). Thus, options such as continuing to pursue a peaceful solution or waiting for a UNSC resolution entailed relatively greater near-term costs compared to benefits along the economic dimension. Further, such expected costs were generally higher for the first option, since it entailed very little possibility of cooperation,

unlike the second option which did not rule out such cooperation; it was only made conditional on a UNSC resolution. Moreover, in terms of probabilities of success, the first and second options were problematic. For instance, in one of his less-guarded moments, Erdogan admitted that all diplomatic efforts at peaceful resolution were exhausted (Excerpt of Erdogan Feast of Sacrifice Message, February 10, 2003; also Kardas, 2006: 320-1). Thus continued pursuit of such avenues as Hussein's cooperation, exile, and/or stepping down from power, US giving up its war plans, etc were very unlikely to yield fruit. Similarly, despite his public calls for a more definitive UNSC resolution on the use of force against Iraq, most informed observers believed that such a resolution was unlikely to be forthcoming (eg. Transcripts of Ret. General Kemal Yavuz Interview, February 17, 2003; also Park, 2004a, 2005; Hale, 2007)

On the other hand, considering the still on-going effects of the economic crisis in Turkey and the anticipated further economic losses that Turkey would have suffered in the event of conflict in Iraq, a decision to cooperate with the Bush administration held very tangible benefits along the economic dimension. For instance, even if, in return for its expected cooperation (ie. immediate near-term parliamentary submission of the land access bill), the lower limit of the Bush administration's economic aid offer was immediately accepted, the subsequent bilateral agreement would have amounted to billions of dollars, in the form of grants and long-term, low interest loan guarantees. There were indirect benefits as well. These included a major injection of confidence in the financial markets, and anticipated positive US leverage on the upcoming fourth IMF loan review process (Saglam, 2003; Park, 2005: 24; Idiz, 2003). Further, cooperation with the US would have facilitated Turkey's participation in post-conflict reconstruction projects, including the decisions over the major oil wells in Kirkuk and Mosul and the important Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline that extended into Turkey's Mediterranean coast (Olson, 2005: 99; Park, 2005: 25; also Hale, 2007: 33). These, in effect, represented some of the expected benefits of the third option, and its requirement of an agreement before submission of the land access bill.

However, in the context of cooperation, the fifth option's call for continued negotiations also held certain advantages. The key to such advantages was time. The calendar-sensitive logistics and operational requirements of military planning meant that the Bush administration was under time and budget pressures to conclude an agreement as soon as possible (Hale, 2007: 108). For the Bush administration, this also meant that a long drawn-out negotiation process was not in its own national interests. For the Gul-Erdogan cabinet, however, the time pressures of the Bush administration had the opposite implications: if adroitly exploited, such pressures would lead to more concessions from the latter (Salmoni, 2003; Park, 2004a; Park, 2005; also Parris, 2003: 2). Therefore, rather than immediately agreeing to the standing US offer on economic aid, the option of continuing negotiations held the realistic prospect of greater economic dividends. Overall, therefore, more benefits than costs attended with any decision to cooperate in US military plans for establishing a northern front, as reflected in the third option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval after a signed agreement) and the fifth option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval before a signed agreement). Moreover, though the third option represented more tangible immediate economic benefits, the fifth option held the very realistic prospect of greater final economic benefits.

Another critical difference between the third and fifth options concerned relative probabilities of success<sup>13</sup>. Much of this related to the timing of the parliamentary submission of the land access bill as well as the *type* (ie. verbal versus signed) of agreement sought<sup>14</sup>. For instance, it was Erdogan's stated belief that a signed agreement, as opposed to merely a verbal agreement, would have afforded greater guarantees that the Bush administration would uphold its promises. Such a signed agreement would have allowed Turkey to avoid a replay of the "cheating" inflicted on it, and of the unfulfilled promises made to it, as in the first Gulf War (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, February 19, 2003; Bila, 2003a; Kardas, 2006: 312; Kapsis, 2005: 382; Rubin, 2005; Sever, 2003; also Park, 2004a: 84; Park, 2005: 26). Relatedly, Erdogan believed that the land access bill submitted for approval only *after* obtaining a signed bilateral agreement would have received more support among the AKP deputies (Excerpts of Erdogan

Interview, February 19, 2003; Idiz, 2003; also, Akyol, 2003). This in turn would have increased the bill's probability of successful parliamentary passage. Nonetheless, the Bush administration was opposed to any written commitments – at least in the immediate term - citing the setting of a negative precedent for the US in future crises (Tinc, Feb 23). Thus, in the short-term, the probability of actually obtaining such a signed agreement by the Gul-Erdogan cabinet was rather low. Moreover, given the deadlocked state of the bilateral negotiations and time-constraints (eg. time required to draw up the document and vetting by relevant stakeholders), even if the Bush administration had decided to modify its position, a signed agreement would have taken longer to achieve. These factors, in effect, “nullified” the third option's higher likelihood of successfully passing the land access bill in a timely manner. In contrast, the fifth option only required a parliamentary submission of the land access bill, and contained no such pre-requisite as an already obtained signed agreement; the signed agreement could come *after* the bill submission – but before the actual parliamentary vote. Indeed, this option was exactly in line with the original preferences of the Bush administration for much of the crisis (eg. Transcripts of Foreign Minister Yakis Interview, February 16, 2003). Though this in turn meant a lower probability of parliamentary passage of the bill, the overall probability of success of this option was still higher than the third option.

### **External-Political (Northern Iraq) Dimension**

In addition to economic aid, or “compensation”, the Gul-Erdogan cabinet also pursued certain political goals with respect to northern Iraq. In large part, these goals were intimately tied to long-standing Turkish policy regarding the region's Kurds. For various reasons, including the potentially trans-regional unifying effect on its own restive Kurd population in the southeast, as well as possible irredentist designs, Turkey has long concerned itself with preventing the emergence of any independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq (Yavuz and Ozcan, 2006; Fuller, 2004: 61; Murinson, 2006: 954; Hale, 2007: 96; Park, 2004a: 83; Kirisci, 2004). The prevention of such a development represented a crucial “red line” in Turkish foreign policy that could not be crossed

(Bozarslan, 2005: 128; Park, 2005: 24; Hale, 2007: 96). In addition, as part of its efforts to dilute the Kurdish dominance in northern Iraq, beginning in 2001, Turkish foreign policy began to pointedly emphasize the political rights of the minority ethnic Turcomans, concentrated in and around Mosul and Kirkuk (Yavuz and Ozcan, 2006: 106; Park, 2005: 25; also Hale, 2007: 13, 76).

Relative to such interests along the external-political dimension, however, the consequences of a decision to reject cooperation with the Bush administration in its plans for creating a northern front against Iraq, as represented by the first option (ie. continue pursuit of peaceful solution) and the second option (ie. wait for UNSC resolution) were simple. Since these two options implied a rejection of the parliamentary submission of the land access bill, as a corollary they also necessarily precluded any type of bilateral agreement concerning Turkey's interests in northern Iraq along the external-political dimension. Thus by implication, the first option and the second option eliminated any opportunities for preserving the "red line" in northern Iraq and the political rights of the Turcoman (Park, 2004b: 499; also Kirisci, 2004: 44-5). Further, in addition to the low likelihood of a peaceful solution or a UNSC resolution, most channels (eg. media reports, statements by administration officials, etc) indicated a determination by the Bush administration to use military force to remove the Iraqi regime, *irrespective* of any continued efforts at a peaceful solution by the cabinet or an authoritative UNSC resolution (Hale, 2007; Park, 2004a, 2005; also Kardas, 2006: 327). These factors only reinforced the low probability of success of the first and second options. Thus, adoption of either the first or the second option meant not only a forfeiture of Turkey's role in any post-conflict political settlement of Iraq, but also a forfeiture of its own specific political goals in northern Iraq (Transcript of Erdogan Interview, February 9, 2003). As with the economic dimension, such expected costs, along the external-political dimension, were generally higher for the first option, since it entailed very little possibility of cooperation, unlike the second option which did not rule out the possibility of such cooperation, under the right conditions (ie. a definitive UNSC authorization on use of force against Iraq).

Decisions to cooperate (ie. third and fifth options), however, presented their own benefits and drawbacks. As part of its bilateral negotiations, the Gul-Erdogan cabinet made three political demands: respect for the territorial unity of Iraq, the political neutrality of northern Iraq's two key cities of Mosul and Kirkuk, and political recognition of the Turcomans (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, February 12, 2003; Park, 2004a: 82-83; Hale, 2007: 100; Tinc, 2003). A bilateral agreement, if successfully concluded on the cabinet's terms, was expected to give such political recognition to the Turcomans, with perhaps a meaningful role in a post-conflict Iraq, including its northern regions (Hale, 2007: 100; Park, 2004a: 82; Congar, 2003). As well, such an agreement would have given explicit guarantees to the territorial unity of Iraq, including the neutrality of Mosul and Kirkuk, and the necessary military tools to counter PKK activity (Congar, 2003; Park, 2005: 21-23; Robins, 2003: 560). These developments would have met the goal of preserving the "red line" in the Kurd-dominated northern Iraq. And lastly, both of these goals were expected to be confirmed in the form of signed, written commitments (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, February 19, 2003). Thus, for both the third and fifth options, along the political dimension, the expected benefits of cooperation were clear. And again, the third option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval after obtaining a signed agreement) represented patently greater immediate benefits relative to the fifth option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval before obtaining a signed agreement).

But there existed temporal differences regarding the likelihood of obtaining such goals and their inclusion in a signed, written agreement. Part of this related to US military planning that was dependent on cooperation from not only the Turks, but also the Iraqi Kurds (Sever, 2003; Kapsis, 2005: 381). Thus, for instance, and despite the demands of the Gul-Erdogan cabinet, the Bush administration was reluctant to give any guarantees on the territorial unity issue, for fear of alienating the two main Kurdish groups in the region, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). In fact, these Kurdish groups had earlier publicly re-stated their right to self-government, as well as a right of secession from a post-conflict Iraq



(Hale, 2007: 109; Tinc, 2003), thus only complicating the position of the Bush administration. For similar reasons, it would seem, the administration also refused to recognize the political status of the Turcoman, as per the Gul-Erdogan cabinet's original demands (Bila, 2003d). Lastly, as with the economic issues, the Bush administration was opposed to a written agreement. These factors suggested that, in the immediate near-term, obtaining a signed bilateral agreement that conformed with Turkey's political interests was unlikely to occur *before* any parliamentary submission for approval of the land access bill. This, in turn, negatively affected the third option's probability of success. On the other hand, the possibility of obtaining such concessions from the Bush administration would have been greater if the cabinet, in line with the fifth option, chose to first submit the land access bill for parliamentary approval, and continued to press its political interests on northern Iraq. When considered in conjunction with the time pressures faced by the Bush administration to reach an agreement, such display of cooperative behavior would have put the onus on the Bush administration to eventually reciprocate via written commitments on the political goals sought by the cabinet. Thus, in terms of the likelihood of success along the external-political dimension, the fifth option had higher probability of such in comparison to the third option.

### **Military Dimension**

Ever since the first Gulf War, Turkey has continued to maintain a small-scale military presence in northern Iraq. But in the current context, the Gul-Erdogan cabinet sought a more robust military presence in the region. In part, this was justified on grounds of securing certain "benign" goals such as the prevention of a repeat of the refugee crisis of the first Gulf War, the securing of important pipelines, and elimination of terrorist "safe havens" in northern Iraq from which the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) had continually launched its operations into Turkey (Baran, 2008; Hale, 2007: 100; Yavuz and Ozcan, 2006; Sever, 2003; Kapsis, 2005; Park, 2005: 25; Idiz, 2003). But much of the Gul-Erdogan cabinet's rationale for a military presence in northern Iraq also had to do with important external-political goals, especially the preservation of the

“red line” against an independent Kurdish state. The military’s role, for instance, was deemed especially critical in the disarming of the various autonomous Kurdish groups, lest they forcefully agitated for greater autonomy or independence in a post-conflict situation. To accomplish this, the Turkish military had to be permitted to act independently and, if need be, to unilaterally intervene in parts of northern Iraq (Kirisci, 2004: 44; Kardas, 2006: 312-3; Park, 2005: 25). Further, a physical military presence in northern Iraq was deemed necessary if the neutrality of the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul were to be assured and, as well, if Ankara wished to have long-term strategic influence resultant from any post-conflict political realignments (Clarke, 2004: 54; Bozarslan, 2005: 23-4; Kapsis, 2005: 385).

In light of its goals in northern Iraq along the military dimension, the non-cooperative options of continuing to pursue a peaceful solution or waiting for a UNSC resolution would have been very problematic for the Gul-Erdogan cabinet. Since these options precluded an immediate near-term submission of the land access bill, the cabinet would have forfeited the possibility of a Turkish military presence, along with any significant leverage against the Bush administration for securing its military interests in northern Iraq. In the consequent absence of a military presence in northern Iraq, then, the expected costs would have been reflected in such things as an increase in PKK activity and incursions into Turkey, moves to greater autonomy and statehood by the Iraqi Kurds, etc (eg. Hale, 2007: 124, 131-2; Kirisci, 2004: 42-5; Parris, 2005; Kapsis, 2005: 385). Further, as with the economic and external-political dimensions, the non-cooperative first and second options would have entailed relatively more expected losses than benefits, if any, along the military dimension (Transcript of Erdogan Interview, February 9, 2003). And such expected losses would have been greater for the first option, in comparison to the second option. As well, the probabilities of success of both options were low, owing to two related and earlier-identified factors: the low likelihood of success of the options themselves (ie. a peaceful solution or a UNSC resolution), and the expected US military action against Iraq *irrespective* of the Gul-Erdogan cabinet’s

choice of either continuing its pursuit of a peaceful solution or waiting for a UNSC resolution.

The benefits of cooperating with the Bush administration, however, were just as clear. In its bilateral negotiations with the Bush administration, the cabinet specifically sought to limit the size of the US troop deployment into northern Iraq (while trying to maximize the size of its own deployment), explicit guarantees on the re-collection of any heavy weaponry distributed to the Kurds by the US, and acceptance of a Turkish military command in northern Iraq that was independent and separate, though co-ordinating with the US command (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, February 26, 2003; Transcripts of Ret. General Kemal Yavuz Interview, February 17, 2003; Bila, 2003b; Hale, 2007: 112; Olson, 2005: 101; Park, 2004a: 83). Thus, an agreement, if favorably concluded on the cabinet's terms, would have resulted in a robust, sizeable and largely independent Turkish military presence, disarmed Kurdish militias, and a contained PKK. Such a military situation, in turn, would have afforded much support to the cabinet's political goals in northern Iraq, particularly as regards the "red line" against an independent Kurdish state and curtailing of PKK activity. Therefore, for both the third and fifth options, along the military dimension, the expected benefits of cooperation outweighed the costs, if any. As with the previous dimensions, such expected benefits were higher for the option third option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval after obtaining a signed agreement) compared to the fifth option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval before obtaining a signed agreement).

But, there existed differences between the third and fifth options, as regards their relative probabilities of success. And, as with the external-political dimension, part of this related to the Bush administration's need for cooperation from both Ankara and the Iraqi Kurds, in setting up its northern front. But such cooperation was complicated by the Iraqi Kurds' intense opposition to a Turkish military entry into northern Iraq, and the KDP's threats of military clashes between Turkish forces and its own militias if such entry occurred (Hale, 2007: 108-9; also Park, 2004a: 82). Moreover, even if the Bush administration were to accede to the cabinet's demand for a sizeable Turkish military

entry into northern Iraq, it was still opposed to a written agreement. Thus, notwithstanding the demands of the Gul-Erdogan cabinet, along the military dimension, the likelihood of obtaining a signed agreement *before* a parliamentary submission for approval of the land access bill was low. This in turn implied negative implications for the third option's probability of success. Conversely, however, a higher probability of success obtained if, in line with the fifth option, the land access bill was first submitted for parliamentary approval, followed up with continued negotiations on the military issues. As with the external-political dimension, the higher probability of success of this fifth option along the military dimension, would have owed to two factors: time pressures faced by the Bush administration, and the onus to reciprocate on a positive demonstration of cooperation by the Gul-Erdogan cabinet.

### **Strategic Dimension**

In addition to the economic, external-political, and military implications, the Gul-Erdogan cabinet had to weigh, per the demands of the poliheuristic theory, the strategic implications of its second-stage options. Among Turkey's various strategic relationships, the one with the US had always been most prioritized. In part, this owed to a path dependent aversion (eg. ascription of Arab "betrayal" for the demise of the Ottoman empire) to any type of serious engagement with its Arab and Muslim neighbors (eg. Iran, Syria, and Iraq) in the region (Fuller, 2004; Park, 2004b). Thus, perhaps as a natural outcome, Turkey's geo-strategic Cold War foreign policy interests converged with those of the US in containing Arab-supported Soviet expansionism in the region, and finding common cause with Washington's other close regional ally, Israel, in countering the Arab proxies of the Soviet Union. As testified by Turkey's participation in various US-led operations (eg. first Gulf War, peacekeeping in Kosovo, Afghanistan etc), continued close military cooperation (eg. transfer and sale of equipment and technology), and defense ties (eg. US use of Turkey's airbases to constrain post-1991 Iraq) etc, this "strategic partnership" with the US largely held even with the demise of the Soviet threat (Parris, 2003; Kapsis, 2005).

Given Turkey's strategic legacy, and in light of its still large import (Erdogan Address at Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 10, 2002; Transcript of Erdogan Interview, February 9, 2003), the drawbacks of non-cooperation in US military plans for establishing a northern front, as represented by the first option (ie. continued pursuit of peaceful solution) and the second option (ie. wait for a UNSC resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq) were many. As one obvious expected cost, for example, the historical "strategic partnership" with the US would have been compromised, perhaps not irreparably, but certainly with consequential reevaluation and inevitable readjustment by Washington. At a minimum, a refusal by the cabinet to make positive moves (ie. parliamentary submission of bill) in granting immediate near-term land access to US forces would most likely have been rejoined by the Bush administration's subsequent and eventual downgrading of Turkey's strategic utility for the US (Park, 2004b: 505; also Kardas, 2006: 321). At a material level, this would likely have been reflected in such developments as decreases in military aid, sales, and technology transfers, either bilaterally or via Washington's proxy, Israel (Parris, 2005; Fuller, 2003; Cakirozer, 2003). The scrapping or indefinite delay of certain key joint defense projects (eg. AH-1Z attack helicopters and airborne early-warning and control aircraft) would have been the likely outcome (Cakirozer, 2003). At a policy level, the strategic down grade would similarly have led to the Bush administration's decreased enthusiasm for Turkey's own key foreign policy goals, including EU accession and membership. As well, with respect to northern Iraq, the cabinet's choice to refuse cooperation would likely have induced greater reliance on the Iraqi Kurds by the Bush administration (Sever, 2003; Rubin, 2005), with an inevitable increase in the PUK and KDP's strategic profile and attendant interests, such as greater autonomy and self-governance in perhaps a post-Hussein federal structure. From a slightly longer-term perspective, the evolution of a more assured and *de facto* independent Kurdish state would also have had the potential to greatly complicate Turkey's historically distant relationships with its regional neighbors, such as Syria and Iran. Thus Turkey would likely have been forced to face an uncertain and unwelcome

strategic re-orientation, in an effort to deal with what all three countries share in common – the existence of sizeable Kurdish populations within their territories<sup>15</sup> who would likely be drawn to an independent Kurdish state and thus agitate regional instability (Park, 2005: 22). Thus along the strategic dimension, the overall expected costs of non-cooperation, such as the pursuit of a peaceful solution or waiting for a UNSC resolution, clearly outweighed the benefits of such, and they would have been greater for first option (ie. pursue peaceful solution) compared to the second solution (ie. wait for UNSC resolution). In addition, these options reflected low probabilities of success, as per previously noted reasons, including the very high likelihood of US military action against Iraq, irrespective of whether the cabinet chose to continue its exploration of peaceful solutions or wait for a more definitive UNSC resolution.

On the other hand, for the Gul-Erdogan cabinet, a decision to cooperate, as reflected in the third (ie. parliamentary submission for approval of bill *after* a signed agreement) and fifth (ie. parliamentary submission for approval of bill *before* a signed agreement) options, would have yielded substantial benefits along the strategic dimension. In large measure, these benefits related to the most salient strategic issues of concern, such as the status of the Iraqi Kurds and alliance relationship with the US. The positive implications of cooperation were also, in part, the converse of the negative implications of no cooperation. For instance, since the Bush administration's aim of opening up a northern front via Turkey owed in large part to its perceived tactical advantages (eg. quicker end to conflict, fewer casualties, etc)(Transcripts of Ret. General Kemal Yavuz Interview, February 17, 2003; also Rubin, 2005: 8), a meaningful move on the part of the cabinet to facilitate such goal would have been in keeping with Turkey's historical "strategic partnership" and thus enhance what Erdogan often described as a "natural alliance" between the two countries (eg. Erdogan Address at Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 10, 2002; Transcript of Erdogan Interview, February 9, 2003). A decision that continued to prioritize the bilateral alliance ties also had positive strategic implications in other ways, including its contribution to continued military aid, sales, and technology transfers, either bilaterally or via

Washington's proxy, Israel, thus helping to maintain Turkey's formidable long-term military-strategic advantage in the region, vis-à-vis Iran and Syria, and others (eg. Greece). As well, on other aspects of Turkey's foreign policy agenda, such as EU accession and membership, the Bush administration's continued long-term support would have been assured, notwithstanding the Copenhagen meeting of the previous December. Further, since cooperation with the Bush administration would entail Turkish military presence in northern Iraq, it would imply an active Turkish role in "regional restructuring" and the filling of any "power vacuum" on its borders (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, February 21, 2003; Excerpts of Erdogan Interview, February 12, 2003; also Bisrel, 2003). Thus a decision to cooperate with the Bush administration, whilst undercutting the strategic utility of the Iraqi Kurds, would have allowed the Gul-Erdogan cabinet to more credibly pursue its goal of preserving the "red line" against the emergence of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. The continued securing of its "red line" would in turn imply less need for a strategic re-orientation with respect to other states in the region. Overall, then, the expected benefits along the strategic dimension of a decision to actively cooperate with the Bush administration's goal of obtaining military access to Turkish territory clearly outweighed the costs, if any. Such benefits would have also been higher for the third option, compared to the fifth option. As well, the benefits of the third and fifth options were in clear contrast to the net strategic losses entailed by either the first or second option.

However, it is patently obvious that these various implications along the strategic dimension fell outside of the purview of any type of bilateral negotiation. Thus, even more so than with the military, economic, and external-political dimensions, the relative overall probability of success of the third option and the fifth option along the strategic dimension could only be inferred with respect to the temporal probability of obtaining a signed agreement. As before, the Bush administration was opposed to granting any written, signed commitments, for fear of setting negative precedents in future crisis negotiations. Thus the likelihood of the Gul-Erdogan cabinet obtaining a signed agreement *before* its bill submission was low. On the other hand, if the cabinet made a

positive demonstration of its efforts at cooperation (ie. immediate near-term submission of land access bill for parliamentary approval) and continued to press for a signed agreement, the pressures of time would likely have forced the Bush administration to make the necessary concessions. These factors implied that, overall, and despite the greater strategic benefits of the third option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval after obtaining a signed agreement) relative to the fifth option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval before obtaining a signed agreement), the probability of success of the fifth option was higher than the third option, along the strategic dimension.

The foregoing poliheuristic analysis thus illustrates the likely steps taken and factors considered by Erdogan, in arriving at the decision, on February 25, to submit the land access bill for parliamentary approval, and to do so before obtaining a signed agreement from the Bush administration. The Gul-Erdogan cabinet's decision reflects the final outcome of a decisionmaking process that was driven in large measure by an established decision rule. This non-compensatory decision rule was in turn driven by the basic goal of preserving the AKP's continued governing mandate. But an important question remains: Was this decision really non-compensatory?

### **Discussion: Decision Rule and February 25<sup>th</sup> Decision**

Table E-1<sup>(Appendix E)</sup> shows the original option set. Each option is also disaggregated along the four relevant dimensions (ie. domestic political, external-political [northern Iraq], military, and strategic). The additive total score for each option is shown in the last column<sup>16</sup>. The total score for an option is based on the sum of the adjusted scores across the five dimensions of the option. For each dimension of a policy option, the adjusted score is calculated by taking into account the comparative baseline score, the probability of success of the option, and the weight of the dimension.

First, based on a reading of the relevant primary and secondary sources of information, regarding the net benefits versus costs of each option, a comparative baseline score is assigned to each of the options, across a common dimension. The baseline score of each option is determined through a comparison with each of the other



options, across the common dimension. The higher the baseline score, the higher the net benefits (and the lower the costs) compared to the other options. Second, each baseline score is multiplied by the probability of success of the related option. The product of the baseline score and the probability value is the “initial score”. And third, the initial score is in turn multiplied by the weight of the common dimension; the dimension weight is determined through a subjective assessment of the relative importance of each dimension relative other dimensions. The subjective assessment is based on interpretation of both primary and secondary sources of information. The product of the initial score and the dimension weight is the “adjusted score”. The final score for an option is then based on an additive summation of the five adjusted scores across the five dimensions.

Since the fourth and sixth options were dropped in the first stage from further consideration, in the second stage of the decision process, Erdogan had to carefully weigh the relative benefits, costs, and probability of success of the remaining options: the first option (ie. continue peaceful solution), the second option (ie. wait until UNSC announces decision), the third option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval after obtaining a signed agreement, and imposing a free vote), and the fifth option (ie. (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval before obtaining a signed agreement, and imposing a free vote). Among these remaining policy alternatives, then, the poliheuristic perspective suggests that the option with the highest score is chosen. Compared to the first option, the second option, and the third option, the fifth option has the highest score. The fact that Erdogan also chose the fifth option as his preferred policy does seem to converge with this assessment.

However, the table also indicates that in comparison to *all* of the other options in the initial set, the fifth option (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval before obtaining a signed agreement, and allow a free vote) has the highest total score. Does this imply that the cabinet’s February 25<sup>th</sup> decision was compensatory?

The fact that Erdogan eliminated those options that posed a threat to the governing mandate of the AKP, such as the fourth (ie. Submit bill for parliamentary approval after signed agreement and impose group vote) and sixth option (ie. Submit bill

for parliamentary approval before signed agreement and impose group vote) that entailed a group vote, clearly shows that Erdogan did in fact follow a non-compensatory decision rule<sup>17</sup>. In other words, for Erdogan, the potential political collapse of the AKP government that would attend with any attempt at imposing a group vote was deemed too costly, whatever its mitigation along other dimensions. Thus, a pre-determined non-compensatory decision rule was in effect exercised by Erdogan.

A core strength of the poliheuristic theory is its applicability in crisis contexts wherein pressures of limited time and limited information necessitate decision shortcuts (Mintz, 1993; Mintz et al, 1997). Just as important however, is correctly identifying the particular parameters of the non-compensatory decision rule. In this vein, explanations that focus solely or mostly on oppositional public opinion have difficulty in explaining Erdogan's February 25<sup>th</sup> decision. If Erdogan's non-compensatory decision rule had indeed revolved around oppositional public opinion, then he should have rejected any option that entailed cooperating with the Bush administration in its quest for land access in northern Turkey. This would have entailed the quick elimination of options three to six, including Erdogan's final decision (ie. fifth option). On the other hand, if the analytic focus is adjusted whereby a potential non-compensatory political loss is recognized for Erdogan along the lines of an enforced group vote, then the resultant outcome (ie. submit bill for parliamentary approval before obtaining a signed agreement, and allow a free vote) falls squarely within the poliheuristic explanatory framework.

### **March 1 Vote**

On March 1, the same day as the parliamentary vote, but after the voting had begun, the Bush administration and the Gul-Erdogan cabinet exchanged three written and signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOU). As regards the main military issues, the MOU permitted a maximum of 62,000 US troops to be allowed to transit to northern Iraq. As well, the US was permitted the use of Turkish airbases, in Incirlik, Diyarbakir, and Batman. In return, Turkey was allowed a buffer zone between itself and northern Iraq, permitted to send a roughly equal number of its own troops to the region,

and was given guarantees on the re-collection of heavy weaponry from the Kurds. Also, the MOU stipulated that while the two military forces would coordinate their operations, they would do so under separate commands. On the main political issues, the territorial unity of Iraq were guaranteed, the neutrality of the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul were respected, and the Turcoman were recognized as a “foundational element” of the Iraqi nation. And on the main economic issue, the MOU stipulated that Washington would provide \$6 billion in grants and \$24 billion in long-term, low interest loans to Turkey (Hale, 2007: 110; *Hurriyet*, February 21/26, 2003; Park, 2005; Robins, 2003: 564; Kapsis, 2005: 385; Clarke, 2004: 54). Approximately \$2 billion of the \$6 billion grant was also intended to be in the form of military aid (Sarıkaya, 2003e; Cakirozer, 2003).

The parliamentary vote itself was held in a closed session, and without the imposition of a “group decision” (ie. party discipline) on the AKP deputies. A total of 264 votes were cast in support of the motion, 250 votes against, and 19 abstentions. Since a successful passage required a majority of the total number of all parliamentary deputies, the bill was defeated by four votes<sup>18</sup>. Within the AKP parliamentary group, 99 deputies voted against the bill, chose abstentions, or were absent for the vote (Hale, 2007: 113; Idiz, 2003; Sazak, 2003d). The number of votes cast against the motion by the AKP deputies was thus far in excess of that originally estimated (ie. about forty) by Erdogan. Not surprisingly, in light of his strong belief that the bill would pass, the vote result shocked Erdogan (Kapsis, 2005: 383). In fact, perhaps to mitigate the unavoidable recriminations with the Bush administration, Gul himself gave personal assurances to US Ambassador Pearson on a resubmission of the bill (*Hurriyet*, March 2, 2003).

Despite the March 1 vote failure, the signed MOUs made clear the undeniably large benefits (eg. economic aid, “strategic partnership”, “red lines”, etc) of cooperating with the Bush administration’s goal of establishing a northern military front. Thus, notwithstanding the identification of new and alternative options, many thought that the cabinet would, in the end, maintain the original choice of cooperating with the Bush administration and (re)submit a bill for the creation of such (Idiz, 2003). It was the opinion of most observers, in fact, that the original bill would be resubmitted, if not

immediately, certainly after the March 9 Siirt by-election, in which Erodgan was a candidate (Berkan, 2003; Alyatli, 2003b; Birand, 2003b). This convergent opinion was attributed in part to a more vocal (re)positioning on the issue by powerful constituents and stake-holders among Turkey's elite foreign policy establishment, including the MGK (Joint Chiefs of Staff)(Bayramoglu, 2003; Cemal, 2003), President Sezer, and the Foreign Ministry. Each of them voiced their support for the original bill and urged its resubmission (Sarikaya, 2003e; Birand, 2003b; Cemal, 2003).

But despite such pressures, both domestic and external (ie. Bush administration), the Erdogan cabinet, on March 18, chose to submit for parliamentary passage a new bill that only authorized US air force access to Turkish airspace for sortie missions into Iraq. The bill was subsequently passed by parliament. The obvious question therefore, is: Why did the presumptive-PM Erdogan choose to reject cooperation with the Bush administration's goal of establishing a northern military front against Iraq – one with tremendous “payoffs”, and not necessarily limited to economic ones - and instead choose to submit a new bill that only granted access to Turkey's airspace for the US? Just as importantly, why did the Erdogan cabinet adopt air space access as its final crisis decision, on March 18, despite contrary signals from the public? Indeed, from the perspective of previous studies, the latter question may be even more relevant.

The answer must necessarily begin with an examination of the options that were available to the Erdogan cabinet, in relation to the Bush administration's demands, in this latter phase of the Iraqi crisis.

## **Crisis Phase 2: Post-March 1 Vote and Alternatives**

Shortly after his Siirt by-election victory of March 9, the now-presumptive Prime Minister Erdogan indicated that continued efforts at cooperation with the Bush administration was not ruled out. This implied that a resubmission of the land access bill was still being considered. He also felt more confident about its parliamentary passage. In his own words: “The authorization bill keeps its place on the agenda. As for the date, the voting atmosphere prevailing last Saturday [March 1] should disappear. I feel it is

disappearing, because some of my colleagues have sent letters to tell me that they will now vote positively” (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview on CNN Turk, March 11, 2003; also Excerpts of Yakis Interview, March 9, 2003 and Hale, 2007: 114). In support of Erdogan, the AKP parliamentary group chairman, Celik, also made positive indications on the resubmission of the original bill – one that would now put more emphasis on the bill’s “humanitarian aims”<sup>19</sup>. Thus there were some signs that the level of internal opposition was being attenuated, perhaps moved by a re-positioning on the land access issue by the aforementioned stakeholders in Turkey’s foreign policy establishment.

There were strong indications that the cabinet was also considering other cooperative options, including the possibility of making a parliamentary submission of a modified bill. In fact, media op-ed pieces indicated that at least two modified bills were under serious consideration by the cabinet. In the first, the bill would allow airlifting of US combat troops through Turkey – without touching Turkish soil - to northern Iraq, while permitting terrestrial passage of heavy weaponry and military equipment. In the second, terrestrial deployment for the US military would be permitted only for support troops, while combat troops would again be allowed to be airlifted to northern Iraq. Thus, despite the slight variation between the two, both modified options involved the opening of Turkish airspace to the US for the transport of its combat troops with the ultimate aim of establishing a northern military front against Iraq (Bila, 2003e). Moreover, both options still involved granting land access to some aspects of US military planning.

Thus, Erdogan did not dismiss the possibility of a resubmission of the land access bill, neither in its original nor modified form. On the other hand, Erdogan was also careful to emphasize that certain issues had yet to be resolved before further moves on cooperation could be made. Notably left out of the MOU, for instance, was any explicit reference to the political representation of the Turcoman in a post-conflict political structure of the Kurd-dominated northern Iraq (Bila, 2003d). Moreover, the Bush administration not only still insisted on IMF supervision of the economic aid, it now also claimed that such aid was subject to final Congressional approval (Bila, 2003d;

Kardas, 2006: 324; *Milliyet*, March 9, 2003). However, as was the case before the parliamentary vote, Erdogan continued to indicate that an amelioration of the anti-land access mood within the AKP could not be achieved if the Bush administration refused to address such outstanding issues. (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview on CNN Turk, March 11, 2003; *Milliyet*, March 9, 2003; also Bila, 2003c/d/e). At other times, however, Erdogan also conveyed the impression that a second UNSC resolution was needed. As prior to the March 1 parliamentary vote, Erdogan continued to state that a follow-up to UNSC resolution 1441, one that more explicitly authorized military action against Iraq was required, before his cabinet could make further moves on cooperation with the Bush administration. In his own words: “It will be beneficial for us to see the United Nations Security Council resolution. We will determine our steps after we see all these”(Excerpts of Erdogan Interview on TGRT, March 6, 2003; *Milliyet*, March 14, 2003).

By mid-March, or approximately two weeks after the cabinet’s failure to secure a parliamentary passage of the original land access bill, the Bush administration sent Erdogan what is now referred to as the “Second Johnson letter”, or a thinly veiled ultimatum against backtracking on cooperation. Moreover, in addition to a demand for a resubmission of the original land access bill, the Bush administration now also sought Turkish permission for use of its air space, to allow a dedicated corridor for US combat sorties into targets in Iraq (Sarıkya, 2003c). In fact, in an earlier related development, informed sources in the Turkish media suggested that a bill that only permitted airspace access for the US military could represent a replacement for the land access request - a possibility that was neither confirmed nor denied by the cabinet (eg. Excerpts of Yakis Interview, March 9, 2003).

In this latter phase of the crisis negotiations with the Bush administration, therefore, the following represents the likely options that were available to the Erdogan cabinet, formed on March 14:

1. Resubmit the original bill.
2. Resubmit the original bill with agreement on outstanding issues.
3. Submit a modified bill.

4. Submit a bill only for airspace access.
5. Wait for UNSC resolution. (ie. let stand the March 1 vote, and do nothing)

As before, this option set is unlikely to be wholly exhaustive<sup>20</sup>. But since it does reflect the range of options that were most probably under consideration, the set is fairly representative of the Erdogan cabinet's options in the latter phase of the Iraq crisis. The first (ie. resubmit original bill), the second (ie. resubmit original bill with agreement on outstanding issues), and the third option (ie. submit a modified bill) represents a decision to continue cooperation since each was aimed at facilitating the Bush administration's goal of establishing a northern military front against Iraq. The fourth option (ie. submit a bill only for airspace access) and the fifth option (ie. wait for UNSC resolution) represent a decision against cooperation, since neither entailed an immediate near-term submission of a bill that would lead to the creation of a northern front, per the demands of the Bush administration and its military planning time. To understand how Erdogan arrived at the final option, it is necessary again, to first turn to the domestic political situation, per the dictates of the poliheuristic theory.

### **Domestic Politics**

Among the possibly salient factors, along the domestic political dimension, that are thought to influence decisionmaking by leaders, at least two are well-illustrated in the second phase of the cabinet's Iraq crisis: election and "pivotal coalition" (Mintz, 2004). According to the poliheuristic perspective, the expected impact of a leader's decisions on future elections can often influence the choices made on such decisions. This is in line with a well-established literature on electoral punishment by the public of leaders for unpopular policies (Trumbore 1998; Aldrich et al, 2007; Baum and Potter, 2008). The key event in this regard was the upcoming Siirt by-election, on March 9, in which Erdogan, stood as one of the three AKP candidates.

Indeed, some interpreted the March 1 vote defeat as a sign of the collapse of the AKP government and Erdogan's own popularity and public approval (eg. Colasan,

2003c). This view went hand and hand with a widely-held opinion that continued efforts at cooperation (ie. submission of a bill for the creation of a northern US military front against Iraq), so soon after the March 1 defeat, would have had fatal consequences for Erdogan's electoral fortunes in the by-election (eg. Robins, 2003). To be sure, oppositional public opinion was a likely factor in this. In the immediate aftermath of the March 1 parliamentary vote on the land access bill, according to one opinion poll, 67% of the Turkish public supported the actions of the parliament<sup>21</sup> (Uslu et al, 2005: Table 38). A slightly larger figure, 75%, also opposed any second US attempts to seek such land access<sup>22</sup> (Uslu et al, 2005: Table 43). Furthermore, the same poll also showed that 69.7% of the Turkish public opposed the opening of Turkish air space to the US air force<sup>23</sup> (Uslu et al, 2005: Table 40).

Thus between March 1 and the by-election of March 9, there was a marked lull in cabinet activities related to the land access bill. The shadow of a future election, therefore, helps explain Erdogan's delayed response to the initial vote outcome of March 1, despite the Bush administration's pressures for renewed efforts at cooperation. Yet, on the other hand, that "delay" should have been quickly rectified after Erdogan's by-election victory, since the possibility of electoral punishment by the public was now moot. So, what explains Erdogan's post-March 9 decisionmaking process and his cabinet's final decision on March 18? Was oppositional public opinion as critical to Erdogan's post-March 9 decision calculus, as has been presumed heretofore? (eg. Yavuz, 2005; Park, 2004a; Hale, 2007; Robins, 2003; Mintz, 2004)

Despite his Sirrt by-election victory and his new status as the presumptive leader of the next government, Erdogan's domestic political position was not wholly unassailable. In particular, his government still had to obtain a formal parliamentary vote of confidence, scheduled for March 23. It is in connection to such vote, that the need for a "pivotal coalition"<sup>24</sup> well-serves the poliheuristic explanation of Erdogan's stage-based decisionmaking, in the post-March 9 domestic political environment. In fact, even compared to its Turkish contemporaries, the AKP was less than a coherent, singularly-moved entity, being guided neither by a unifying ideology nor a consistent, common



policy agenda. This was in part a reflection of the circumstances of its creation. Originally one of the successors of the banned pro-Islamist Welfare Party (*Refah*), it was hurriedly cobbled together, by Erdogan, only a year prior to the general elections which brought it to power in November 2002. As a result, the AKP represented a broad mixture of various groups, ranging from nationalists, Kurdish-region deputies (from southeastern Turkey), center-right conservatives, and unreformed Islamists<sup>25</sup>. The AKP was indeed a “broad coalition” of very diverse groups and factions (Kardas, 2006: 322-26; Salmoni, 2003; also Hale, 2007: 87-8). The fact that the AKP managed to hold together, despite the disparateness of its parts, owed mostly to the mass popular appeal of its leader, Erdogan. But, of course, the subsequent Iraq crisis put to severe strain Erdogan’s hold over the party.

Within the party’s parliamentary group, in the first phase of the Iraq crisis (ie. run-up to the March 1 vote), Erdogan’s center-right faction represented the main internal impetus for cooperation with the Bush administration on the land access bill. For various reasons, the majority of the deputies in the other factions opposed such cooperation. Such opposition to cooperation by these groups had not changed with Erdogan’s new found status as the presumptive Prime Minister. For instance, a few days after Erdogan’s by-election victory, AKP Deputy Sirin, one of the leaders of the original “rebel” group, gave clear warnings of greater number of defections, or even a party “split”, in the event of continued attempts at cooperation with US military planning. (*Milliyet*, March 11, 2003; Dilipak, 2003; Sarikaya, 2003d; Gorvett, May 2003). The intensity of such opposition was particularly pronounced within the unreformed Islamist faction. Unofficially led by the AKP Parliamentary Speaker Arinc (Salmoni, 2003; Kardas, 2006: 323; Excerpts of Arinc Interview, March 10, 2003), the unreformed Islamist group represented about 30% of the AKP parliamentary group, or about 110 AKP deputies (Salmoni, 2003). In fact, Arinc, a former deputy of the pro-Islamist Welfare Party, played a significant role in influencing the votes of the unreformed Islamists in defeating the original bill (Sazak, 2003d; also Yavuz, 2005: 170). Reinforcing Deputy Sirin’s warnings were Arinc’s own role and statements, which added a new and important

dimension to the issue. For instance, in a rare interview, Arinc not only reiterated his original position, but also began now to publicly emphasize his long-term relationship to Erbakan, the former leader of the Welfare Party and now presumptive leader of the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*)(Excerpts of Arinc Interview, March 10, 2003). What is instructive about Arinc's public statements is their timing; they were made the day after Erdogan publicly mooted<sup>26</sup> the possibility of continued efforts at cooperation (ie. a resubmission of the original land access bill) (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview on CNN Turk, March 11, 2003), and a few days after confirmed reports of Erbakan's active efforts at recruiting the "rebel" deputies (mostly unreformed Islamists) into his own Felicity Party (Karakus, 2003; also Sarikaya, 2003d). By implication then, continued attempts at cooperating with the Bush administration's plans for establishing a northern military front carried with it the very real threat of mass defections – perhaps led by Arinc - of the unreformed Islamist AKP deputies to Erbakan's Felicity Party. Such an outcome would have effectively cut short AKP's majority status in the parliament<sup>27</sup> and, in turn, would have greatly complicated Erdogan's goal of obtaining a parliamentary vote of confidence in his new government (Arcayurek, 2003).

Thus, the Erdogan cabinet's crisis decision making was faced with two possible set of influences: (1) a Turkish public that continued to signal its opposition to cooperation with US military planning (ie. land access) as well as non-military involvement (ie. airspace access), and (2) intra-party divisions and potential collapse of the AKP government. An insight into the relative import of these two contrasting set of influences is revealed by Erdogan himself, in his recalling of the conversation he had with Bush, in the days after the March 1 parliamentary vote. By his own account, a key statement made to Bush was the following: "Currently a negative atmosphere prevails. We cannot take a third motion [of the land access bill] to the parliament under such circumstances."(*Anatolia*, March 27, 2003). When viewed in the context of the Erdogan cabinet's final crisis decision, on March 18, this statement is strongly suggestive of the larger influence of the potential collapse of AKP government, relative to an oppositional public opinion, in his decision calculation<sup>28</sup>.

Given his initial goal of securing a by-election victory, and the later – and more important - goal of obtaining a parliamentary vote of confidence, then, Erdogan would have been hard-pressed to adopt a policy option that entailed continued efforts at cooperation (ie. aid in the creation of a US northern military front against Iraq) with the Bush administration. In particular, the need to maintain the faction-filled “pivotal coalition” within the AKP to assure a timely parliamentary vote of confidence in his newly-established government implied that, along the domestic political dimension, any option that entailed such cooperation would have been non-compensatory. This in turn suggested the non-viability of the first option (ie. resubmission of the original land access bill), second option (ie. submission of a modified bill), and the third option (ie. resubmit the land access bill with agreement on outstanding issues). Eliminating these three options thus left only two options for further consideration: submit a bill only for airspace access or wait for a UNSC resolution. These two remaining options reflected non-cooperation, since they entailed no immediate near-term submission of a bill that would advance the Bush administration’s goal of creating a northern front. Based on the poliheuristic theory of decisionmaking, the relative attractiveness of the two remaining options were assessed in terms of their costs and benefits along the economic, external-political (northern Iraq), military, and strategic dimension

### **Economic Dimension**

Considering the finalized, signed agreement and associated MOUs outlining the Bush administration’s guarantees on most – though not all - of the economic, external-political, and military issues deemed critical to the Erdogan cabinet, a decision against cooperation entailed major costs. For instance, along the economic dimension, a decision against cooperation (ie. wait for UNSC resolution or submit bill only for airspace access) obviously meant the forfeiting of nearly \$30 billion of economic aid, in the form of direct grant and long-term loans. But a decision against cooperating with the Bush administration’s attempts to set up a northern front against Iraq also had further corollary

economic implications, in the areas of government budget, financial markets, and negotiations with the IMF.

Indeed, the withdrawal of such major US economic aid would have made it exceedingly difficult to compensate for the expected economic losses flowing from the expected military actions against Iraq. The resultant strain on Turkey's state budget, for 2003, would have inevitably implied the need for increases in various types of taxes (eg. transportation and property) to make up for the expected budgetary shortfalls (Excerpts of Gul Interview, March 11, 2003; Sarikaya, 2003d). As well, the withdrawal of US economic aid would have predictably led to negative financial market reaction, further undermining investor sentiment, both foreign and domestic. In fact, the Erdogan cabinet was so concerned about the possibility of such development that, when it had received early negative signals from the market after the March 1 vote, it falsely reported that the US economic aid was still on track – despite the fact that this was very much in doubt at the time (*Milliyet*, March 20, 2003; also Sarikaya, 2003e). Lastly, a decision to either submit an airspace access bill or wait for a more definitive UNSC resolution, and thus make void the economic aid, would have complicated Turkey's on-going negotiations with the IMF. In fact, an early indication of this was the IMF's initial reaction to the state budget. Apparently dissatisfied, the IMF demanded the inclusion of more austerity measures, including an end to most state subsidies to Turkey's agricultural sector (Cevik, 2003). In light of this, a final decision to reject cooperation would likely have led to more such demands by the IMF. But for the AKP, the prospect of greater and deeper austerity measures would have been very problematic, since much of its electoral success was attributed to successfully appealing to the urban poor and rural farmers, with a message of social justice and alleviation of poverty. In all, then, along the economic dimension, the two remaining options on non-cooperation (ie. either submitting a bill only for airspace access or waiting for a UNSC resolution) would have been very costly in terms of Turkey's economic recovery and retaining the support of a core sector of the AKP's constituency.

However, a critical and obvious difference between the option of waiting for a UNSC resolution and the option of submitting a bill only for airspace access was that the former option, in effect, entailed doing nothing. On the other hand, the latter option entailed a positive move, on the part of the Erdogan cabinet, in contributing to the success of the Bush administration's military planning and operation. Thus, despite anticipated loss of the major economic aid package, there was expectation, within the cabinet, that Turkey would still be offered *some* type of economic aid<sup>29</sup>, in the event that airspace access was granted (Sarıkaya, 2003e). This feeling was also apparently shared by those outside of the cabinet, including leaders of key international financial ratings institutions (eg. Urey, 2003).

### **External-Political (n. Iraq) Dimension**

Unlike with the economic dimension, for the external-political dimension, the Erdogan cabinet faced a more clear cut set of costs and incentives with respect to the two non-cooperation options. Unlike its new position on the previously-agreed to economic aid package (ie. March 1), for instance, the Bush administration was willing to honor its previously negotiated MOU on political issues related to northern Iraq, in the event of parliamentary approval of the bill authorizing airspace access for US combat sorties (Sarıkaya, 2003e; also Hale, 2007: 125). This meant that most of the major external-political goals of the cabinet concerning northern Iraq would be supported, including a guarantee of the territorial unity of Iraq, the neutrality of the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul, and recognition of the ethnic Turcoman as a “foundational element” of the Iraqi nation. Such guarantees would have, in turn, furthered Ankara's long-term policy of preventing the development of an independent Kurdish state in the region, as per Turkey's “red line”. On the other hand, however, as pointed out by Erdogan, the MOU of March 1 left out any explicit reference to the political representation of the Turcoman in a post-conflict political structure of the Kurd-dominated northern Iraq (Excerpts of Erdogan Interview on CNN Turk, March 11, 2003; Milliyet, March 9, 2003; also Bila, 2003c/d/e).

Therefore, a decision to submit an airspace access bill would still have incurred a cost in terms achieving this outstanding goal.

In contrast, however, for the Erdogan cabinet, the option of waiting for a UNSC resolution would have yielded neither the preservation of previously negotiated gains along the external-political dimension, nor any new similar gains. This option, therefore, would have meant no guarantees on the continued territorial unity of Iraq nor the neutrality of key cities in northern Iraq, and even less certainty regarding the political status of the Turcoman. All of these foregone gains would in turn have meant that the continued maintenance of the “red line” against an independent Kurd-dominated state in northern Iraq would have been severely weakened. Thus, for the Erdogan cabinet, the “opportunity costs”, along the external-political dimension, of waiting for a UNSC resolution were indeed large. In an overall comparison with the option of waiting for a UNSC resolution, then, the option of submitting a bill granting airspace access to the US airforce would have resulted in far greater gains for the cabinet, relative to costs, along this dimension.

### **Military Dimension**

Along the military dimension, the two non-cooperation options entailed mostly costly implications for the Erdogan cabinet. These were in relation to at least two key military issues covered in the March 1 Memorandum of Understanding, including an agreement for Turkey to deploy upto 60,000 troops in northern Iraq, as well as guarantees on a re-collection of heavy weaponry from the Kurds. Along with the creation of a buffer zone, these provisions would have aided in the prevention of a refugee crisis and terrorist infiltrations. The Turkish forces were also expected to safeguard the region’s oil pipelines, and to prevent any Kurdish entry into Mosul and Kirkuk, thereby ensuring its neutrality. For the greater part, however, the MOU’s provisions on military issues were aimed at supporting Ankara’s long-held political goal of maintaining the “red line” against an independent Kurdish state. Indeed, as part of their deployment mission, the Turkish troops were expected to be given a mandate to

actively pursue and disarm not only the approximately 5,000 members of PKK terrorist group, but also the armed militias (ie. *peshmerga*) attached to the PUK and the KDP, the two main political groups in northern Iraq (eg. Olson, 2005: 108 and Kirisci, 2004: 43).

However, since the two non-cooperation options (ie. submit a bill only for airspace access or wait for UNSC resolution) precluded any land access for the US military, such options would have effectively undercut the Erdogan cabinet's equivalent claim for making a large Turkish force projection into northern Iraq. Indeed, the Bush administration indicated as much (Hale, 2007: 115; *Milliyet*, March 22, 2003). The absence of a credible Turkish threat or application of force in northern Iraq, then, would have greatly handicapped the cabinet's goal of curtailing PKK activities and preventing a repeat of the earlier refugee crisis. Moreover, the absence of a formidable Turkish military deterrent would likely have invited Kurdish incursions and possible takeover of the key regional cities of Mosul and Kirkuk, and their surrounding oilfields, thereby further enhancing the group's march toward greater autonomy, and possible claims to independent statehood (eg. Bozarslan, 2005: 129; Hale, 2007: 125; Gorvett, May 2003).

Yet, on the other hand, the option of submitting a bill only for airspace access would still afford a certain amount of comparative advantage to the Erdogan cabinet, along the military dimension. The Bush administration's need for such airspace access, for instance, was actively leveraged by the cabinet to persuade it to either accept or acquiesce to a smaller Turkish force (eg. special forces units) entry into northern Iraq<sup>30</sup>. Such a force would likely have been relatively small compared to what the Bush administration had originally agreed to in the March 1 MOU. But as a supplement to the pre-existing small-scale Turkish military presence in northern Iraq, such units would still be helpful in mitigating the expected losses along the military dimension<sup>31</sup>. In contrast, the option of waiting for a requisite UNSC resolution would have yielded no such leverage on entry of Turkish troops, since the option would have contributed very little to immediate, near-term US military planning.

### Strategic Dimension

As with the military dimension, many obvious costs attended with the two non-cooperation options, along the strategic dimension. For the Erdogan cabinet, many of these expected costs were largely a revisiting of the ones that it had faced in the run-up to its February 25 decision (ie. submit land access bill for parliamentary approval before obtaining a signed agreement, and allow a free vote). At a broad, generic level, such expected costs included a deterioration of the “strategic partnership” with the US (Park, 2004b: 505; also Kardas, 2006: 321; Parris, 2005; Fuller, 2003), less consistent US support for Turkey’s EU accession and membership goals, an increase in the strategic profile of the Iraqi Kurds and their interests, a disintegration of the “red line” (ie. greater autonomy and independence for the Iraqi Kurds), etc.

Beyond such rough estimations of expected costs, however, there were certain nuanced differences between the two options, along the strategic dimension. For instance, a decision to wait for requisite UNSC resolution on use of force against Iraq (if any) would have been in line with the dominant EU thinking and foreign policy line, especially as led by France and Germany. This had relevancy as regards Turkey’s long-sought foreign policy goal of EU membership. An important reason for the EU’s refusal to grant Turkey an accession date in the December 2002 Copenhagen summit, for example, was the Bush administration’s *quid pro quo* application of pressure on EU leaders in anticipation of active Turkish cooperation in US efforts at creating a northern front (Robins, 2003: 556; also Clarke, 2004: 53). Given this background, if the Erdogan cabinet were to defy final expectations and choose, in the end, not to cooperate with US military planning, and instead decided to wait for a UNSC resolution, then the cabinet’s actions would have been accord with the need for “international legitimacy”. Critically as well, such a decision would have also have made difficult Turkey’s unilateral military entry into northern Iraq, and thereby attenuate the potential for large-scale repression of the region’s Kurdish population. Thus, by default, a decision to wait for requisite UNSC resolution, however likely or unlikely, would have led Turkey to uphold the EU’s Copenhagen criteria which demands, in part, that a state’s policies be in accord with



such principles as the peaceful settling of conflicts, rule of law, and respect for human rights (Durmuslar, 2007; Robins, 2003; Kirisci, 2004). Considering the highly salient nature of the Iraqi crisis, it is unlikely that EU leaders would have ignored Turkey's final decision. This in turn would have had positive impact on the aim of acquiring an accession date with the EU, a still-highly prioritized goal on the AKP foreign policy agenda<sup>32</sup> (Park, 2004b: 500-1; Muftler-Bac, 2004: 436).

Such important potential gain of the fifth option aside, however, the Erdogan cabinet was also cognizant of the increasing "inevitability" of US military action against Iraq, and Turkey's dilemma therein (eg. Excerpts of Erdogan Interview on CNN Turk, March 11, 2003). For the cabinet, such dilemma began with an understanding of the likely regional strategic consequences of a choice against cooperating with the Bush administration in establishing a northern front. The elimination of such option, from the outset, was likely to lead to an increase in Kurdish moves to independence, owing in part to the Bush administration's consequent greater reliance on the group for the successful execution of its own military operation. To counter the possibility of such greater Kurdish independence in a post-conflict regional context, the cabinet would have to seek closer ties with Syria and Iran, however uncertain and unfamiliar the resulting fruits (Parris, 2005a). Combined with this, the removal of a hostile regime in Iraq would imply decreased strategic utility of Turkey for the US. To counter Turkey's deprioritized place in US strategic calculation, then, Turkey would have had to seek better ties with other major power centers, such as the EU (Kardas, 2006: 319-20; Parris, 2005a). In effect, therefore, non-cooperation would set in motion a chain of events that would dovetail with a rising and influential force in the newly-established Erdogan cabinet's thinking on strategic matters – "strategic depth"<sup>33</sup>. However, a quick, transparent and open move towards "strategic depth" would have created its own set of problems, not the least of which pertained to Turkey's historically strong alliance ties to the US, *a la* "strategic partnership". Thus, in addition to properly understanding and anticipating the likely impact of non-cooperation, there was also recognition for the need to balance the expected negative strategic fallout of non-cooperation (ie. refusal to aid in the

establishment of a northern front) with the need to honor certain implicit bilateral obligations in light of historically strong “natural alliance” ties with the US (eg. Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, Address at Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 10, 2002; Transcript of Erdogan Interview, February 9, 2003). Compared to waiting for a UNSC resolution, a positive move towards granting airspace access would have obviously better met such a balancing act, however imperfect. In sum, therefore, compared to the fifth option, the fourth option (ie. submit bill only for airspace access) would have better allowed the cabinet to meet the *minimum* requirements of unstated alliance commitments with the US and would have allowed it to more effectively pursue a re-oriented, forward-looking, “multidimensional” long-term strategy in the region, a strategy that did not prioritize any one particular power center (Kardas, 2006: 316-20; also Parris, 2004a).

As with the earlier phase of the crisis, the foregoing poliheuristic analysis illustrates the likely steps taken and factors considered by Erdogan, in arriving at the final crisis decision, on March 18, to make a parliamentary submission of a bill only for airspace access. The Erdogan cabinet’s final crisis decision also reflects a decisionmaking process that was driven in large measure by an established decision rule that prioritized the domestic political criterion: maintaining the pivotal coalition within the AKP. Policy options that violated this decision rule were dropped from further consideration. These included the first option (ie. submit original bill), second option (ie. submit original bill with agreement on outstanding issues), and the third option (ie. submit a modified bill). What remained were the fourth option (ie. submit a bill only for airspace access) and the fifth option (ie. wait for UNSC resolution). A relative assesement of the costs and benefits of the two remaining options were then undertaken. Considering its ability to better satisfy the economic, external-political, military and strategic criteria, the Erdogan cabinet chose the fourth option over the fifth option. But regarding the final decision to make a parliamentary submission of the bill only for airspace access, was it compensatory or non-compensatory?

### **Discussion: Non-Compensatory Decision**

According to other well known theories on decisionmaking, such as expected utility (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita, 1984) and cybernetic theory (Ostrom and Job, 1986), patterns of leaders' decision making often reflect an additive or compensatory outcome. From the perspective of these theories, then, the Erdogan cabinet should have chosen as its final policy decision, the option that represented the highest total benefits relative to costs. But was this the case?

Among the cooperation options, and summing across the four different dimensions, the second option (ie. resubmit original bill with agreement on outstanding issues) represented the greatest expected net benefits relative to costs. This owed in large part to the fact that, if the agreement entailed therein was successfully obtained from the Bush administration, it would have addressed the remaining issues, along the external-political and economic dimensions, that the Erdogan cabinet believed to be problematic from the standpoint of Turkey's various national interests. These included guarantees on the political status of Turcoman and further guarantees on the agreed-to economic aid in the event of Congressional opposition. Between the remaining cooperation options, the first option (ie. resubmit original bill) represented slightly higher expected net benefits, across the different dimension, compared to the third option (ie. submit modified bill). This is because the latter option might have required a re-negotiation with the Bush administration, and thus would have provided less guarantees on the originally agreed to MOUs, on economic, external-political, and military issues.

Between the two non-cooperation options, the fourth option (ie. submit bill only for airspace access), on balance, represented greater expected net benefits relative to costs, compared to the fifth option (ie. wait for UNSC resolution). This difference in net benefits between the two options holds constant across each of the four different dimensions. But the critical difference in all this is the relative probability of success, not only between the cooperative and non-cooperative options, but also options within each of the two categories.

Indeed, in addition to the different relative costs and benefits of the fourth option (ie. submit bill only for airspace access) and fifth option (ie. wait for UNSC resolution), the two remaining non-cooperative options reflected different relative probabilities of success<sup>34</sup>. Notwithstanding the issue of anticipated Bush administration's military action, irrespective of UNSC resolution, the likelihood of success of the option of waiting for a UNSC resolution, for example, was problematic on two counts: continued deferral as an official UNSC agenda item and threat of veto by other UNSC members. First, though the UN weapons inspection team had finalized its report to the UN, the Security Council could not agree, even by mid-March, on whether or not to bring up the Iraq issue for Council debate. Thus, a UNSC resolution authorizing military action against Iraq would have taken too long, if at all, and therefore would have conflicted with the Bush administration's time-table for military planning. Related to this was the second factor. In fact, part of the reason for the UNSC's indecisiveness related to a very vocalized intent on the part of France and Russia, to veto any such resolution, should it be brought up for Council debate and vote (eg. Sazak, 2003f).

In contrast, a higher probability of success attended with the option of submitting a bill for parliamentary approval only for airspace access. This owed mainly to the fact that the Bush administration's request for airspace access was, at most, a relatively low level of cooperation, in so far as it did not directly contribute to the creation of a northern front. Thus, the likelihood of opposition by the AKP parliamentary group was low. In addition however, another key factor that enhanced the probability of parliamentary approval of the airspace access bill was the assurance that Turkey's political goals concerning northern Iraq would be respected and the strong possibility of attaching a rider to the bill that also authorized entry of Turkish troops into northern Iraq, albeit with the ostensible aim of preventing another refugee crisis and curtailing PKK terrorist activities (eg. Park, 2004: 85; Sarikaya, 2003e).

Thus, in addition to its greater net benefits relative to costs, the fourth option (ie. submit bill only for airspace access) represented a higher probability of success compared to the fifth option (ie. wait for UNSC resolution). On the other hand, the cooperation

options (ie. resubmit original bill, resubmit original bill with agreement on outstanding issues, and submit a modified bill), generally reflected the same low level of probable success. Of course, this relatively lower level of probable success owes in large part to the fact that each of these three options entails cooperation with the Bush administration in creating a northern front. This in turn suggests the high likelihood of parliamentary rejection of these options, via a replay of the original March 1 vote.

These results are summarized in Table E-2<sup>(Appendix E)</sup>. The table shows the initial option set in the second stage of the Iraq crisis. As in Table E-1, each option is also disaggregated along the five relevant dimensions (ie. domestic political, economic, external-political [northern Iraq], military, and strategic). The additive total score for each option is presented in the last column<sup>35</sup>. As shown, however, the option with the highest total additive score is the second option (ie. resubmit original bill with agreement on outstanding issues). This is the option that would have been predicted by the expected utility and cybernetic theories. But the Erdogan cabinet's final decision, reached on March 18, was the fifth option (ie. submit a bill only for airspace access), an option whose total additive score is less than the first option (ie. resubmit original bill) and the second option (ie. resubmit original bill with agreement on outstanding issues). The results on Table E-2 thus suggest strong evidence of the stage-based, satisficing, non-holistic, non-compensatory decision rule of the poliheuristic theory.

The basic outline of the argument put forth in this study is illustrated in Figure E-1<sup>(Appendix E)</sup>. The Erdogan (Gul-Erdogan) cabinet's Iraq crisis occurred in two phases: from mid-December, 2002 to March 1, 2003 and from March 1, 2003 to March 21, 2003. In both phases, public opinion had a large – though not complete - influence on the preferences of the AKP deputies. This in turn led to an internal division among the latter group.

In the initial phase of the Iraq crisis, this intra-party division led to the first decision rule: a group vote, along the domestic political dimension, was viewed as non-compensatory. This non-compensatory decision rule meant that although a group vote could not be used, it could still allow a parliamentary submission of the bill for land

access to US forces. Previous studies that have focused merely on the oppositional public opinion have difficulty in explaining the cabinet's decision on February 25 to make such parliamentary submission.

In the second phase of the Iraq crisis, from March 1 to March 21, 2003, the second decision rule took form, wherein continued cooperation was perceived as being non-compensatory. Thus, a resubmission of the original or a revised land access bill was ruled out. On the other hand, this same non-compensatory rule did not rule out the submission of bill for airspace access, despite opposition to it by the Turkish public. Again, a facile focus on oppositional public opinion would have difficulty in explaining this outcome, while a focus on intra-party dynamics would encounter fewer difficulties.

## **Conclusion**

Public opinion, in most instances, can ill afford to be ignored by political leaders. However, it is also often the case that public opinion has not a direct, but an indirect impact on political leaders' decisions and policy choices. Equally, a more direct impact may be levied at "domestic structures" (Risse-Kippen, 1991; Hagan, 1993), including the dynamics of parliamentary politics, that mediate between public opinion and elite decision and policy choices. Such was the case with the Erdogan (Gul-Erdogan) cabinet's experience during the Iraq crisis. This study attempted to illustrate that for the Erdogan (Gul-Erdogan) cabinet, the demand for intra-party cohesion in face of potential collapse of its governing mandate better explains the outcome than does oppositional public opinion.

This examination of the Erdogan cabinet's foreign policy decisionmaking over the US land access issue is also meaningful in a few other ways. First, on the issue of conceptual validity, case study evidence is strongly suggestive of the impact of cognitive *subjectivity* in the perception on non-compensatory political loss. This is implied in Erdogan's decision strategy that downplayed the impact of public opinion – despite his own admission that nearly 100% of Turks were opposed to cooperation with the Bush administration - in the run-up to the March 1 parliamentary vote. Only when such public

opinion was seen as being connected to his own electoral fortunes, was it perceived as a non-compensatory level of political loss and a concomitant threat to his own position. Second, the case study illustrates the role of parliamentary politics, *a la* “pivotal coalitions”, in Erdogan’s decision calculus and as another way to infer political loss. Third, the results of the detailed, step-by-step process-tracing method suggest stronger support for the poliheuristic theory relative to competing explanations, such as the expected utility-based alliance dependence thesis. The results for the main theory are all the more impressive considering the different operationalizations of “political loss” and the extreme measurement parameters that makes Erdogan’s crisis decision context a “least likely” case for the poliheuristic theory, and a “most-likely” case for the expected utility-based alliance dependence thesis.

These findings need also be put in comparative perspective, as related to the earlier chapter on cross-national patterns. At one level, there is clear convergence in main findings. For instance, both the case study method and the correlational method have demonstrated the primacy of domestic politics and the desire to avoid major political loss along such dimension, on the part of most political leaders. This is in line with much of the core assumptions of the poliheuristic theory. Both methods have together also illustrated the robustness of PH theory under different operationalizations of “political loss”. Yet, on another level, there is an obvious divergence regarding the directionality in the impact of public opinion. In the correlational method, public opinion was shown to have statistically significant direct impact on decisionmaking and policy choices of leaders. But the findings of the current case study should not be viewed as a negation of such. Indeed, in as much as it represents a “least likely” case, Turkey in many respects also represents an “outlier” case<sup>36</sup>. Turkey’s outlier status undoubtedly influenced Erdogan’s decision calculus, including his discounting of oppositional public opinion<sup>37</sup>. Moreover, the outlier status also speaks to the uniqueness of Turkey and the Erdogan cabinet’s foreign policymaking decision context – the outcome of which should pose as a cautious caveat, but not necessarily a rejection of the cross-national, correlational-based findings.

## Notes

1. A single case study design usually lacks sufficient variance on the dependent and independent variables. Thus, explicit hypotheses-testing is difficult. However, a rigorous process-tracing method can reveal the underlying causal mechanism that can either refute or support a particular theory, if such method can eliminate all other theories or explanations. See, for example, George and Bennett, 2005: 75.
2. Granted, such a nuanced view of the impact of public opinion often gets glossed over in correlational type of investigations, owing in part to the need for categorizations. Nonetheless, this claim of an indirect impact is in line with much of the established research on mass-level public opinion on foreign policy. For a recent overview of the indirect impact of public opinion, see Baum and Potter (2007).
3. Further, adjusting the analytic focus in this manner may also reveal insights regarding the comparatively different policy choices of Blair (U.K.) and Erdogan (Turkey). In both instances, the leaders faced high levels of oppositional public opinion to their policy preferences. Yet, whereas Erdogan was forced to compromise, Blair did not. A focus on whether or not both leaders faced similar levels of non-compensatory political loss (ie. intra-party rivalry or potential collapse of government) should add to our understanding of the different outcomes.
4. As a member of the Welfare Party, Erdogan was convicted and sentenced, in 1998, to 10 months in prison for his pro-Islamist political activities, under Article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code. The conviction meant that, under Article 76 of the Turkish Constitution, and Article 11/f.3 of the MP Election Law, Erdogan also faced a lifetime ban from political activities. The situation was only rectified on Dec 11 when, using its majority status in the TBMM, the AKP was able to pass the necessary motions that deleted or amended the relevant provisions in Article 76 of the Constitution and Article 11/f.3 of the MP Election Law. See also: Hale, p. 87-89; *Hurriyet*, Dec. 11, 2002; *Milliyet*, Dec 3 and Dec 28, 2002.
5. The details were released to the media about a week after the initial meetings. See *Hurriyet*, Dec 13, 2002.
6. The first stage involved initial site inspections of ports, bases, and other facilities; executive permission for such was given on Dec 18, 2002. This was to be followed, in the second stage, by site preparation that included necessary upgrades to and construction of facilities to meet requirements of military operations. In a 318 to 193 vote, with 16 abstentions, Turkey's parliament authorized the second stage of the US plan, on Feb 6, 2003. See Huseyin and Ergun, Feb 2.
7. Erdogan made a distinction between "multidimensional diplomacy" and the separate US-Turkey bilateral negotiations. See *Anatolia*, Jan. 21, 2003.
8. This is akin to the imposition of party discipline on a vote.
9. By "cooperation", the Bush administration understood it to mean Ankara's help in establishing a northern military front. This understanding of "cooperation" is therefore also used in this study. The option of pursuing a peaceful solution and the option of waiting for a UNSC resolution implied non-cooperation, since they went against the Bush administration's goal of an immediate near-term permission for land access for setting up a northern front.
10. These are omitted options:
  - A. Submit with UNSC resolution but without complete and signed agreement + free vote.  
(In effect, this can be with partial or no agreement on any issues)
  - B. Submit with UNSC resolution but without complete and signed agreement + group vote.



These options entail a bill submission that is accompanied by a UNSC resolution. But such a UNSC resolution was beyond the control of the cabinet. Thus, their omission from cabinet's original option set.

11. During this phase of the crisis, however, Erdogan conveyed a greater appreciation for the need to preserve the latter goal than concern about his upcoming by-election in Siirt (Transcript of Erdogan Interview, February 9, 2003; Robins, 2003: 564). This made *prima facie* sense since, in the absence of AKP's continued governing mandate, his goal of securing the premiership and establishing his own government would have been that much less certain.

12. This is based on a published account given by Fikreet Bila, an influential columnist with regular access to Turkey's political establishment.. See Hale's (2007) footnote #93, in page 120.

13. Since – as with the other second-stage options – both the third and fifth options had similar probability levels in preserving the AKP's governing mandate, the concern here is with the probability of successfully achieving the aims of the option under consideration (eg. a peaceful solution, a second UNSC resolution, a signed agreement, a verbal agreement, parliamentary passage of the land access bill, etc)

14. The possibility of reaching no agreement was very unlikely, since implementation of the land access permission, if granted, was predicated on a bilateral agreement that addressed the Gul-Erdogan cabinet's political, military, and economic concerns. The land access permission was thus conditioned on a bilateral agreement, irrespective of whether such agreement was reached before or after the parliamentary submission of the relevant bill.

15. There are approximately 3,5000,000 Kurds in northern Iraq. If those in Syria, Iran, and Turkey are added, the total estimated population of Kurds in the region exceeds 20,000,000.

16. This is based on adding up the adjusted score of each option across each of the four dimensions. The adjusted score is calculated in the following way:

Assignment of baseline score (ie. net benefits versus costs).

Baseline score is multiplied by the probability of the success of the option, along the particular dimension. This is the initial "score". (Note that for the domestic-political dimension, a probability value of 0.6 indicates likely retention of the related option, whereas a value of 0.4 indicates likely elimination. Also, options 3 and 4 each have two probability values, to reflect the two requirements contained within each option).

The "score" is multiplied by the weight of the dimension, to arrive at "adjusted score".

The adjusted score for each of the five dimensions is added to arrive at final score for the option.

17. Though this fact may be masked when one focuses merely on the scores.

18. The total number of all elected deputies to the parliament was 533. A simple majority of this is 267.

19. Such as the prevention of bloodshed and conflict amongst the different ethnic groups in northern Iraq, including the Turcoman. Doing so, it was hoped, would attenuate some of the opposition to the land access bill. (*Milliyet*, Mar 9). This humanitarian dimension was again considered in the summer of 2003, upon US request for Turkish troops (see Kirisci, 2004: 44).

20. The distinction between a group vote and a free vote is also unnecessary in this option set, since there was no indication that the Erdogan cabinet even considered a group vote. This is not surprising given the March 1 vote outcome.

21. The survey question item read as follows: "What do you think about the TGNA's rejection of the AKP government's decision to send Turkish troops to Iraq and the settlement of the US troops in Turkey?"

Among the respondents, 66.9% chose “Positive” as their answer.

22. The survey question item read as follows: “If the US wants to settle its troops in Turkey again, should Turkey accept this demand?” Among the respondents, 75% chose “No” as their answer.

23. The survey question item read as follows: “What do you think about the Turkish government’s decision to open the Turkish air space to the US air force?” Among the respondents, 69.7% chose “Negative” as their answer.

24. Mintz (2004) actually uses the term “pivotal parties”, which in turn seems to be based on the role of Tsebelis’s (1995, 1999) “veto players” in coalition governments. My usage of the concept of “pivotal coalitions” is slightly closer to the latter usage, in so far as it takes into account the role of internal party groups or factions whose behavior may be equivalently consequential as those of formal political parties in a governing coalition.

25. According to Salmoni (2003), these unreformed Islamists represented “the unreconstructed Refah hardcore from 1995-1998”, and were led by Arinc.

26. Erdogan’s actual interview with CNN Turk was held on March 9. Excerpts of the interview were published two days later, in *Milliyet*.

27. Were the Arinc-led faction of unreformed Islamist to join Erbakan’s Felicity Party, the AKP would have lost approximately 110 deputies, leaving it with only about 253 deputies. This would have been less than the minimum 275 seats required to maintain a parliamentary majority. In the event of defection by Arinc’s faction, the possibility of Erdogan creating a stable coalition government with the main opposition party, Republican People’s Party, was unlikely, since the latter was ideologically center-left.

28. Further, “atmosphere” is an idiomatic expression that he used on past occasions to refer to intra-party dynamics (eg. Excerpts of Erdogan Interview on CNN Turk, March 11, 2003). When combined with the fact that he was generally under-appreciative of public opinion, one can infer that the reference to “negative atmosphere” was an intimation regarding expected intra-party opposition among many rank-and-file deputies of the AKP parliamentary group.

29. In fact, soon after the Erdogan cabinet’s final decision of March 18, the Bush administration pushed through Congress a measure for providing \$1 billion in direct grants, with the option of it being converted to \$8.5 billion in long-term loans. See: Hale, 2007: 125; Park, 2004: 85; Parris, 2005a: 4; Gorvett, June 2003.

30. In fact, in conversations with Powell after the cabinet had reached its final decision, Erdogan made this very point. See *Milliyet*, March 22, 2003. A bilateral agreement for such was later confirmed by Erdogan. See Transcripts of Erdogan Interview, *Newsweek*, March 31, 2003.

31. In fact, subsequent events suggested that the Bush administration did acquiesce to the entry of a limited number of Turkish troops into northern Iraq, as evinced by Gul’s statement: “There is no outstanding disagreement with the United States. Turkish troops will enter northern Iraq” (*Milliyet*, March 22, 2003; also Park, 2005: 27). Soon after his statement, a force of 1,000 Turkish special-ops commandos entered northern Iraq.

32. Despite the EU’s December 2002 decision to post-pone the decision on such accession, this still remained a vital foreign policy goal for the cabinet. See, for example, Transcript of Erdogan Interview, “AKP Leader Erdogan Assesses Chances of Averting Iraq War”, *Der Spiegel*, February 9, 2003.

33. Davutoglu was the main architect of this new strategic thinking in Turkey's foreign policy, and was the chief foreign policy advisor to Erdogan. His "strategic depth" centered around the need for a "multidimensional" foreign policy, one that, in part, sought to reconcile Turkey's geographical depth (eg. geographical location, size, population, etc), historical depth (eg. inheritance of the Ottoman legacy), and cultural depth (eg. Islamic identity), with the demands of globalization and increasingly diversified set of strategic challenges, including Iraq. In practice, "strategic depth" also implied the need to re-evaluate the largely unidimensional approach to Turkey's foreign policy and strategic thinking, and a need to de-prioritize traditional ties to single power center, including the one with the US, in favor of links with multiple power centers (eg. EU). Murionson (2006) offers a concise interpretation of Davutoglu's "strategic depth".

34. For the option set in the run-up to the March 1 vote, the probability of success of each option was affected in part by the possibility of obtaining a separate agreement for each of the economic issue area, political-external issue area, and the military issue area. In the second phase of the Iraq crisis, this situation no longer exists. Thus, it is more plausible to infer one common probability value for the likelihood of success of an option across all of its different dimensions.

35. This is based on adding up the adjusted score of each option across each of the four dimensions. The adjusted score is calculated in the following way:

Assignment of baseline score (ie. net benefits versus costs).

Baseline score is multiplied by the probability of the success of the option, along the particular dimension.

This is the initial "score". (Note that for the domestic-political dimension, a probability value of 0.6 indicates likely retention of the related option, whereas a value of 0.4 indicates likely elimination.)

The "score" is multiplied by the weight of the dimension, to arrive at "adjusted score".

The adjusted score for each of the five dimensions is added to arrive at final score for the option.

36. With respect to alliance dependence, for instance, among the thirty countries, the standardized score for Turkey was by far the highest (followed by Germany) for 1992-2002. More critically, Turkey was the only country that was dealing with a major economic and financial crisis, and was the only country that was offered major material and non-material inducements in return for cooperation with US military planning. In all these aspects, Turkey's position was extreme, in comparison to the other twenty nine countries.

37. For instance, in a speech given to the AKP parliamentary group, in the run-up to the March 1 vote, Erdogan urged the deputies to ignore – just as much as he had done - oppositional public opinion, in light of the greater interests at stake (ie. the need to maintain alliance ties with the US, the need to overcome the on-going economic and financial crisis, etc): "Support the motion, this is our motion. Those who tell 'no war' forget that when they can't get their salaries for three days", quoted in Kardas (2006: 321). The "no war" slogan was a common cry of the vocal public that was opposed to military action against Iraq. In fact, in early February, at his appearance in a football match, Prime Minister Gul himself was met with slogans of "no war" for nearly half an hour.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **POLIHEURISTIC THEORY AND MILITARY COALITIONS: AN EXPERIMENT**

To better illustrate the strength of the poliheuristic theory (Mintz et al, 1997; Mintz, 1993; Redd, 2002; Brulé, 2005; Mintz, 2004) for understanding patterns of participation and burden-sharing decisions in military coalitions, and to demonstrate the usefulness of alliance dependence (Bennett et al, 1994) within the larger explanatory framework, a limited experiment can be undertaken.

It is well understood that various methodological approaches each have their own obvious strengths. The previous methods of statistical analysis and case study, for instance, have broader claims to generalizability and greater in-depth understanding of a phenomenon, respectively. However, the acknowledged forte of the experimental method is in locating causality, through control and manipulation of variables. Indeed, a well-designed, controlled, and carefully executed experiment can yield results that more directly enable the inferring of causality as regards the underlying process and outcome of decisionmaking. In relation to poliheuristic theory, moreover, an experiment may yield greater leverage over the specific cognitive and analytic processes, at the individual level, of the non-holistic, non-compensatory, dimension-based decisionmaking process and final decision outcome on military coalitions.

#### **Main Hypotheses**

Among the original hypotheses, the main ones of interest examined in this chapter are the following:

H1. The greater the level of perceived political loss (PL) from participation, the more likely the support for non-participation<sup>1</sup>.

By way of a re-visitation, H1 was derived from alliance dependence thesis for understanding coalition participation decisions (Bennett et al, 1994). Hypotheses H2 is based on the poliheuristic theory ((Mintz et al, 1997; Mintz, 1993; Redd, 2002; Brulé, 2005; Mintz, 2004). As well, an interaction effect should also exist between political loss and alliance dependence. This holds especially so in regards to the particular policy option chosen. The final policy choice should be reflective of this, such that:

H2: If the perceived PL from participation is high and AD is high, the final policy choice should represent the highest level of cooperation with the military coalition short of active military participation.

Similarly,

H3: If the perceived PL from participation is high and AD is low, the final policy choice should represent the lowest level of cooperation with the military coalition.

H4: If the perceived PL from participation is low and AD is high, the final policy choice should reflect greatest benefits relative to costs among the initial option set.

H5: If PL is low and AD is low, then all options from the initial set are equally likely to be supported.

H1 to H5 are mainly focused on outcomes. However, in addition to such outcome-oriented competing hypotheses, a more process-oriented set of hypotheses can be derived<sup>2</sup>. Alliance dependence thesis (Bennett et al, 1994), for instance, posits that important foreign policy decisions, such as those involving military coalitions, are often based on an assessment of a country's multifaceted alliance ties (eg. military, economic,

security, etc) to another country. Further, the alliance dependence thesis is implicitly grounded in a holistic approach to understanding the overall level of dependence, such that lows (highs) in one area of dependence (eg. military) can be offset by highs (lows) in another area of dependence (eg. economic). This holistic or compensatory approach should also extend to understanding the ramifications of policy choices. In fact, a greater/lesser tendency to adopt such a compensatory approach should be related to the level of existing alliance dependence. A decisionmaker who faces a possible major loss along some dimension of his/her country's existing alliance dependence is more likely to look for ways to offset such losses, as compared to a decisionmaker who does not face such possible loss. Therefore,

H6. There is greater tendency to adopt a compensatory strategy when the existing alliance dependence level is high, as compared to when such dependence is low.

On the other hand, a core assumption of poliheuristic theory is that various constraints of crisis decision contexts, such as limited information and limited time, demand the use of decision heuristics, or shortcuts. One such important decision heuristic is the noncompensatory information search strategy (Mintz et al, 1997; Mintz, 2004; Brulé, 2005). In other words, in order to deal with the constraints of crisis contexts, and to arrive at the most optimal choice, and do so most efficiently, decisionmakers attempt to focus on the most important and common dimension(s) among a range of options. A focus on such dimension(s) is important since possible losses cannot be compensated by gains in other dimensions. Moreover, since the cognitive demands placed on a decisionmaker is greater when he/she faces a potential political threat to his/her position, there is a greater tendency to adopt such a simplifying decision heuristic in such situations. Therefore,

H7. There is greater tendency to adopt a noncompensatory strategy when the potential political loss is high, as compared to when the potential political loss is low.

## **Research Design**

This section outlines the relevant aspects of the research design. This includes an explanation of the type of study participants used in a factorial design. As well, the experimental treatment, the main instrument of measure, and actual laboratory procedures are outlined.

### **Study Participants**

The use of “unrepresentative subjects”, such as students, has frequently been questioned (eg. Sears, 1986). Much of the associated concern relates to the issue of “generalizability”, or external validity of such subjects to decision making by political leaders. This is an important issue that cannot easily be ignored. In relation to this, the most obvious way of alleviating such validity concerns is through the use of actual or former political leaders (McDermott, 2002a). Thus, the current chapter should be seen as a first step in establishing the general plausibility of the main hypotheses, before additional experiments are undertaken with actual or former individuals in political leadership positions<sup>3</sup>. Doing so may also yield additional insights into the differences between the use of different subject pools and external validity, as well as generalizability of findings (eg. Mintz and Redd, 2007).

With the foregoing caveat, in the current study, subject-participants were 80 volunteer undergraduate students<sup>4</sup>. All participants were recruited from introductory and advanced political science courses. In return for participation, subjects received either a course credit or small monetary compensation.

### **Factorial Design**

Since the study investigates two main variables, or factors, a basic 2 x 2 between-group<sup>5</sup> design was used (Keppel, 1991; Kirk, 1982). As shown in Table F-1<sup>(Appendix F)</sup>, the between group factors were political loss and alliance dependence. Each factor had two levels. For the alliance dependence factor, this level was either high or low. For the political loss factor, this was either a non-compensatory level or a low level. The two factors are reflective of the two competing explanations, alliance dependence (Bennett et al, 1993) and poliheuristic theory (Mintz et al, 1997; Redd, 2002; Brulé, 2005; Mintz, 2004), for understanding patterns of participation and burden-sharing decisions.

### **Treatment/Stimulus**

There were two experimental treatments: perceived political loss (ie. non-compensatory level of political loss versus low level of political loss) and alliance dependence (ie. high level versus low level of alliance dependence). For political loss, a perceived non-compensatory level was induced in the subject via exposure to background scenario information that indicated a very high level of domestic public opposition within the country to participation in a military coalition. The domestic public opposition was conveyed in the form of opinion polls and widespread public demonstrations and protests against participation. A low level of perceived political loss was manipulated via opinion polls that indicated that the majority of the domestic public was either moderately opposed or indifferent to our country's participation in a military coalition.

Similarly, for alliance dependence, the perception of a high level of such was stimulated in the subject through exposure to information that indicated dependence of our country on the allied country in the areas of energy, finance, and military technology<sup>6</sup>. And exposure to information indicating only low levels of dependence on the ally country in the three areas was used to manipulate a low level of alliance dependence<sup>(Appendix G)</sup>.



### **Instrument and Dependent Measure**

The main experimental instrument is the Decision Board. This is an interactive, computer-based, process-tracing program that has been used in previous experimental studies of decision making (eg. Mintz et al, 1997; Redd, 2002). The unique capabilities of the Decision Board, shown in Figure F-1<sup>(Appendix F)</sup>, Table F-1<sup>(Appendix F)</sup> and Appendix H, also make it a particularly superior instrument for comparing the strengths of the two competing explanations for decisions on military coalitions.

There are two main components to the Decision Board: a hypothetical scenario and a decision matrix. The hypothetical scenario provides the necessary background context and the particular decision task cues for the subject. The related decision matrix contains columns of available policy options, and rows of relevant dimensions of such options. At the center of the decision matrix is a set of boxes. Each box contains information that explains the implication(s) of each policy option along the relevant dimension. For this study, four options (ie. send combat troops, send military resources and/or support troops, permission for use of airspace, airports and/or sea ports, and do nothing) and four relevant dimensions were used (ie. domestic-political, energy, financial, and military technology). As well, for simplified decision analysis, each of the four dimensions were assigned equal weight.

Since the Decision Board is a computer-based, interactive decision-making program, all aspects of information search are recorded, including the order of search, search time (eg. time spent on examining each policy, each dimension of a policy, etc), search frequency (eg. number of times a particular policy or dimension has been examined), and decision on final policy option. The process-tracing capabilities of the Decision Board thus makes it particularly well-suited as an experimental instrument in investigating not only the relative strength of the alliance dependence explanation, but also the multifold aspects of the poliheuristic theory, including its core assumptions that decision making is driven by a stage-based, non-compensatory, non-holistic process.

The dependent measures are three: participation, policy option, and CSI. With regards to “decision”, the subject-participants were asked to support one of four possible

policy options: (1) send combat troops, (2) contribute military resources (eg. fighter planes and/or naval ships) and and/or support units (eg. engineers, medical teams, biological teams, or chemical teams), (3) give permission for use of airspace, airports, or sea ports, or (4) do nothing. This specific decision task was a constant for all four experimental conditions, and was also built into the Decision Board. “Decision” was the dependent measure for investigating H3 to H6. The four policy options also related to a second dependent measure, “participation”. Options 1 and 2 were categorized as participation. Options 3 and 4 were categorized as non-participation. The categorization and coding was done by the principal investigator after the experiment. “Participation” was the dependent measure for investigating H1 and H2. The last dependent measure, “CSI” refers to the consistency-selectivity index (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1993). This index has been used in previous experimental studies of poliheuristic theory (Redd, 2002, Astorino-Courtois, 2000) to unravel the conditions under which compensatory versus non-compensatory decision processing strategy should take place. The index is expressed as the following:

$$CS_{alt} = 1/2 \sum_{n=1}^n \text{ for all } y \neq z \parallel \sum_{n=1}^n a_{yn} - \sum_{n=1}^n a_{zn} \parallel,$$

where n is the number of alternatives in the option set, a represents the number of information/implication boxes accessed per alternative, y, z, etc. Scores for the index range from 0 (complete compensatory process) to 16 (complete non-compensatory process)<sup>7</sup>. The CSI is the measure used to assess the veracity of hypotheses H7 and H8.

### **Laboratory Procedure**

Upon arrival in the computer laboratory, subjects were given written information that described the use of the Decision Board as part of an investigation into political decisionmaking. Each subject was then placed in front of a computer monitor with the opening page of the Decision Board on-line website. Instructions were given to the

subjects to refrain from attempting to access the Decision Board program itself until permitted to do so by the principal investigator. Each subject was randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions (ie. A, B, C or D).

Prior to the start of the experiment, an overhead illustration of the two main components (ie. background scenario and decision matrix) of the Decision Board was presented. This was accompanied by an explanation that the background scenario contained the necessary cues as to the particular decision task demanded of the subject. It was further explained that the decision matrix specified the four relevant dimensions common to each of the four available policy options, and that each option had a specific implication along a relevant dimension. Subjects were also told that the information bit contained in each implication “box” was to be used to help them decide on what they thought to be the most appropriate policy option. They were also instructed to click at least one of the implication boxes (ie. access, read, and understand the information contents therein) before making a final policy decision.

Next, each subject was given a card containing the ID number of one of four scenarios. Each subject was also instructed to input a user id and password of their own choosing. Once the hypothetical background scenario appeared, subjects were instructed to start the experiment by reading the scenario. The average time to reach a final policy decision varied from subject to subject. The Decision Board recorded each subject’s information search pattern as well as the total amount of time expended to reach a final decision. To preclude the potential for experimenter bias<sup>8</sup>, the principal investigator left the room once the experiment began.

At the end of the experiment, each subject was given a five-item survey questionnaire to complete<sup>(Appendix I)</sup>. This self-report was done to assess the relative effectiveness of the experimental manipulations, and the related motivational orientation of each subject. Once all subjects had completed the experiment and had completed the post-manipulation check, a debriefing was given to the group as a whole. This debriefing indicated the principal goals of the experiment. Each subject was also then compensated for his/her participation.

## Results and Discussion

Results of two-way analysis of variance<sup>9</sup> are presented in Table J-1<sup>(Appendix J)</sup>.

The dependent measure is participation. Of interest are the F-statistics for the main and interaction effects of the two investigated factors, alliance dependence and political loss. Alliance dependence (AD) is shown to have a statistically significant main effect, with  $F(1, 65) = 9.203$ ;  $p < 0.001$ . The results thus suggest that across its two manipulated levels (ie. high and low alliance dependence), there is a significant difference between the two levels of alliance dependence, when it comes to participation decisions on military coalitions. A closer look at the marginal means, in Table J-2<sup>(Appendix J)</sup> confirms that, in comparison to a low level of AD, a high level of AD leads to a higher propensity to choose participation. This result seems to support H1. In other words, a high level of alliance dependence is more likely to lead to a choice to support either the first option (ie. contribute combat troops) or the second option (ie. contribute military resources and/or support units) towards the military coalition. Conversely, a low level alliance dependence is likely to lead to a decision to reject any such participation. Again, the values of the marginal means seem to confirm this.

The results of Table J-1 also show a significant main effect for political loss (PL), with  $F(1, 65) = 14.271$ ;  $p < 0.01$ . Consistent with expectation, there is a meaningful difference between the two levels of PL. When there is a high level of potential political loss, there is a less likelihood of choosing participation and noticeably greater likelihood of choosing non-participation. Thus, in cases of high political loss, there is a greater tendency to support either the third option (ie. give permission for use of airspace, airports, and/or sea ports) or option four (ie. do nothing). In contrast, when the level of political loss is low, there is a greater tendency to choose either the first option (ie. send combat troops) or second option (ie. contribute military resources and/or support units). Again, this difference in the overall pattern of non-participation is confirmed by the marginal means, in Table J-2: among the subjects in the high political loss condition, 84% chose either option three or option four. In comparison, among

subjects in the low political loss condition, 41.5% chose either option three or four. These results thus seem to lend support to the first hypothesis<sup>10</sup>, H1.

To assess the veracity of hypotheses H2 through H5, another omnibus test was undertaken to measure the dependent variable, “decision”. The results are presented in Table J-3<sup>(Appendix J)</sup>. Again, as in the previous dependent measure, “participation”, in the measure for “decision” a significant main effect is shown for both AD and PL, with  $F(1, 65) = 7.071$ ;  $p < 0.01$ , and  $F(1, 65) = 8.094$ ;  $p < 0.01$ , respectively. However, though interesting these results are, the main aim was to assess and find a statistically significant interaction effect between the two factors, AD and PL. But the F-statistic shows that no such significant interaction exists. Much of this may owe to research design.

The previous results mainly dealt with the outcome-related hypotheses of H1 through H5. However, as earlier noted, there should also be notable difference between the alliance dependence thesis and poliheuristic theory regarding the conditions under which a compensatory versus a non-compensatory decision processing strategy should dominate. Table J-4<sup>(Appendix J)</sup> presents the ANOVA results for the dependent measure “CSI”. Results for AD (alliance dependence) show that there is no significant difference between a high level of AD and a low level of AD. In neither situation does one particular strategy dominate the decision making process. This result thus goes against the hypothesized expectation of H6. On the other hand, the F-statistic for PL (political loss) suggests that the PL factor may be close to significance, with a p-value of nearly 0.1. It may cautiously be claimed, therefore, that between a high PL and a low PL, there is a greater tendency to choose a non-compensatory decision strategy when there is the potential for a high level of political loss. As shown in Table J-5<sup>(Appendix J)</sup>, the marginal means for PL seem suggestive of this impact of PL across its two different levels. Based on the Consistency/Selectivity Index, a noticeably greater percentage of subjects exhibited a noncompensatory decision strategy (87.5%) when placed in the condition of a high level of political loss, compared to those subjects who were placed in the condition of a low level of political loss. Thus, though inconclusive, there does seem some support, albeit weak, for H7.

**Conclusion**

Overall, when it comes to understanding the choice to participate or not participate in a military coalition, both political loss and alliance dependence seem to find some experimental support in this study. Results of F-tests for analysis of variance on the dependent measure “participation” lend support to both the alliance dependence thesis and the poliheuristic theory. An important way to resolve the equivocal findings would have been through an examination of the interaction between the two factors, alliance dependence and political loss, through the dependent measure “decision” that would have revealed specific policy decision choices on military coalitions (ie. option one, two, three, or four). But in the current study, no significant interaction was found. On the other hand, when it comes to the actual decision making processes, a comparison between alliance dependence thesis and poliheuristic theory suggests that the latter may provide a more accurate understanding of the situations under which a compensatory versus a noncompensatory decision strategy should dominate.

## Notes

1. For simplified analysis, a high level of political loss is assumed to be functionally equivalent to a non-compensatory level of political loss. In this study, this level is represented by a combination of possible electoral threat and oppositional public opinion.

2. It is important to keep in mind that since alliance dependence is, strictly speaking, not a foreign policy decision making model, its implicit processes can only be inferred.

3. A plausible way to further test the various hypotheses of this study, as well as to extend the robustness of the poliheuristic theory is with additional experiments with actual/former Provincial legislative members in Canada. In terms of access, this may be easier with former legislative members.

4. There are different ways of estimating the required minimum sample size (and power), including various statistical software (eg. Statistical Power Analysis, G\*power 4 – Power Computation, and STAT POWER). For the purposes of this study, however, the following standard formula was used:

$$\sigma^2_{\text{effect}} = \frac{(\text{no. obsn}) [\sum (\text{dev.})^2]}{(\text{df}_{\text{effect}} + 1)(\sigma^2_{\text{error}})}$$

where (no. obsn) = the number of observations.

$\sum (\text{dev.})^2$  = the sum of the squared population deviations.

$\text{df}_{\text{effect}}$  = the degree of freedom associated with the treatment effects.

$\sigma^2_{\text{error}}$  = the population error variance (ie. average of group variances)

Hypothesized (or ideal) estimates were used for the following: standard deviation, group variance, and error variance.

5. Within-group designs have well-known merits, including greater number of controls, need for fewer subjects, and greater validity of results due to smaller error variances (Keppel, 1991: 18-9; Keppel, 2004). But such designs also have a common methodological problem: the possibility of “learning” on the part of subject-participants from exposure to previous, albeit different, level of manipulation – thus compromising validity of findings. Thus, for my purposes, a between-group design seems most appropriate.

6. The choice of dimensions to include that would have properly captured “alliance dependence” was constrained by the simple fact of using American citizens, undergraduate or otherwise. As citizens of the world’s sole superpower, it is generally difficult to induce or stimulate a perception of the US as being “dependent” on any other country. Moreover, another dimension, “grand strategy” was dropped from the stimulus for “alliance dependence”. It was feared that the inclusion of such would have made it even more difficult to detect treatment effects and/or necessitated a far larger sample size than feasible.

### Grand strategic dependence:

Among major powers, our country is unrivalled in its ability to pursue its various geo-strategic interests around the world. However, critical to this ability is the existence of forward-stationed military bases and installations throughout the world. Such bases play a supporting role in our grand strategy by allowing for a quick projection of our military power to most parts of the world. Of our country’s many overseas military bases, the three largest and geo-strategically important ones are hosted by Waenland. These three bases currently host nearly 80,000 US soldiers and two

carrier-groups. Since they are irreplaceable, the possible loss of such bases would have a major negative impact on the continued pursuit of our strategic interests around the world. The current lease on all three bases are set to expire very shortly. However, due to budgetary constraints of the on-going economic crisis, our country has not been able to meet the financial obligations necessary for a renewal of the lease on the bases.

7. Scores from 0 to 7 are categorized as compensatory. Scores from 8 to 16 are categorized as noncompensatory. For an illustrated example of the steps involved in the calculation of this value, see Redd (2002: 347-8). Also note: CSIndex mainly counts the number of separate implication/information boxes accessed by a subject per alternative. However, since the subjects in this experiment were allowed to access the same implication/information box more than once, an adjustment had to be made. In light of this, a “double-count” was allowed in some cases. Of the total number of cases, there were a number of such cases. However, regardless of whether or not a double-count was allowed or not allowed, this did not greatly alter the data. The double counting led to code changes (ie. classification as either “compensatory” or “noncompensatory”) in only four cases.

8. To a certain extent, this type of bias, such as expectancy effects and demand characteristics among subjects, can be mitigated through random assignment of experimental condition (McDermott, 2002b; Aronson et al, 1998; Keppel, 1991: 14-15). But the physical removal of the investigator from the laboratory during the experiment may also further eliminate any additional bias.

9. All ANOVA analyses and related significance tests were done using SPSS 17.0. Also, note that since the cell sizes were different, a least-squares means was used in the calculations (Keppel and Wickens, 2004).

10. Note that there is no significant interaction between AD and PL for this dependent measure. Since there was no a priori specified hypothesis regarding the interaction effect between AD and PL on this dependent measure, the lack of a significant interaction on this null finding may not be a problem.



## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

This dissertation was undertaken to answer a simple question: what explains political leaders' participation and burden-sharing decisions on military coalitions? In tackling the question, two distinct lines of research were brought together; the one based on alliances, the other based on foreign policy decision making. Based on the two lines of research, two explanatory frameworks were introduced: alliance dependence thesis and poliheuristic theory.

Based on a reading of the relevant literature and the main explanatory frameworks, a set of hypotheses was derived and tested. A multimethod approach (Mintz, 2005; also Mintz, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003; Maoz et al, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita, 2002; Levy, 1998: 162; Levy, 2001; Elman and Elman, 1997; Schafer, 2003; George and Bennett, 2005: 3-16) was employed utilizing statistical, case study, and experimental methods. The choice of such methods was informed, in part, by a recognition that each method exhibits both strengths and weaknesses regarding scientific inferences. However, when they were integrated and brought together to bear on examining a common research topic, such as the military coalition, the individual strengths were highlighted and weaknesses attenuated by companion methods.

For instance, in investigating cross-national patterns, concomitant with the application of probit models to a relevant data set of public opinion polls, it was found that statistically significant patterns of (non)participation could persuasively be explained by poliheuristic theory, with a supporting role of alliance dependence at critical junctures of the decisionmaking process. This held particularly in illustrating the analytic second stage of decision making, per the poliheuristic theory. In broad terms, therefore, the use of the statistical method allowed development of findings that seem to hold some claim to a wider generalizability, on the topic of (non)participation and burden-sharing in military coalitions. But a problem with the statistical method is that causal inferences are mostly a function of mathematical probabilities and correlations.

Moreover, there can sometimes occur internal validity problems with key concepts, such as “political loss”.

To address these types of problems, an in-depth examination of the Erdogan (Gul-Erdogan) cabinet’s foreign policy decision making vis-à-vis the Bush administration during the Iraq crisis was also undertaken. Drawing from both primary and secondary sources of information, the case study of the Erdogan (Gul-Erdogan) cabinet was driven by a process-tracing method. This method dictated a step-by-step re-counting and interpretation of relevant events, and cross-referenced by the views of key decision makers of the Erdogan (Gul-Erdogan) cabinet at critical time points. Results of the case study showed that the process-tracing method is a particularly illuminating tool for illustrating some of the core assumptions of the poliheuristic theory, including the claim that decision making is largely characterized by a satisficing, non-holistic, non-compensatory, dimension-based, and stage-based process. The study of the Erdogan (Gul-Erdogan) cabinet’s decision making also highlighted the various ways by which non-compensatory political loss can be viewed. In sum, when applied to explaining both the initial decision (February 25) and the final decision (March 18), the poliheuristic theory provided a persuasive account, with a supporting role of the alliance dependence thesis (Bennett et al, 1994). As well, the poliheuristic theory was better able to explain the cabinet’s final policy choice than either expected utility theory (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita, 1984) or cybernetic theory (Ostrom and Job, 1986).

To gain more definitive traction over the causal process, an experiment was also undertaken to put to limited test the two competing explanations for understanding (non)participation and burden-sharing decisions on military coalitions. Indeed, as a complement to the statistical and case study findings, an experiment was expected to yield more convincing evidence as regards the relative causal strength of alliance dependence and non-compensatory political loss. In the event, the results were largely equivocal on the issue of (non)participation: though the poliheuristic theory offered statistically significant explanatory outcome in the first stage of decision making, such as

participation versus non-participation, the lack of interaction with alliance dependence in the second stage compromised causal inferences in the second stage of the poliheuristic decision processing. Much of this had to do with research design issues and less than clear operationalization of the non-compensatory principle. On the issue of decision making process, however, the experiment found some plausible support for the conditions under which non-compensatory decision strategy should prevail, per the poliheuristic theory - though this was measured only indirectly.

Overall, the results of applying the multimethod approach is generally suggestive of the strength of the poliheuristic theory, with a supporting – but critical – role of the alliance dependence thesis, in understanding participation and burden-sharing decisions on military coalitions. Moreover, though in large part the second Iraq War (2003 -) was used as the reference for the statistical and the case study method, an implicit underlying claim of the current research is that the findings may be extended to any broad context wherein the development of a military coalition may be a possibility.

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
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## APPENDIX A

### DECISION-MAKING MODEL

**Figure A-1. Combined Model and Causal Decision Paths**



## APPENDIX B

### GENERAL DATA SOURCES

*Electoral Studies* (2003), Issue No. 22.

Euro Gallup (2003), “International Crisis Survey”, Jan.21/27, 2003.

Countries covered in the survey: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, France, Sweden, U.K., Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Switzerland, and Norway.

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Benoit, Kenneth and Michael Laver, “Party Policy in Modern Democracies: Expert Survey Results from 47 Countries, 2003-2004” (2004).  
([http://www.tcd.ie/Political\\_Science/ppmd](http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/ppmd)).

World Factbook, Washington D. C.: Central Intelligence Agency (2003, 2004)

## **APPENDIX C**

### **DATA SOURCES FOR ALLIANCE DEPENDENCE**

Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Worldwide List of Military Installations”, 1999-2001.

Department of Defense, “Military Personnel Statistics”, 1992-2002.

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID): US Overseas Loans & Grants [Greenbook], 1992-2002.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, 1992-2002.

**APPENDIX D**  
**CROSS-NATIONAL PATTERNS**

**Table D-1. Participation or Non-Participation**

	(PH.H1)			
	<u><b>1999-2001</b></u>		<u><b>1992-2002</b></u>	
	<u><b>P1</b></u>		<u><b>P4</b></u>	
Political Loss	-0.250 *** (0.112)	-0.281 *** (0.122)	-0.232 *** (0.93)	-0.232 *** (0.111)
Ideology (HoG)	0.540 ** (0.263)	0.508 ** (0.253)	0.451 ** (0.226)	0.337 * (0.197)
Unemployment	0.143 (0.160)	0.086 (0.138)	0.193 (0.139)	0.140 (0.124)
Inflation	-0.052 (0.120)	-0.016 (0.076)	-0.030 (0.096)	0.032 (0.098)
Election	0.274 (0.938)	0.282 (0.967)	0.250 (0.904)	0.121 (0.912)
Democracy	0.534 (0.575)	0.376 (0.524)	0.498 (0.527)	0.333 (0.499)
ADEP	0.883 * (0.557)	1.008 * (0.567)	0.195 (1.419)	-0.542 (1.495)
Majority Gov't		-1.427 (2.367)		-0.159 (2.547)
Minority Gov't	3.196 (4.081)		3.071 (3.403)	
Coalition Gov't	0.562 (3.713)		0.466 (2.647)	
LR Chi Square				
p-value of Chi2	22.36	21.36	19.60	17.71
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.0078	0.0062	0.0205	0.0235
p-value of LH	0.5809	0.5549	0.5092	0.4600
<p>* p &lt; 0.10    ** p &lt; 0.05    *** p &lt; 0.01</p> <p>Note: Standard errors in parentheses below estimates. Estimates for PLOSS variable based on one-tailed tests of significance; other variables are based on two-tailed tests.</p> <p>Dependent: Dichotomous (ie. Participation/Non-participation)</p> <p>N= 29</p>				

**Table D-2. Type of Participation or Non-Participation**

	(PH.H3)			
	<u>1999-2001</u>		<u>1992-2002</u>	
	<u>T1</u>		<u>T3</u>	
Political Loss	-0.159 *** (0.056)	-0.131 *** (0.047)	-0.148 *** (0.052)	-0.128 *** (0.046)
Ideology (HoG)	0.179 * (0.109)	0.109 (0.090)	0.106 (0.094)	0.052 (0.080)
Unemployment	0.027 (0.082)	-0.015 (0.074)	0.042 (0.076)	0.006 (0.069)
Inflation	-0.059 (0.038)	-0.054 (0.038)	-0.069 * (0.041)	-0.060 (0.040)
Election	-0.299 (0.755)	-0.605 (0.711)	-0.346 (0.738)	-0.631 (0.697)
Democracy	0.044 (0.364)	-0.127 (0.338)	-0.079 (0.346)	-0.213 (0.328)
ADEP	0.751 * (0.285)	0.656 * (0.266)	0.466 (0.315)	0.338 (0.299)
Majority Gov't		1.475 * (0.893)		1.128 (0.879)
Minority Gov't	-0.431 (1.196)		-0.085 (1.217)	
Coalition Gov't	-1.846 * (0.994)		-1.267 (0.930)	
LR Chi Square	27.84	25.85	22.39	20.76
p-value of Chi2	0.0010	0.0011	0.0077	0.0078
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> p-value of LH	0.3493	0.3243	0.2810	0.2605
<p>* p &lt; 0.10    ** p &lt; 0.05    *** p &lt; 0.01</p> <p>Note: Standard errors in parentheses below estimates. Estimates for PLOSS variable based on one-tailed tests of significance; other variables are based on two-tailed tests.</p> <p>Dependent: Ordinal: Type of Burden-sharing .</p> <p>N= 29</p>				

**Table D-3. Non-Compensatory Model**

	(PH.H2)				
	<b><u>1999-2001</u></b>			<b><u>1992-2002</u></b>	
NC Political Loss	-17.433 ** **	-12.179 **	-16.114	-5.265 ** (2.795)	-4.374 ** (2.180)
Ideology (HoG)	(10.087) 2.604 *	(7.130) 1.893 *	(10.233) 2.358 *	0.802 * (0.478)	0.568 * (0.326)
Unemployment	(1.417) 0.240 *	(1.059) 0.231	(1.405) 0.188	0.246 * (0.140)	0.174 (0.114)
Inflation	(0.153) 0.215	(0.155) 0.016	(0.160) 0.0832	0.026 (0.078)	0.066 (0.092)
Election	(0.177) 0.293	(0.068) 0.099	(0.214) 0.267	-0.150 (0.880)	-0.343 (0.857)
Democracy	(1.117) 2.788 *	(1.022) 2.075 *	(1.132) 2.403 *	1.010 (0.698)	0.708 (0.565)
ADEP	(1.486) 3.440 *	(1.191) 2.397	(1.439) 3.226	0.397 (1.165)	-0.358 (1.177)
Majority Gov't	(2.115) -7.694	(1.540)	(2.131)		-0.880 (2.206)
Minority Gov't	(5.463)			4.071 (4.015)	
Coalition Gov't		1.752 (9.392)		1.768 (2.734)	
			0.646 (2.489)		
LR Chi Square				19.23	17.77
p-value of Chi2	25.89	24.65	24.32	0.0233	0.0231
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.0011 0.6724	0.0018 0.6402	0.0020 0.6318	0.4995	0.4615
<p>* p &lt; 0.10    ** p &lt; 0.05    *** p &lt; 0.01</p> <p>Note: Standard errors in parentheses below estimates. Estimates for NC PLOSS are based on one-tailed test of significance; other variables are based on two-tailed tests.</p> <p>Dependent: Dichotomous (ie. Participation/Non-participation)</p> <p>N= 29</p>					

**Table D-4. Alliance Dependence Scores**

	<u><b>1999-2001</b></u>	<u><b>1992-2002</b></u>
Belgium	-.05623459	-0.4121974
Denmark	- 0.7522184	-0.5153552
Germany	3.620924	3.233591
Greece	-0.0326252	1.258464
Spain	-0.1960236	-0.1917951
Ireland	0.0447576	-0.0972079
Italy	0.2896742	0.0864427
Luxembourg	-0.8503787	-0.582877
Netherlands	-0.220437	-0.2981577
Austria	-0.8688707	-0.5769306
Portugal	-0.6228593	-0.1136437
Finland	-0.5995104	-0.5166467
France	-0.7243115	-0.4770781
Sweden	-0.8238307	-0.5403725
U.K.	1.492435	1.124737
Bulgaria	1.518335	0.0980295
Cyprus	-0.5300915	-0.3669604
Czech Republic	0.0530031	-0.4634993
Estonia	-0.2737082	-0.5398928
Hungary	0.0690978	-0.3779131
Latvia	-0.2884468	-0.5148546
Lithuania	-0.1870446	-0.3320209
Malta	-0.6794709	-0.5848472
Poland	0.7748648	0.2413338
Romania	1.823757	0.162675
Slovakia	-0.0631509	-0.39794
Slovenia	-0.4748717	-0.5589945
Turkey	0.6782268	3.317909
Switzerland	-0.8710744	-0.5773682
Norway	-0.7438055	-0.4866296

Data Sources for Alliance Dependence: See Appendix C.

**Table D-5. Selection Model and Analytic Second Stage**

		<u>1992-2002</u>			<u>1999-2001</u>
		<u>SM1</u>	<u>SM2</u>	<u>SM3</u>	<u>SM4</u>
Level					
	ADEP	0.620 *** (0.128)	0.741 * (0.566)	0.743 * (0.525)	0.250 (0.267)
	Constant	-0.553 ** (0.263)	-0.487 (0.353)	-0.463 (0.361)	-0.562 *** (0.009)
NC					
	ADEP	0.771 (1.121)	0.050 (0.352)	0.173 (0.399)	0.026 (0.484)
	Ideology (HoG)	0.366 ** (0.174)	0.231 * (0.129)	0.262 ** (0.132)	0.032 ** (0.143)
	Unemployment	-0.114 (0.086)	-0.104 (0.104)	-0.170 (0.122)	-0.081 (0.095)
	Inflation	0.041 (0.083)	0.020 (0.065)	0.054 (0.82)	0.039 (0.150)
	Democracy	1.035 (1.060)	0.334 (0.665)	0.445 (0.613)	0.808 (1.037)
	Majority Gov't	-2.521 (2.245)			
	Minority Gov't		-0.194 (0.353)		1.751 (1.496)
	Coalition Gov't			0.173 (0.399)	1.798 ** (0.790)
Likelihood Ratio					

\* p < 0.10    \*\* p < 0.05    \*\*\* p < 0.01

Note: Standard errors in parentheses below estimates. Estimates for Level variable based on one-tailed tests of significance; other variables are based on two-tailed tests.

Dependent : Level

N= 29



**Table D-6. Analytic Stage of PH Theory: Type of Non-Participation**

	<b><u>1999-2001</u></b> (PH.4)	<b><u>1992-2002</u></b> (PH.4)
Level of Alliance Dependence	2.099 *** (0.970)	2.322 * (1.974)
LR Chi Square	6.11	6.79
p-value of Chi2	0.0134	0.0092
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.1946	0.2161
<p>* p &lt; 0.10   ** p &lt; 0.05   *** p &lt; 0.01</p> <p>Note: Standard errors in parentheses below estimates. Estimates for Level of ADEP based on one-tailed test of significance.</p> <p>Ordinal Dependent : Type of Non-participation (no support of any kind, political support, or military support passive)</p> <p>N= 16</p>		

## APPENDIX E

## ERDOGAN CABINET AND POLICY CHOICES

Table E-1. Feb 25 Decision

Option	Poli-domestic (weight=0.15)	Economic (weight: w=0.2)	Political-n.Iraq (weight: w=0.15)	Military (weight: w=0.25)	Strategic (weight: w= 0.25)	Total
1: Continue peaceful sol'n	Baseline: 6 Prob: p= 0.6 score= 3.6 adj score=0.54	Baseline: 1 Prob: p=0.1 Score = 0.1 Adj score=0.02	Baseline: 1 Prob: p=0.1 Score = 0.1 Adj score=0.015 (Copenhagen criteria)	Baseline: 1 Prob: p=0.1 Score = 0.1 Adj score=0.025	Baseline: 1 Prob: p=0.1 Score = 0.1 Adj score=0.025	0.625
2. Wait until UNSC announced.	Baseline: 5 Prob: p= 0.6 score = 3 Adj score= 0.45	Baseline: 2 Prob: 0.1 Score = 0.2 Adj score=0.04	Baseline: 2 Prob:0.1 Score = 0.2 Adj score=0.03	Baseline: 2 Prob:0.1 Score = 0.2 Adj score=0.05	Baseline: 2 Prob:0.1 Score = 0.2 Adj score=0.05	0.62
3. Submit bill for parliamentary approval <i>after</i> signed agreement + free	Baseline: 4 Prob: p= 0.6 score = 2.4 Adj score=0.36	Baseline:6 P=(0.4)(0.6)=0.24 score= 1.44 adj score=0.288	Baseline:6 P=(0.4)(0.6)=0.24 Score=1.44 Adj score=0.216	Baseline: 6 P=(0.4)(0.6)=0.24 Score=1.44 Adj score=0.36	Baseline: 4 P=(0.4)(0.6)=0.24 Score=1.44 Adj score=0.24	1.464
4. Submit bill for parliamentary approval <i>after</i> signed agreement + group	Baseline:2 Prob: p= 0.4 score = 0.8 Adj score= 0.12	Baseline: 5 P=(0.4)(0.6)=0.24 score = 1.2 Adj score= 0.24	Baseline: 5 P=(0.4)(0.6)=0.24 score = 1.2 Adj score= 0.18	Baseline: 5 P=(0.4)(0.6)=0.24 score = 1.2 Adj score=0.3	Baseline: 3 P=(0.4)(0.6)=0.24 score = 0.72 Adj score=0.18	1.02
5. Submit bill for parliamentary approval <i>before</i> signed agreement (ie. continue negotiations) + free	Baseline:3 Prob: p= 0.6 score = 1.8 Adj score=0.27	Baseline: 4 P=0.4 score=1.6 adj score=0.32	Baseline: 4 p=0.4 score=1.6 adj score=0.24	Baseline: 4 p=0.4 score=1.6 adj score=0.4	Baseline: 6 p=0.4 score=2.4 adj score=0.6	1.83
6. Submit bill for parliamentary approval <i>before</i> signed agreement + group	Baseline: 1 Prob: p= 0.4 score = 0.4 Adj score=0.06	Baseline: 3 Prob: p= 0.4 score = 1.2 Adj score= 0.24	Baseline: 3 Prob: p= 0.4 score = 1.2 Adj score=0.18	Baseline: 3 Prob: p= 0.4 score = 1.2 Adj score= 0.3	Baseline: 5 Prob: p= 0.4 score = 2.0 Adj score=0.5	1.28

**Table E-2. March 18 Decision**

Option	Poli-domestic (weight=0.15)	Economic (weight: w=0.2)	Political-n.Iraq (weight: w=0.15)	Military (weight: w=0.25)	Strategic (weight: w= 0.25)	Total
1. Resubmit original bill	Baseline: 1 Prob: p= 0.4 score= 0.4 adj score=0.06	Baseline: 4 Prob: p= 0.4 score= 1.6 adj score=0.32	Baseline: 4 Prob: p= 0.4 score= 1.6 adj score=0.24	Baseline: 4 Prob: p= 0.4 score= 1.6 adj score=0.4	Baseline: 5 Prob: p= 0.4 score= 2.0 adj score=0.5	1.52
2. Resubmit with complete agreement	Baseline: 2 Prob: p= 0.4 score= 0.8 adj score=0.12	Baseline: 5 Prob: p= 0.4 score= 2.0 adj score= 0.4	Baseline: 5 Prob: p= 0.4 score= 2.0 adj score= 0.3	Baseline: 5 Prob: p= 0.4 score= 2.0 adj score= 0.5	Baseline: 4 Prob: p= 0.4 score= 1.6 adj score= 0.4	1.72
3. Submit modified bill.	Baseline: 3 Prob: p= 0.4 score= 1.2 adj score= 0.18	Baseline: 3 Prob: p= 0.4 score= 1.2 adj score= 0.24	Baseline: 3 Prob: p= 0.4 score= 1.2 adj score= 0.18	Baseline: 3 Prob: p= 0.4 score= 1.2 adj score= 0.3	Baseline: 3 Prob: p= 0.4 score= 1.2 adj score= 0.3	1.2
4. Submit a bill only for airspace access.	Baseline: 4 Prob: p= 0.6 score= 2.4 adj score= 0.36	Baseline: 2 Prob: p= 0.6 score= 1.2 adj score= 0.24	Baseline: 2 Prob: p= 0.6 score= 1.2 adj score= 0.18	Baseline: 2 Prob: p= 0.6 score= 1.2 adj score= 0.3	Baseline: 2 Prob: p= 0.6 score= 1.2 adj score= 0.3	1.38
5. Wait for UNSC resolution (ie. let stand Mar 1 vote , do nothing)	Baseline: 5 Prob: p= 0.6 score= 3.0 adj score= 0.45	Baseline: 1 Prob: p= 0.4 score= 0.4 adj score= 0.08	Baseline: 1 Prob: p= 0.4 score= 0.4 adj score= 0.06	Baseline: 1 Prob: p= 0.4 score= 0.4 adj score= 0.1	Baseline: 1 Prob: p= 0.4 score= 0.4 adj score= 0.1	0.79

**Figure E-1. Decision Flow Chart**

Initial Phase (run-up to March 1 parliamentary vote):

Oppositional public opinion → Preferences of AKP deputies → Decision Rule → Policy Decision (Feb25)  
 (Opposed to land access) (Internal division) (Group vote is NC) (Submit bill for land  
 access + allow free vote)

Latter Phase (run-up to Mar 21 parliamentary vote):

Oppositional public opinion → Preferences of AKP deputies → Decision Rule → Policy Decision (Mar 18)  
 (1. Opposed to land access) (Internal division) (Land access is NC) (Submit bill for  
 (2. Opposed to air space access) airspace access only)

Note: The Erdogan cabinet's Iraq crisis can be broken down into two phases.  
 The first phase ran from mid-December 2002 to March 1, 2003.  
 The second phase ran from March 1, 2003 to March 21, 2003.  
 Note: "NC" indicates non-compensatory.

**APPENDIX F**

**POLIHEURISTIC THEORY AND MILITARY COALITION: AN EXPERIMENT**

**Table F-1. Four Conditions**

Political Loss	Alliance Dependence	
<u>Non-compensatory</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>
	A	B
	<u>Low</u>	
	C	D

**Figure F-1. Decision Board 4.0**

Hypothetical scenario

	Option 1	Option 2	Option 3	Option 4
Dimension 1	Implication	Implication	Implication	Implication
Dimension 2	Implication	Implication	Implication	Implication
Dimension 3	Implication	Implication	Implication	Implication
Dimension 4	Implication	Implication	Implication	Implication
Dimension 5	Implication	Implication	Implication	Implication
Final Choice	0	0	0	0

## APPENDIX G

### SCENARIOS FOR EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS

#### Baseline Scenario (i.e. condition A)

Our nation is currently faced with a foreign policy crisis. Our country has recently been asked by the diplomatic representatives of Waenland to join in an immediate military action in Vanutia. Vanutia is a large country located in the South Pacific and has little economic or military ties to our country.

According to the diplomatic representatives of Waenland, the target country, Vanutia, is currently experiencing a civil war between the Saavli-dominated government forces and Kinu-dominated rebel forces. Both the Saavli and the Kinu represent the two main ethnic groups in Vanutia.

Though the conflict had been simmering for some time, reports indicate that in recent weeks, the conflict has become noticeably more violent. There are reports of massive and indiscriminate killings on both sides. Further, since both sides of the conflict have ethnic brethren in nearby countries, the conflict has the real potential to spread and create instability in the region. Moreover, according to Waenland, since both sides of the conflict are heavily armed, only a large military ground operation will be able to subdue both sides of the ethnic conflict.

However, the Saavli-led government of Vanutia has made clear indications that any “outsider” intervention will be resisted. Despite this threat, Waenland has made urgent requests for 50,000 combat troops. If that is not possible, Waenland will accept a contribution of military resources and/or various types of support units from our country. It is not certain whether Waenland has made requests for participation from any other country.

Our country must choose one of the following set of policy options: (A) contribute combat troops to the military operation, (B) contribute military resources (eg. naval crafts, fighter planes, etc.) and/or support units (eg. engineers, medical teams, chemical and/or biological teams) to the military operation, (C) grant permission for use of our country’s airspace, air bases, and/or sea ports to the military operation or (D) do nothing. Options A and B are different types of participation. Options C and D are different types of non-participation. Each policy option requires an equal amount of time to implement. However, each policy option entails a different set of implications in the areas of domestic politics, energy, finance, and military technology. Each policy option also entails varying levels of cost to our country in terms of national resources.

Though leaning towards making a positive response to Waenland’s request (ie. choose either option A or option B), our leader is wavering and still uncertain. Thus, under an executive order, the leader of our country has quickly established a consortium of our country’s most innovative foreign policy think tanks. They have been tasked in an advisory role in the formulation of the appropriate response to Waenland’s request. As an individual of a select group of the informed and educated public, you have been asked to participate as a visiting (temporary) member in one such foreign policy think tank. As a visiting member, your duties and responsibilities are limited. However, your opinion on the appropriate policy response to Waenland is no less important. A carefully thought out and timely opinion on this crisis issue may lead to more opportunities for you within the think tank.

As you consider the various policy options, you must keep in mind that, as typical of leaders in a democracy, the leader of our country is concerned foremost with maintaining his/her political position. Your suggested policy choice will have either negative or positive impact on this long-term goal of our country's leader.

[I] As a first term president, our country's current leader wishes to be re-elected for another term. The presidential election is set to take place in less than four weeks. But, given the leader's vacillation over the crisis, a re-election is not at all certain. With respect to the general sentiment of the public, for instance, two organizations, Gallup International and Reuters/AP, conducted the most recent round of national opinion polls. The results suggest that at the national level, public support for our country's active participation in a military operation (ie. sending of combat troops, contributing military resources, and/or support units) against Vanutia is less than 20 percent. Moreover, the same polls also suggest that a significant majority of the national public (more than 70%) is against participation (eg. Option 1 [ie. combat troops] or Option 2 [ie. military resources and/or support units]) in the military operation. This opposition to participation is even more pronounced in a majority of the key "swing" states. In fact, in such key states, the public's opposition to participation is nearly 75%. Further, such states have traditionally had a disproportionately high amount of impact in deciding the outcome of presidential elections. Recent news reports have also highlighted widespread anti-operation demonstrations in such key states, and throughout other parts of our country. News reports indicate that much of the public's opposition to participation is grounded in a fear of foreign entanglements in the absence of any perceived national interests in such a military operation

Against this domestic political backdrop, two things must be considered. First, the diplomatic representatives of Waenland require an immediate response to their request. And second, the relations between our country and Waenland must also be taken into account.

As the world's sole superpower, our country is dominant in most aspects of our relationship with other countries. [II] However, in certain key areas, such as energy, finance, and military technology, this situation is less so.

For instance, compared to most other countries, our country is relatively blessed with many natural resources (eg. coal, oil, natural gas) that help to fuel our economy. However, when it comes to oil, the single most important energy source, [III] our country meets approximately 35% of its annual needs via imports from Waenland. A disruption in the supply of such would therefore cause major difficulties to the growth of our economy.

As well, in terms of absolute size (eg. GDP), our country still represents the world's biggest economy. [IV] But, for over two decades now, our country has also been a net debtor nation. In recent year, this situation has only worsened. Moreover, of our country's current total outstanding sovereign debt, approximately 40% is held by Waenland, mostly in the form of Treasury Bonds. This is by far the greatest amount of our debt held by any single foreign country. Without Waenland's willingness to continue to purchase our country's Treasury Bonds, it will be very difficult to finance our attempts at economic recovery and overcome our country's current economic crisis.

Also, as the world's sole superpower, our military strength is unrivalled. However, the maintenance of our military dominance requires continual investment in research and development. The need for such investment holds especially so regarding the next generation of fighter planes, tanks, and surface warships. [V] However, due to budgetary constraints of the on-going financial crisis and a need to defray the substantial costs involved, our country has recently entered into key joint development projects with Waenland in all three areas. In return for sharing the research, Waenland has agreed to shoulder approximately 60% of all costs associated with the development of next generation fighter planes, tanks, and warships. A refusal by Waenland to continue its joint development projects would pose a serious

problem for our military-technological interests.

Given these factors, what is your suggested policy option for our country's leader?

#### Relevant Changes in Various Scenarios

In condition B, the shaded section were substituted by the following:

[II] This holds true in the areas of energy, finance, and military technology.

[III] our country meets approximately 10% of its annual needs via imports from Waenland. A disruption in the supply of such, however, would pose only minor problems for our economy.

[IV] Moreover, though our country does have a sizeable amount of sovereign debt, only 10% is held by Waenland., mostly in the form of Treasury Bonds. Should Waenland refuse to continue its purchase our country's Treasury Bonds, this will have only minimal impact on our sovereign debt and financial situation.

[V] However, our country has recently entered into key joint development projects with Waenland in all three areas. In return for sharing the research, Waenland has agreed to shoulder approximately 10% of all costs associated with the development of next generation fighter planes, tanks, and warships. However, a refusal by Waenland to continue its joint development projects would not pose a serious problem for our military-technological interests.

In condition C, the shaded section were substituted by the following:

[I] As a first term president, our country's current leader wishes to be re-elected for another term. The presidential election is set to take place in less than four weeks. Two organizations, Gallup International and Reuters/AP, conducted the most recent round of national opinion polls. The results suggest that at the national level, public support for our country's active participation in a military operation (ie. sending of combat troops, contributing military resources, and/or support troops) against Vanutia is mixed. The same polls suggest that while about 30 percent of the public express support for such action, about the same percentage of the public, or 30 percent, do not support such action, and 40 percent of the public have no opinion on the issue.

In condition D, the shaded section were substituted by the following:

[I] As a first term president, our country's current leader wishes to be re-elected for another term. The presidential election is set to take place in less than four weeks. Two organizations, Gallup International and Reuters/AP, conducted the most recent round of national opinion polls. The results suggest that at the national level, public support for our country's active participation in a military operation (ie. sending of combat troops, contributing military resources, and/or support troops) against Vanutia mixed. The same polls suggest that while about 30 percent of the public express support for such action, about the same percentage of the public, or 30 percent, do not support such action, and 40 percent of the public have no opinion on the issue.

[II] This holds true in the areas of energy, finance, and military technology.

[III] our country meets approximately 10% of its annual needs via imports from Waenland. A disruption in the supply of such, however, would pose only minor problems for our economy.

[IV] Moreover, though our country does have a sizeable amount of sovereign debt, only 10% is held by Waenland., mostly in the form of Treasury Bonds. Should Waenland refuse to continue its purchase our country's Treasury Bonds, this will have only minimal impact on our sovereign debt and financial situation.

[V] However, our country has recently entered into key joint development projects with Waenland in all three areas. In return for sharing the research, Waenland has agreed to shoulder approximately 10% of all costs associated with the development of next generation fighter planes, tanks, and warships. However, a refusal by Waenland to continue its joint development projects would not pose a serious problem for our military-technological interests



## APPENDIX H

### DECISION MATRIX AND IMPLICATIONS

	Contribute combat troops to the military operation.	Contribute military resources (eg. naval crafts, fighter planes, etc.) and/or support units (eg. engineers, medical teams, chemical and/or biological teams).	Grant permission for use of our country's airspace, air bases, and/or sea ports to the military operation.	Do nothing.
Domestic Political	If the majority of the public is opposed to participation, this option will pose a threat to the continued political position of our country's leader.	If the majority of the public is opposed to participation, this option will pose a threat to the continued political position of our country's leader.	This option will not pose a threat to the domestic political position of our country's leader.	This option will not pose a threat to the domestic political position of our country's leader.
Energy	This option will have the most positive impact on Waenland's willingness to continue to supply our country with its oil. In terms of cost, this option will be the most costly.	This option will have some positive impact on Waenland's willingness to continue to supply our country with its oil. In terms of cost, this option will be somewhat costly.	This option will have some negative impact on Waenland's willingness to continue to supply our country with its oil. In terms of cost, this option will be less costly.	This option will have the most negative impact on Waenland's willingness to continue to supply our country with its oil. In terms of cost, this option will be the least costly.
Finance	This option will have the most positive impact on Waenland's willingness to continue to buy our Treasury Bonds and to finance our debt. In terms of cost, this option will be the most costly.	This option will have some positive impact on Waenland's willingness to continue to buy our Treasury Bonds and to continue to finance our debt. In terms of cost, this option will be somewhat costly.	This option will have some negative impact on Waenland's willingness to continue to buy our Treasury Bonds and to continue to finance our debt. In terms of cost, this option will be less costly.	This option will have the most negative impact on Waenland's willingness to continue to buy our Treasury Bonds and to continue to finance our debt. In terms of cost, this option will be the least costly.
Military technology	This option will have the most positive impact on Waenland's willingness to continue with its joint military development projects with our country. In terms of cost, this option will be the most costly.	This option will have some positive impact on Waenland's willingness to continue with its joint military development projects with our country. In terms of cost, this option will be somewhat costly.	This option will have some negative impact on Waenland's willingness to continue with its joint military development projects with our country. In terms of cost, this option will be less costly.	This option will have the most negative impact on Waenland's willingness to continue with its joint military development projects with our country. In terms of cost, this option will be the least costly.

## APPENDIX I

### POST-EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE

#1. How important is our country's dependence on Waenland?

Indicate the level of importance by circling the appropriate number. Higher numbers indicate higher levels of importance.

Not important		Very Important
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; padding: 0 10px;"> <span>0</span><span>1</span><span>2</span><span>3</span><span>4</span><span>5</span><span>6</span><span>7</span><span>8</span><span>9</span><span>10</span> </div>		

#2. How strong is our country's dependence on Waenland?

Indicate the level of strength by circling the appropriate number. Higher numbers indicate higher levels of strength.

Not Strong		Very Strong
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; padding: 0 10px;"> <span>0</span><span>1</span><span>2</span><span>3</span><span>4</span><span>5</span><span>6</span><span>7</span><span>8</span><span>9</span><span>10</span> </div>		

#3. How threatening is the country of Vanutia?

Indicate the level of threat by circling the appropriate number. Higher numbers indicate higher levels of threat.

Not threatening		Very Threatening
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; padding: 0 10px;"> <span>0</span><span>1</span><span>2</span><span>3</span><span>4</span><span>5</span><span>6</span><span>7</span><span>8</span><span>9</span><span>10</span> </div>		

#4. How supportive is the public for any participation in military action against Vanutia?

Indicate level of public support by circling the appropriate number. Higher numbers indicate higher levels of public support.

Not Supportive		Very Supportive
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; padding: 0 10px;"> <span>0</span><span>1</span><span>2</span><span>3</span><span>4</span><span>5</span><span>6</span><span>7</span><span>8</span><span>9</span><span>10</span> </div>		

#5. How threatened was the political position of our country's leader?

Indicate the level of threat by circling the appropriate number. Higher numbers indicate higher levels of threat.

Not threatened

Very Threatened

0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10

\_\_\_\_\_ End of Survey \_\_\_\_\_

**APPENDIX J**  
**POST-EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE**

**Table J-1. Effects of Alliance Dependence and Political Loss on Participation**

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: Participation

Source	Type II Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared	Observed Power <sup>b</sup>
Corrected Model	3.992 <sup>a</sup>	3	1.331	6.613	.001	.234	.965
Intercept	13.928	1	13.928	69.210	.000	.516	1.000
Pl	2.872	1	2.872	14.271	.000	.180	.961
Ad	1.852	1	1.852	9.203	.003	.124	.848
pl * ad	.004	1	.004	.019	.890	.000	.052
Error	13.080	65	.201				
Total	31.000	69					
Corrected Total	17.072	68					

**Table J-2. Tabulated Cell and Marginal Means**

	<u>High AD</u>	<u>Low AD</u>	Marginal means of PL	
High PL	<u>Scenario ID: 3129</u> Option 1: 12% (2) Option 2: 19% (3) <u>Option 3: 56% (9)</u> Option 4: 12% (2)  Participate: 31% Not participate: 68%  Total participants: 16	<u>Scenario ID: 3130</u> Option 1: 0 % Option 2: 0 % Option 3: 75% (6) <u>Option 4: 25% (2)</u>  Participate: 0 Not participate: 100  Total participants: 8	Avg: 6% Avg: 9.5% Avg: 65.5% Avg: 18.5%  Avg: 15.5% Avg: 84%	
<u>Low PL</u>	<u>Option 1: 19% (4)</u> Option 2: 57% (12) Option 3: 19% (4) Option 4: 5% (1)  Participate: 76% Not participate: 24%  Total participants: 21	Option 1: 12% (3) Option 2: 29% (7) Option 3: 42% (10) Option 4: 17% (4)  Participate: 41% Not participate: 59%  Total participants: 24	Avg: 15.5% Avg: 43 % Avg: 30.5% Avg: 11%  Avg: 58.5 % Avg: 41.5 %	
Marginal Means of AD	Avg: 15.5% Avg: 38 % Avg: 37.5 % Avg: 8.5%  Avg: 53.5% Avg: 46 %	Avg: 6% Avg: 14.5% Avg: 58.5% Avg: 21 %  Avg: 20.5 % Avg: 79.5 %		

**Table J-3. Effects of Alliance Dependence and Political Loss on Decision**

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: Decision

Source	Type II Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared	Observed Power <sup>b</sup>
Corrected Model	8.700 <sup>a</sup>	3	2.900	4.248	.008	.164	.840
Intercept	448.928	1	448.928	657.628	.000	.910	1.000
Ad	4.827	1	4.827	7.071	.010	.098	.745
Pl	5.525	1	5.525	8.094	.006	.111	.800
ad * pl	.004	1	.004	.006	.940	.000	.051
Error	44.372	65	.683				
Total	502.000	69					
Corrected Total	53.072	68					

a. R Squared = .164 (Adjusted R Squared = .125)

b. Computed using alpha = .05

**Table J-4. Effects of Alliance Dependence and Political Loss on Compensatory vs Noncompensatory Decision Processing**

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable:CSI

Source	Type II Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	.768 <sup>a</sup>	3	.256	1.280	.289	.056
Intercept	36.232	1	36.232	181.159	.000	.736
Ad	.108	1	.108	.538	.466	.008
Pl	.504	1	.504	2.520	.117	.037
ad * pl	.226	1	.226	1.129	.292	.017
Error	13.000	65	.200			
Total	50.000	69				
Corrected Total	13.768	68				

a. R Squared = .056 (Adjusted R Squared = .012)

b. Computed using alpha = .10

**Table J-5. Compensatory vs Noncompensatory Decision Processing**

	<u>High AD</u>	<u>Low AD</u>	Marginal means of PL
High PL	Compensatory: 43.8% Noncompensatory: 75%	Compensatory: 0 % Noncompensatory: 100 %	Avg: 21.9% Avg: 87.5%
<u>Low PL</u>	Compensatory: 38% Noncompensatory: 62%	Compensatory: 33% Noncompensatory: 67%	Avg: 35.5% Avg: 64.5%
Marginal Means of AD	Avg: 40.9% Avg: 68.5%	Avg: 16.5% Avg: 83.5%	Avg: Avg:

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